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ME COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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38683-2011
KYLE ATHAY,
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Appealed from the DIstrict Court of the SIXTH
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CRAIG R. JORGENSEN,
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent,

ALAN JOHNSTON, PETER STIRBA
Attorneys For Defendant/Appe"ant
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)
)
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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Plaintiff-Respondent,
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Defendant-Appellant,
and
DALE M. STACY; CHAD L. LUD\VIG;
GREGG ATHAY; BRENT R. BlTh~;
BEAR LAKE COUNTY, IDAHO,
Defendants.

CLERK'S LIMITED RECORD ON APPEAL
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HONORABLE MITCHELL W. BRO\VN
Sixth District Judge

CRAIG R. JORGENSEN
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 4904
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Counsel for PlaintifflRespondent

ALiL~ JOHNSTON
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949

Resident Counsel for Defendant!Appellant

PETER STIRBA
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810
Non-Resident Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
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DISTRiCT COURT
SiXTH JUDIC!AL COURT
~~EAR LAKE COUNTY IDAHO
~_ dLo I ~_D.-.;I0=--_ __
ATE
TiME
CLERK
IN THE DISTRlCT COlJRT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCI:Of TII_t:1E-----

CASE NO.

Utt-'U I Y

STATE OF IDAHO, IN •.c\."N"D FOR

KYLEATHAY,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)

-vs-

)

RICH COUNTY, UTAH,

)
)
)

Defendant.

COu"NTY OF BEAR LAKE

Case No. CV -2002-000072

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

)
th

The above entitled matter came before this Court on the 13 day of July, 2010, for
a Jury Trial.

The Plaintiff appeared by and tb.rough counsel, Craig Jorgensen.

The

Defendants appeared by and through counsel, Peter Stirba, Alan Johnston, and Kathleen
Abke.
At 9:02 a.m. Court convened. The Court introduced the case, court persoILT1el,
and counsel to the prospective jury panel.
The deputy clerk took role of the jury panel. The following jurors were called,
sworn and seated:
1. Valerie Tims
2. Andrew Mogolich
3. Jennifer Attebery
4. Ann Hysell
5. Tonique Wartenbe
6. Courtney Syndergaard
7. Robert Rudder
8. Chris Hammond
9. Bonnie Michaelson
10. Rachel Rowan-Arnold
11. Jacquelyn Lucero
12. Cheryl Shuler
Minute Entry and Order
CV -2002-000072
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13. Hal Waldram
14. Adam Valenty
15. Melissa Dopp
16. Nicole Hanse
17. Ryan Russom
18. Larry Bybee
19. Amy Montoya
20. Cheri Nichols
21. Michael Skerritt
22. Chelneca Perry
23. Erik Hillary
24. Pamela Petty

Larry Bybee was excused for cause and Ronald Henderson was called to fill the
vacancy. Bonnie Michaelson was excused for cause and Ryan Miller was called to fill the
vacancy. Erik Hillary was excused for cause and Wendy Sha"wver was called to fill the
vacancy. Rachel Rowan Arnold was excused for cause and Paul Petersen was called to
fill the vacancy. Tonique Wartenbe was excused for cause and Li Dunker was called to
fill the vacancy. Li Dunker was excused for cause and Christina Degn was called to fill
t..fJ.e vacancy. Chris Hammond was excused for cause and Kristy Reading was called to fill
the vacancy. Paul Peterson was excused for cause and David Szelmeczka was called to
fill the vacancy. Rvan
. Russon was excused for cause and Karl Taft was called to fill the
,;

vacancy. Karl Taft was excused for cause and Lila Palmer was called to fill the vacancy.
Lila Palmer was excused for cause and Brooke Girse was called to fill the vacancy.
Brooke Girse was excused for cause and Justin Hoskins called to fill the vacancy. The
Court passed the panel to Plaintiffs attorney, Craig Jorgensen, to conduct voir dire.
During Plaintiffs questioning, Pamela Petty was excused and Amy Bums was called to
fill the vacancy. Mr. Jorgensen passed the panel for cause. Defendant's counsel Mr.
Stirba questioned the panel. The Court took a brief recess in chambers on the record. Mr.
Stirba moved to remove Valerie Tims for cause, the Court granted to motion without
objection from Mr. Jorgensen. Additionally Mr. Stirba moved to remove juror Ronald
Henderson for cause, and the Court denied the motion. Mr. Stirba passed the balance of
the panel for cause.

Upon reconvening, the Clerk called Elizabeth Morris to fill the

vacancy on the panel. The Court and counsel each briefly questioned Ms. Morris.
The panel was passed for cause. Counsel each exercised their peremptory
challenges. The following jurors were called to try this matter and administered an oath:
Minute Entry and Order
CV -2002-000072
Page 2

1. Elizabeth Morris
2. Andrew Mogolich
3. Jennifer Attebury
4. Ann Hysell
5. Amy Burns
6. Wendy Shawver
7. Michael'Skerritt

8. Kristy Reading
9. Nicole Hansen
1O. David Scelmeczka
11. Jacquelyn Lucero
12. Cheryl Shuler
13. Hal Waldram
14. Cheri Nichols

The Court read jury instructions 1 through 10. The Court took a lunch recess at

1:00 p.m. and reconvened at 1:44 p.m. Mr. Jorgensen presented opening statements. Mr.
Stirba presented opening statements.

Mr. Jorgensen called his first 'witness, W. D. Jones who was administered an oath
and testified. Mr. Jorgensen conducted direct examination. Mr. Stirba cross examined the
'V\1tness. During the course of cross exa...rnination, Defendant's exhibits #218-1 through
218-7 were offered and admitted without objection.

The witness was excused. The

Court admonished the jurors and released them for the day at 3 :40 p.m. After brief
discussion with cOlLllsel the Court adjourned for the day at 3 :46 p.m.
At 9:50 a.m., Wednesday, July 14,2010, Court reconvened. Counsel waived roll
call of the jury. At the outset, the Court talked with the jury about scheduling issues.
Plaintift'" s counsel then called his next witness, Justin Hartley who was administered an
oath and testified. :Mr. Jorgensen conducted direct exam of the witness. Mr. Stirba cross
examined the witness. Brief re-direct and re-cross were conducted and the witness was
excused.
Blair Keetch was then called, administered an oath and testified. Testimony was
given and the witness was excused. Plaintiff then called Katrina Humpherys Jacobs who
was administered an oath and testified. Direct and cross examination were conducted and
the witness was excused.
Minute Entry and Order
CV-2002-0000n
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PurSUfu"lt to stipulation of the parties, Defense COlL'lsel then called a witness out of
order, Joe Greenlief.

Portions of this witness' deposition were read to the jury as

testimony due to the passing of Mr. Greenlief prior to trial. Mr. Stirba read questions
from the deposition as direct examination, with attorney Alan Johnston having been
sworn to read the a..'1swers ofthe witness. The Court took a brief recess at 1100 a.m.
Upon reconvening, Mr. Jorgensen read additional questions from the deposition
as cross eXfu'TIination, again with Mr. Johnston reading fu"'1SWers. The Court briefly
excused the jury at 11 :30 a.m. to hear argument from counsel pursuant to a foundational
objection to the reading of certain portions of the deposition. The jury was returned to
Court at 11 :43 and Mr. Jorgensen reading continued.
Mr. Stirba then called an additional witness out of order, being Katrina

Humpherys Jacobs, who was reminded she was still under oath. Mr. Stirba conducted
direct examination of the witness. Mr. Jorgensen cross examined and the witness was
excused.
The Court recessed for the day at 12:00 p.m. due to a scheduling conflict with
witnesses for the Plaintiff, no other witness being available until tomorrow morning.
Trial reconvened at 9:00 a.m. Thursday, July 15,2010, outside the presence of the
Jury.

Mr. Stirba made a motion to the Court for the removal of juror #10, David

Scelmeczka. The Court heard argw'TIent from both sides as to the motion and GRANTED
the motion. The juror was brought into chambers, where the Court informed him of the
motion and decision to remove him from the panel.
Upon returning to the Courtroom, the jury was brought in at 9:26 a.m. with the
Court informing them of the removal of juror # 10 and instructing them further about their

; Entry and Order
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duties as jurors. Trial testimony resumed with Mr. Jorgensen calling his next witness,
Greg Athay who was admipistered an oath and testified. Mr. Jorgensen conducted direct
examination of the 'witness. Cross exam was conducted by Mr. Stirba. Defenda.'t1t's
Exhibit #227 was offered and admitted by stipulation. The Court took a brief recess at
10:37 a.m.
Upon reconvening, cross examination concluded and re-direct commenced. At the
conclusion of the redirect, Mr. Stirba requested he be able to call a.Tlother V\ri.tness out of
order. Without objection, Mr. Stirba called Greg Athay, who remained in the witness
stand, and was now questioned by !\11'. Striba on direct examination. Defendant's Exhibit
#227 was offered and admitted without objection. Video Exhibit #209 was played for the
jury. Mr. Jorgensen cross examined the witness. During cross, the Court took a recess to
research a hearsay objection. Upon reconvening outside the presence of the jury, the
Court ruled the information was hearsay and the objection was sustained.
The jury was returned to Court at 11 :56 am and roll call was waived. Brief
questioning on re-direct and re-cross and the witness was excused. The Court recessed
for lunch at 12:01 p.m.
Testimony commenced at 12:39 p.m. with Plaintiff calling his next witness, Deby
Ebom, who was administered an oath and testified. Plaintiff's Exhibit #154 was offered
and admitted without objection through the course of Ms. Ebom's testimony. Plaintiff's
next witness, Royce Phelps was called, administered an oath and testified.

Brief

examination of the witness was conducted by both sides and the witness was excused.
Plaintiff then called Dale Stacey, who was administered an oath and testified.
The Court recessed at 1:45 p.m. briefly. When the Court reconvened at 2:02 p.m., direct

Minute Entry and Order
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examination continued. Plaintiff's Exhibits #101,102 ruld 117 were offered and admitted
without objection. Direct examination of the witness concluded.
The jury was excused for the day at 3 :26 p.m. The Court remained on the record
with counsel to discuss the upcoming witnesses scheduled and to hear argument on
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider. After discussion with Counsel, the Court recessed for
the day at 3:45 p.m. to reconvene at 8:00 a.m. with the argument on the pending motion.
Argument began at 8:02 a.m. on Friday, July 16, 2010, y\rith J\1r. Stirba presenting
his Motion to Reconsider concerning Doctor Jeffrey Rosenbluth's testimony.

After

hearing from cOll.l1sel, the Court DENIED the Motion to Reconsider. Discussion as to
witness order was held, and the Court recessed at 8:37a.m.
The jury returned to the Court at 8:58 a.m. and trial testimony resumed. Mr.
Stirba conducted cross examination of Dale Stacey, who was reminded he was stilllmder
oath.

Defendant's Exhibit #228 was offered and admitted without objection. Mr.

Jorgensen redirected, and additional cross was held as well. Upon excusing the witness,
the Court took a brief recess at 9:54 a.m.
The Court reconvened at 10:03 a.m. with Plaintiff calling as his next witness Dr.
Jeffery Rosenbluth who was administered an oath and testified. During his testimony,
Defendant's Exhibits #224-1,224-2,224-3, 224-4, and 224-9 were offered and admitted
without objection. Examination of the witness concluded and the Jury was excused for
the weekend at 10:48 a.m. Counsel and the Court held brief discussion as to Monday's
schedule, and then recessed for the day at 10:51 a.m.
Trial reconvened outside the presence of the jury at 8:40 a.m. Monday, July 19,
2010. Plaintiffs counsel informed the Court he intended to recall Doctor Rosenbluth by

Minute Entry and Order
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telephone to ask one additional question. Counsel for the Defendant objected to the
recalling of the \\'itness, and the Court heard argument as to that issue. After a short
recess, the Court ruled he would allow the telephonic recalling of the doctor. The

jUt}

returned to Court at 9:40 a.m. with Dr. Rosenbluth on the phone. The Court reminded
him he was still under oath. Mr. Jorgensen completed direct examination, and there
being no cross examination conducted, Dr. Rosenbluth was excused.
The Plaintiff then called its next witness, Daryl Ervin, Jr. who was administered
fu'1 oath and testified. Mr. Jorgensen conducted direct examination of the V\itness. Upon
cross examination the Court briefly excused the jury and then reconvened fu'1d concluded
cross exam. Brief redirect was conducted and the witness was excused.
Plaintiff's next witness was called, Helen Woodard, who was administered an
oath and testified. Plaintiff's Exhibit #138 was offered and admitted without objection.
Exhibit #137 was offered by Mr. Jorgensen and objected to by Mr. Stirba. The Court
excused the jury as to hear argument on the exhibits admissibility. The Court heard
argument and ruled the exhibit would be admitted over objection. The jury returned to
Court and roll call was waived, direct examination continued. The Court recessed for
lu.llch at 12:14 p.m.
Testimony reconvened at 12:55 p.m. with cross examination of Helen Woodard
by Mr. Stirba.

Upon conclusion of cross examination the witness was excused and

Jerome Sherman was called, administered an oath and testified. Mr. Jorgensen conducted
direct examination of the witness. Plaintiff's Exhibit #144 was offered and admitted
without objection. Mr. Stirba cross examined the witness and the witness was excused.
Plaintiff then called Austin Athay and Shanelle Athay, Plaintiff's children. Mr.

Minute Entry and Order
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Jorgensen briefly questioned them on direct, fu'1d no cross examination was conducted by
Defendant. The Plaintiff was then called to the vvitness stand, administered fuT} oath and
testified. Mr. Jorgensen questioned the 'witness on direct exam. The Court adjourned for
the day at 3:35 p.m.
Trial testimony resw'TIed at 9:11 a.m. on Tuesday, July 20, 2010. Kyle Athay
resumed the v.ritness stand and was reminded he was still under oath. Mr. Jorgensen
continued with direct examination of the witness. Plaintiffs Exhibits #124, 125, 126,
128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, and 135 were offered and admitted without objection
during direct examination. Mr. Stirba then conducted cross examination of the Plaintiff.
Exhibit #229 was marked and offered. Mr. Jorgensen objected to the exhibit, and the jury
was excused for the Court to hear argument.
Upon jury returning to courtroom, Defendant's Exhibit #229 was admitted over
objection for impeachment purposes only, and cross examination continued. The Court
heard additional argument outside the presence of the jury several times throughout the
course of cross examination. Redirect and re-cross were conducted and the v.ritness was
excused. The Court took its morning recess at 10:48 a.m.
Court reconvened outside the presence of the jury. Mr. Jorgensen informed the
Court the Plaintiff was resting. Defendant's counsel then made an oral Motion for
Directed Verdict which the Court heard argument on, and DENIED. The Court then
allowed Mr. Stirba to place an offer of proof on the record as to cross examination of
Kyle Athay he was prevented from conducting due to the Court's rulings.
The jury was returned to Court and roll call was waived. Defense counsel called
his first witness, Catherine Hinck, who was administered an oath and testified. Mr. Stirba

Minute Entry and Order
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conducted direct examination. Defendant's EX11ibits #202 and 203 were offered and
admitted V\rithout objection, and the same were played for the jury. Additionally

Exhibit

#201 was offered and admitted without objection. Mr. Jorgensen conducted cross

examination. The Court took a lunch recess at 12:15 p.m.
Cross examination of the witness resumed at 12:50 p.m. The witness was excused
and Defendant called Deputy Mark Lee who was administered an oath and testified.
Direct examination and cross examination of the witness were conducted ru"1d the vvitness
was excused. Derk Rasmussen was then called, administered an oath and testified. :Mr.
Stirba examined the Vvitness on direct. During direct, Defendant's Exhibit #219-2 was
offered and admitted without objection. Mr. Jorgensen conducted cross examination and
the witness was excused.

Donnetta Fox was then called, administered an oath fu'1d

testified. Mr. Stirba conducted direct exam. Defendant's Exhibits #204 and 205 were
offered and admitted without objection.

The same were played for the jury. Mr.

Jorgensen cross examined t.~e witness and she was excused. Court adjourned for the day
at 3:36 p.m.
On Wednesday, July 21, 2010 at 9:02 trial resumed with Mr. Stirba calling his
next witness, Chad Ludwig who was administered an oath and testified.

Direct

exmnination of the witness was conducted. During the course of direct, Mr. Ludwig
constructed a drawing which was marked as Defendfu"1t's Exhibit #230, offered, and
admitted into evidence without objection. The Court briefly excused the jury to hear
argument as to a hearsay objection in regard to Mr. Ervin's statement to Deputy Ludwig.
After hearing argument, the Court overruled the objection and deemed the statement an
exception to the hearsay rule. The jury returned and direct examination of the witness
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resumed. The Court took its morning recess at 10:49 a.m.
Testimony resumed at 11 :08 a.m. with :MI. Jorgensen cross examining the
witness. The next witness was called, John Janzen, who was administered an oath and
testified. The Court took its lunch recess at 12: 17 p.m.
Court reconvened at 12:52 p.m. and direct examination continued. Mr. Stirba
created Defendant's Exh.ibit #231 during the course of direct eX8....rn. The

ex...~ibit

was then

offered and admitted without objection. Mr. Jorgensen cross eXfu"TIrned the witness and
the witness was excused.
After a brief recess, Sheriff Brent Bunn was called, administered an oath and
testified. :MI. Stirba offered Defendant's Exhibits #213 and #214 in the course of direct
exam. The exhibits were admitted without objection. Cross examination and brief redirect examination were conducted and the witness was excused.
:MI. Stirba then called Greg Duval, who was administered 8....'1 oath and testified.

Direct examination of the witness included the offering of Exhibits #212-2, 212-3,212-4,
212-5,212-6, and 212-7 which were objected to and admitted over objection. Further
Exhibit #212-1 was offered and admitted without objection. Cross exam was conducted
and the witness was excused.
The jury was released for the day at 3 :32 p.m. Outside the presence of the jury,
the Court heard argument from counsel as to the possible upcoming testimony of Carlton
Ericson. Thereafter, the Court ruled Mr. Ericson will be allowed to testify in a limited
fashion for impeachment purposes. The Court adjourned at 3:48 p.m.
Trial reconvened Thursday, July 22, 2010 at 9:05 a.m. The Court informed the
jurors of the intended course for the rest of the triaL Mr. Stirba then called Carlton
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Ericson who was administered and oath a..rld testified. Plaintiff's counsel renewed his
objection of yesterday as to this witness' testimony, and the Court noted that for the
record. Direct and cross exa..liination were conducted and the witness was excused.
Defense then called Sheriff Dale Stacey, who was reminded he was still under
oath. Mr. Stirba questioned the witness on direct examination. Defendant's Exhibits
#211-1, 211-2, and 211-3 were offered and admitted without objection. In addition,
Exhibit #216 was offered and admitted without objection. The jury was excused at 10:08
a.m. fu'1d the Court heard argument in aid of objection. The jury returned to the Court at
10:31 a.m. and direct exam continued.

Defendant's Exhibit #222 was offered and

admitted pursuant to the prior stipulation of the parties. Mr. Jorgensen cross examined
the witness, as well redirect fuld re-cross were also conducted, and the witness was
excused.
The Defense then rested their case. The Jury was again excused for the Court to
hear argument. Outside the presence of the jury, Mr. Jorgensen made a Motion to Strike
part of Mr. Rasmussen's testimony. The Court heard argument from counsel on this
issue and took a recess at 11 :23 a.m. to review the argument. At 11 :41 Court reconvened
still outside the presence of the jury, fu'1d the Court ruled the motion would be DENIED.
The jury returned to Court at 11 :53 a.m. and roll call was waived. The Plaintiff,
Kyle Athay was recalled as a rebuttal witness, and reminded he was still under oath. Mr.
Jorgensen conducted direct exam, Mr. Stirba cross examined the witness, and the witness
was excused.
Evidence concluded at 12:38 p.m. and the jury was excused for the day. The
Court spoke Vvith counsel on the record as to which exhibits had been admitted, and then
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took a lunch recess. Court reconvened for a jury instruction conference on the record at
2:36 p.m. During said conference counsel was permitted to place any argument and/or
objections on the record as to the Court's proposed jury instructions. Counsel also gave
argument to the Court as to the Special Verdict Form. The Court adjourned at 4:50 p.m.
The Court reconvened outside the presence of the jury on Friday, July 23,2010 at
8:56 a.m. The Court discussed with counsel the revisions that had been made to the jury
instructions and Special Verdict Form. Counsel for the Plaintiff had no further objections
to the proposed instruction. Mr. Stirba, cOlL.'lsel for Defendant, renewed his objections to
instructions #8, 31, 24, and the Special Verdict Form. The Court noted the objections for
the record, and overruled them.
The jury was brought before the Court at 9:55 a.m. and the Court read instructions
#1 through #36 to the jury. Each counsel gave closing arguments. The name of one juror
was drawn, Wendy Shavwer, to be the alternate juror.
The deputy clerk was instructed to administer an oath to the Court Marshall and
the same was done. At 1:07 p.m., the jury retired and the Court recessed.
During the course of jury deliberations, the jury sent out the following questions
to the Court:
1.

"How do the two parts of the question #2 relate to each other? If the
second part is answerable as yes, is the first part necessarily answerable
only as yes?" The Court gave the following answer, "The jury must
first determine that Sheriff Dale Stacey's conduct amounted to reckless
disregard; if the answer to that question is yes, then the jury must make
a separate finding that Sheriff Stacey's conduct, amounting to reckless
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disregard, was a proximate cause of Kyle Athay's injuries."
2.

"We may be facing a split vote that cannot be resolved into a 2/3 (nine
votes) nine way or rulother. If it comes to that (' a hung jury'), how do we
report that to you?" The Court gave the following answer, "I encourage
you to continue to deliberate, continue to read the instructions, and review
the evidence. I would direct your attention to the admonishment of the
Court contained in instruction #34."
"Our verdict form has only one sign

sheet, yet our instructions seem to

indicate that it does not have to be the same nine jurors who are in
agreement on each question. We anticipate t..h.at may not be the case. How
is it that we can use only one sign off sheet?" The Court gave the
following answer, "The Court would refer you back to jury instruction #33
and the language in the 3rd paragraph. In answering the specific question
asked, there must be at least nine of you agree on each question, before
moving to the next question, if the Special Verdict Form requires you to
do so. Each question answered, does not have to be answered by the same
nine or more jurors. Whichever question is the last question on the form
that you are going to answer, the nine or more who agreed on that question
are the nine who shall sign the verdict form."
The Court, after consultation with counsel, provided written responses to each of the jury
questions
The jury suspended deliberations for the day at 7:15 p.m. At 10:00 a.m. on
Monday, July 26, 2010 Court reconvened and handled question #3 from the jury. Jury
Minute Entry and Order
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deliberations continued until 12:00 p.m. when the Court was informed a verdict had been
reached. The COlh"'i reconvened and asked the foreman, Jennifer Attebury if the jury had
reached a verdict. Foreman, Jennifer Attebury, acknowledged that they had reached a
verdict. The verdict was then presented to the Court for review.
The Court asked the deputy clerk to read the Special Verdict form and the same
was done.
Question No.1: \Vas Sheriff Dale Stacey's conduct on June 10, 1999 within the
scope of his authority as an agent of Rich County Utah?

Answer: Yes

Question No.2: Did Sheriff Dale Stacey's Conduct amount to reckless disregard,
a.'1d if so was this reckless disregard a proximate cause of Kyle Athay's injuries?
Answer: Yes
Question No.3: Was Kyle Athay negligent, and if so, was this negligence a
proximate cause of his own injuries?

Answer: No

Question No.4: Was Daryl Ervin negligent, and if so, was his negligence a
proximate cause of Kyle Athay's injuries?

Answer: Yes

Question No.5: \Vhat is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the
following:
Answer:

Sheriff Dale Stacey, agent of Rich County
Kyle Athay
Daryl Ervin

30%
0%
70%

Question No.6: What is the total amount of damage sustained by Kyle Athay as a
result of the accident?

Answer:

1. Economic damages, as defined in the Instructions: $2,720,126.00
2. Non-economic damages, as defined in the Instructions: $1,000,000.00.
Minute Entry and Order
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Nine jurors out of twelve signed t.1J.e Special Verdict Form.
The Court asked if counsel would like the jury panel polled, and counsel for the
Defendant answered in the affirmative and the same was done. The Court then read a
final instruction to the jury, thanked them for their service and excused them.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated July 26, 2010.

~~

!:'M:ITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge

I
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I hereby certify that on the 11 th day of August, 2010, I mailed/served a true copy
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CRAIG R. JORGENSEN (#1990)
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1246 Yellowstone - Suite A4
P.O. Box 4904
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4904
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L'N THE DISTRICT CO{JRT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AA'D FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE

KYLEATHAY,

vs.
RICH COUNTY, lJTAH,
A political subdivision of the State of Utah;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-02-00072

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF J1JDGMENT
A..1\'D MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
THEREOF

----------------------------)
COMES NOW Craig R. Jorgensen, counsel for the Plaintiff and moves the Court for
Entry of Judgment on the Special Verdict returned by the jury on the 26th day of July, 2010.
Plaintiff specifically states the following sums and calculations apply in determining the
Judgment to be entered:

I. SlJl\1 D1JE ON VERDICT
Economic Damages:
$2,720,126.00 x .30 = $816,037.80
Non-Economic Damages:
$1,000,000.00 x .30 = $300,000.00*
*This sum is fully allowed for the following reasons:
a)

The statutory cap set forth in I.C. 6-1603 does not apply since I.e. 6-1603 was

not effective until July 2003. This is a 2002 case;
Motion- for Entry of Judgment
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b)

Even ifthe statutory cap were to apply- a $300,000.00 award is still below the

cap set by the Idaho State Industrial Commission. Attached is a document called "CalculationNon-economic damages cap" (Exhibit A)" obtained from the website of the Industrial
Commission. This calculation of the cap, as ofJuly 1, 2010 is $305,028.46;
c)

The Defendant's "reckless misconduct" excepts the cap from application (I.C. 6-

1603(4»;
TOTAL DlJE ON VERDICT
$816,037.80 + = $300,000.00

n.

=

$1,116,037.80

INTEREST DUE ON PLAINTIFF'S OFFER
OF SETTLEMENT/JUDGMENT

$147,073.04**
** Plaintiffs made a "Plaintiffs Offer ofSettlementiJudgment" on January 21,2004. A
copy of this is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". Defendant did not accept this offer. Pursuant to
I.C. 12-301, Plaintiff is entitled to interest "on the amount contained in such offer". Exhibit "c'
attached hereto reflects the applicable annual interest rate (I.e. 28-22-104(2) as 6%.
Exhibit ''D'' is an "instruction" obtained from the Idaho State Treasurer on how to
calculate the interest due.
Plaintiffs calculations are as follows:
Date of Offer:

January 21,2004

Amount of Offer:

$375,000.00 x 6% = $22,500.00

Per Diem Rate:

$22,500.00 -7- 365

Number of Days

2004 (365 - 21) =
2005
2006

=

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JlJDGMENT - PAGE 2 ;2~

$61.64 per dium
344
365
365

()

2007
2008
2009
2010 through August 5,2010
Total Days:

365
365
365
217
2,386

2,386 days x $6l.64 (per diem)

=

$147,073.04.

III. COSTS
See Memorandum of Costs filed herewith as a "Matter of Right":

$15,514.03

See Memorandum of Costs filed herewith for "Discretionary":

$28,604.23

IV. TOTALS
(a)

With costs as a Matter of Right only:

$816,073.80
300,000.00
147,073.04
(MOR costs)
15.514.03
TOTAL

(b)

With costs as a "Matter of Right" and
"Discretionary" Costs:

$1,278,660.87

$816,073.80
300,000.00
147,073.04
15,514.03
(MOR costs)
28.604.23
(Disc. costs)
TOTAL

$1,307,265.10

Plaintiff is informed that Defendant Rich County has a policy of insurance which is
"applicable, valid, collectible liability insurance coverage in excess of said limit" (I.e. 6-926).
Plaintiff is informed such policy is a "single limit" policy and defense costs mayor may not be
included in the policy limits. Defendant should be compelled to provide a detailed accounting of
the sum which is "valid and collectible". Such accounting should include the declaration page of
the insurance policy reflecting the applicable policy limits and a detailed explanation and
accounting of any sums which would be deducted therefrom.
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The Plaintiff requests the Court enter judgment for $1,307,375.80.
DATED this

.3

day of August, 2010.

CRAIG R. JORGENSEN
(/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of August, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of
Lhe foregoing pleading on the following person(s) by the means so indicated:

~irst

[
Class Mail
[ ] Hand-Delivery
tvjF acsimile

Peter Stirba
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810
Fax: (801) 364-8335

[ ~st Class Mail
[ ] Hand-Delivery
[ ~Facsimile

Alan Johnston
E.W. PIKE Al\TJ) ASSOCIATES, P.A.
P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403-2949
Fax: (208) 528-6447

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT - PAGE

4

:;;;1.::t

Calculation -- Non-economic Dama
Unofficial, provided as a courtesy
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CR4JG R. JORGENSEN (#1990)
Attorney at Law
1246 Yellowstone - Suite A4
P.O. Box 4904
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4904
Telephone: (208) 237-4100
Facsimile: (208) 237-1706
Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN TIffi DISTRICT COVRT OF THE SIXTH J1JDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ~~1) FOR THE COIJNTY OF BEAR LAKE
KYLE and I\1ELISSA ATHA Y,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DALE M. STACEY, Individually; and
in his official capacity as Sheriff of Rich
County, Utah; RICH COlJNTY, UTAH,
A political subdivision of the State
of Utah; CHAD LlJDw1G, Individually;
and in his official capacity as a Deputy
Sheriff of the Bear Lake County Sheriff's
Department; GREGG ATHAY,
Individually; and in his official capacity
as Captain of the Sheriff's Department of
Bear Lake County, Idaho; BRENT BlTNN,
Individually; and in his official capacity as
Sheriff of Bear Lake County, Idaho;
BEAR LAKE C01.JI"lY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the State ofIdaho,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV -02-00072

PLAINTIFFS' OFFER OF
SETTLEMENT/J1J1)GMENT

The above named Plaintiffs, pursuant to Idaho Code §12-301 and Idaho Rille of Civil
Procedure 68, hereby offers to settle and to allow judgment be entered against Defendants in the total
sum of Three Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($375,000.00).
PLAlNTIFFS' OFFER OF SETTLEMENT/JUDGMENT - PAGE 1

~~~

EXHIBIT "B"

The total offer of Settlement/Judgment herein of $375,000.00 must be totally accepted and
is not divisible and includes all claims recoverable by Plaintiffs, including any attorney's fees and
costs.
The undersigned represents that he has authority to sign this Offer of Settlement/Judgment
on behalf of Plaintiffs.
RESPECTFlJLLY SlJBMITTED this

,;;2-( day of Janua..ry 2004.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Zday of January, 2004, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing pleading on the follovving persons by the means so indicated:
[ ~st Class Mail
( ] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Carlton R. Ericson
Naylor & Hales, P.C.
P.O. Box 9496
Boise, Idaho 83707
Fax: (208) 383-9516

[ ~st Class Mail
[ ] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Peter Stirba
Stirba & Hathaway
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810
Fax: (801) 364-8335

[ t}f"irst Class Mail
[ ] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

E.W. Pike
Pike & Smith, P.A.
P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403-2949
Fax: (208) 528-6447
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CAO Instruction 25
A Basic Method for Calculating Interest on a Judgment
$
[J] _ _ X _ _[1] _ _%= [AJ
judgment amount
bterest rate
annual amount
of interest due

Step 1:

Multiply

Step 2:

Divide [AJ by 365 = [DI] the daily interest amount

Step 3:

MUltiply t.~e daily interest amount [DI] times the number of days since
the date of judgment to determine the amount of bterest owed.
Example: Judgment of$2000; interest rate of6% per year; 37 days since the date
the judgment was entered.
1. $2000 X .06 = $120 annual bterest
2. $120/365 = $.329 per day
3. $.329 X 37 days = $12.17 bterest owed.

Each year, the legal rate of bterest for an Idaho judgment is computed by the Idaho State
Treasurer's Office, Idaho Code 28-22-104.
Click on:
http://sto.idaho.gov/Reports/Le£alRateOflnterest.aspx for a report.
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ALAN JOHNSTON (Idaho BarNo. 1709)
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P..A.
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210
P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403~2949
Telephone: (208) 528-6444
Telefax: (208) 528-6447

PETER STIRBA (Utah Bar No. 3118)
R. BLA..KEHAMILTON (Utah BarNo. 11395)
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES
215 South State Street, Suite 750
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City) DT 84110-0810
Telephone: (801) 364-8300
Telefa.x:: (801) 364-'.\355
Attorneys jor Defendant
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COI1NTY OF BEAR LAKE

K\TLEATHA,Y,
Plaintiff,
v.

DEFENDA..~T RICH COUNTY'S
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT THEREOF AND OBJECTIONS
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORA.~1J)UM OF

R: CH COUNTY, UTAH,

COSTS

Defendam.

Case No. CV -2002-0000072
Judge Mitchell Brown

PurS\laJJ to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and 58) Defendant Rich County. Utah. by
Lj,nd through ut.dersigned cOUnsel) hereby submits the follovving Memorandum in Response to

1 DBFSN!>ANi' krCH COUNTY'S MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE to PLAlNTtFP'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
AND :MEMORANDlIM IN SUPPORT Th"EttBOF ANn O:BJECTIONS TO PLAINT[FF' S MEMORANDUM OF COSTS,
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&ASSOCIATES
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Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof and Objectbns
to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs.

ARGDMENT

I.

~"DER I.e.

§ 6-926~ THE TOTAL DAMAGES AWARDED AGAINST RICH
COUNTY MUST BE CAPPED AT S500,OOO.OO.
A.

Rich County Does Not Have "Applicable, Vruid IUld CoUe-dible"

Compl"ehensive Liability Insurance Under the Idaho Tort Claims Act.
1n Athay II, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "releval1i provisions" of the Idaho Tort
Claims Act ("ITCA") would apply in cases ariSing out of the wrongful acts or omissions of
another state, its political subdivisions) or its employees. See Athay II, 196 P.3d 325, 339 (Idaho

2008) (emphasis added). The Court noted that it did not have authority to apply the ITCA as a
whole to out of state defendants, specifically those provisions regarding the compromise and
settlement of claims and the purchase of liability insurance. l
Idabo l s governmental liability cap statute is entitled "Judgment or claims in excess of

comprehensive liabtlity plan-Reduction by court-Limits of liability," I.e. § 6~926 (emphasis
added). A go'Vernmental entity's total liability may only exceed $500,000.00 if the entity has
purchased "applicable, valid) collectible liability coverage," in excess of$SOO,OOO.OO.ld. The
statute itself provides little guidance as to what qualifies as an "applicable, valid, and collectible"
liability insuranc,e policy nor does the

rrCA specifically define this phrase, However, the title of

'This Court does not have authority to apply celtain provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act to another
State or its political subdivisions, They are the provisions regarding the compromise and settlement of claims, I.e.
§§ 6-912 & 6.913; provisions regardhlg the purchase ofliabiJity insurance, Le. §§ 6-9] 9,6-920,6-921,6-923,6.
924 & 6-925; the provision for payment of a judgment Ot' olaim against the State when it has not obtained insurance,
I.e. § 6-922; and the previsions ·for levying taxes, I.e. §§ 6-927 & 6-928," ld. at FN 1D.
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LC. § 6-926 indicates that this stattlte pertains to judgments in excess of the "Comprehensive
Liability Plan," which is explained and defined in I.e. § 6-919.
Under I.e. § 6-919, the Comprehensive Liability Plan is the liability insurance coverage
provided to the State ofIdaho, its governmental entities and employees through the Division of
Insurance Management, See I.e, § 6-919. All liability insurance policies for the State's
governmental entities and employees are controlled and provided by the administrator of the
Division of Insurance Management. Id, In other words. the Comprehensive Liability Plan
described in I.e, § 6-919 is the only "applicable) valid, and collectible" liability insurance policy
for which the statutory cap may be exceeded under I.e. § 6-926,
Undoubtedly, Rich County does not have and would not qualify to obtain liability
insurance plrsuant to the Comprehensive Liability Plan and thus any liability insurance poHcy

held by Rkh COl.U1ty is inapplicable for purposes of the alternative limit-of-liability-coverage cap
in LC, § 6-926, Stated another way, the limit-of-liability coverage cap, which corresponds to t.'le

liability coverage provided under I.e, § 6·919, has no application to out of state defendant
entities &UC',h

a~

Rich County and thus Rich County's total, aggregate liability in this matter is

limited to $SuO,OOO,OQ,

B.

Puhlic Policy Dictates that Rich County's Liability Insurance Policy Is Not
"Applicable, Valid and Collectible" Comprehensive Liability Insurance Under
I.C. § 6-926.

In Ati-xay II, the Idaho Supreme Court pointed out the practical issues involved ifIdaho did
not apply Ldaho law to tort actions against other sovereigns brought in Idaho courts:
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"Idaho a4joins six stares and a Canadian province, all of which have differing statutes. If
we were to pick certain provisions of the Utah Act to apply to this case, it would not give
much guidance to trial courts when other sovereigns are defendants in Idaho courts or if
[other sovereigns] change the provisions of its Act[S],,,2

Athay II. 196 P.3d at 339. In essence, the COll.1:'s decision was rooted it it's deshe to provide
predictability both to the Idaho courtS as well as to other sovereigns against which a claim is
brought in Idaho cou..."'ts.
Similarly, when a state or its political subdivision(s) purchase liability insurance, the entity
considers its exposure under the laws of its own state, as opposed to the laws of su.....·rou...'1ding
states, c.ountries, or provinces. Insurance policies and their attendant premiums are created based
upon on the expectation of risk. Rich County largely, if not enfuely, based its expectation 0 f risle
on the Utah GoveITlLllental Immunity Act ("DGIA"). which, at the time of this incident, limited a
governmental entity's tota11iability to $250,000.00 regardless of liability insurance policy
limits. 3 It would be impracticable, ifnot impossible for Rich County to tailor its insurance policy
to the laws ofWyommg, Colorado, New Mexico) Arizona, Nevada and/or Idaho. The insurance
carrier would have little gUidance as to which laws a policy must comply v.ri.th or the authority
under which to even provide coverage in the first place.4

Idaho will apply the [daho Tort Claims Ant in actions against other sovereigns in Idaho state courts except
§§ 6-912, 6-913, 6~919) 6-920, 6-921,6-922,6-923,6-924,6-925,6-927 and 6-92fi. Atliay IL 196 P.3d atFN 10.
In 1999, Utah's liability cap was set out at UTAH CObE ANN. § 63-30-34. CUrrently, the liabillty cap is
$583.900.00 regardless of the entity's liability insurance policy limits. DTAH CoDS ANN, § 63G-7~604 (2010).

While the public polioy argument above is sufficient on its own merits such that the statutory cap should
have application only, to rule otherwise ra.ises an entire array of ConstitutiDnal problems that go to the heart of
requiring OUr out of state County to be obligated beyond the cap; Due prooess, fair notice and Commerce Clause
implications are only some afthe Constitutional flaws to decide something in excess of the cap applies. Given the
space limitations of this Memorandum, Rich County raises, but is not able to fully brief, these issues in this context.

4
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The Idaho Division of Insurance Management may not provide liability coverage with a
li1niLbelow $500,000,00.

I.e. § 6·924. Any Idaho governmental entity that procures insurance

with a limit in excess of the mandatory minim:urn does so at its o,vn peril, with knowledge that it
could be held liable to this limit. Rich County did not consider Idahols liability cap statute when
itjoin.ed the Utah Association of Counties Insurance Mutual and obtained liability coverage.

s

The insurance provisions of the rTCA are not applicable to Rich County. just as the insurance
requirements of the DOIA are not applicahle to the counties of any other state, including Idaho.
lberefol'e, Rich County does not have applicable liability insurance for purposes of I.C. § 6-926
and t.\e judgment against Rich County 1."1 this case may not exceed $500,000.00.

ll.

PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY INTEREST ON AN OFFER OF
";ETTJ ,EMENT UNDER I.e. § 12-301 BECAUSE THE OFFER WAS MADE
Pru~H. TO TillS MATTER'S DISMISSAL AS A MA TIER OF LAW AND
BECAGSE THE OFFER WAS M.WE TO ALL DEFENDANTS, NOT JUST RICH
(;OUNl'V.
ldah ,J law provides that at any time after commencement of a civil action and up to 10 days

before trLil, a claimant IDay serve a wlitten settlement offer to an adverse party. I.e. § 12-301. A
c1ai:ranl may be entitled to interest on a rejected settlement offer if the cla.i.mant prevails against

the (,fferee at trial a..lld is awarded an a:nount equal to or greater than the settlement offer.ld.
Tho Haintiffs January 21, 2004 Offer ofSettlementiJudgment does not entitle the Plaintiff
to interest P Lll'suant to I. C. § 12-301. As an initial matter) this Offer was filed prior to the Idaho
Supreme C,;)u:rt's dismissal of any Defendants and was made to all of the Defendants collectively

S
Rlc.h County is a member of and maintains liablllty ooverage through the Utru.l Counties Insurance Pool, a
public agenL)1 consisti.ng of26 Member Coun.ties throughout Utah that are parties to the Amended Interlocal

Cooperation Agreement.
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including Bear Lake County, Gregg Athay, Chad Ludwig, Brent Bunn and Sheriff Stacey. The
Offer specifically states. "The total offer ... must be totally accepted end is not divisible., .,"
indicating that a single Defendant could not agree to accept a portion of the offer, nor could one
party ac·cept the Offer on behalf of the other Defendants. See Plaintiff's Offer of
Sertl.ementlJudgment, January 21, 2004, p. 2 (attached to Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of
Judgment, Exh. "B").
At trial, the Plaintiff only prevailed against Rich County, as all other Defendants have been

dismissed and rue no longer parties to this action, The January 21, 2004 Offer was not made to
each Defendant individually and cannot be said to contain a specific offer of settlement to Rich
County. Plaintitr has not alleged that he has made any other settlement offers to Rich County
since January 21, 2004 despite having ample time, up until July 3 of this year, to do so.6 Plaintiff
has failed tu make any qualifying offer of settlement to Rich County that would permit him to
collect interest on a settlement after under Idaho law.

Additic,nally. Plaintiffs January 21, 2004 offer was made prior to the trial court's first
dismissal of Plaintiff's claims as a matter of law. This dismissal effectively terminated the
lawsuit and thus discharged with Plaintiff s offer of settlement. If the Plaintiff v.lished to reach an
out of court resolution, he should have renewed his settlement offer after it was remanded to the

trial COhrt in either 2005 or 2008. A.,.+ter each dismissal, appeal, and remand, some Defendants
were dismissed from the case, providing the Plaintiff the opportunity to reevaluate and adjust his
In his Memorandum of Costs, attached to his Motion for Entry of Judgment, p. 9, Plaintiff alleges that the
Defen,;ant made a settlement offer in a 2010 mediation. Under the Idaho Rules of Bvidence, the substance of a
mediadon are confidential and Plaintiff's disclosure is improper. Pursuant to the Idaho Rules, Rich County will not
COmment in any way on the substantive content of any mediation between the Patties.
6
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Offer in light oft.1-tese changes. In absence of any Offer of Set'lement, the Plaintiff may not
recover interest UJ."1der I.C. § 12-301.

Ill. ANY COSTS AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF AS A MATTER OF RIGHT ARE
LIMITED TO THE PERCErt.'TAGE TO WIDen THE PLAINTIFF ACTUALLY
PREYAILED AGAINST RICH COUNTY.
Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may award certain costs to a prevailing
party in a fmaljudgment as a matter of right. IDAHO R. Cry. PROC, 54(d)(1)(A). To determine
whether a party is "prevailingH and entitled to c.osts, the court must consider the relief sought by
the parties and the action's result and may apportion the costs between and among :he parties in
a fair and equitable manner. IOAHO R Cry. PROC. S4(d)(I)(B).
Here, the Plaintiff s claims are solely based on the damages he has suffered as a result of
the June 10, 1999 motor vehicle collision between bimself and Daryl Ervin. The jury determined
that Rich County was only partially lia.ble fGr this event and was thus only responsible for 30%
of the total damages award. That is to say, in light of.. "all of the i~sues and claims involved ill
the action," the Plaintiff partialzv prevailed against Rich County and this Court should apportion
costs in accordance with the jury's findings. !d.
The Plaintiff, in his Memorandum of Costs, lists the total am01..mt he avers: is owed to him
for various categories of "matter ofrighf' costs pursuant to IDAHO R. Cry. FRoc. 54(d)(1)(C).
However, the Plaintiffhes failed to provide the requisite "itemization" of these costs including
proof that these charges were actually incurred such as receipts or invoices. IDAHO R. elY. PROC.
54(d)(5). Absent a sufficiently specific accounting of these expenses, t.1-lis Court should 110t
award any matter of right costs.
7 DEFRNbANT RlCH COUNTY'S MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MO'flON POR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
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Additionally, the Plaintiff has miscalculated several matter of right cost categories in his
Menlorandum including witness and e:x:pert fees and'l1.ritness travel expenses. Under Rule
54(d)(1)(C)(3), the '<Aritness fee is $20.00 per day for each day of trial testimony. Witness travel
expenses are to be calculated. at ,30 per mile, one way, from the witness's residence, assu...'Uing
the witness has traveled by private transportation pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(4), By these
calculations, the Plaintiffs witness fees should total $180.00, as opposed to $749.50, as stated in
the Memorandum of Costs,7 The only Viritness travel expenses identified are those of Daryl Ervin,
The Memorandum of Costs does not indicate where Mr, Ervin traveled from for purposes of the
expense calculation but instead lists the cost of Mr. Ervin's air fare. taxes and fees and shuttle

joe, none of which are 'Valid witness travel expenses for witnesses travelit.tg by private
1ransportation such as an airline. Also, while the Plaintiff accurately notes that he is only entitled
';0

$2,000.00 for each eKpert witness whose fees exceeded this amount) he erroneously has

included a $2,000.00 expense for Geoffrey Alpert and Dr. Jeffrey Rosenbluth, both of whom
were not calbd as expert witnesses at trial. The Parties argued at some length regarding the
testimony

OJ

Dr. Rosenbluth and the Plaintiff maintained that he was not calling this witness as

an expert v,! mess, but rather as a treating physician fact witness. This Court permitted Dr.
Rosenblutlc's testimony under this representation. Mr. Alpert was simply not designated as a
vVitness, e _pert or othervvise, in Plaintiff's Disclosure and was not called to testify at trial.

rUt Plaintiff identifies nine trial witnessef>, one of whom, Shawn a Hansen, did not test[j)' at trial. Justin
Rartle; resti iJed on July 14,2010, but was also present to testify On July 13, 2010. Witness fees should be calculated
af. folluws:7 witnesses :x $20,00(1 day of testimony)) + (1 witness x ($20,00)(2 days present to testify)) = $180.00
&
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The Plaintiff s total matte! of right costs cannot be determined due to the deficiencies in
Plaintiff's Memorandum and this Court cannot accurately award any of these costs in absence of
a proper itemization. At a minimum, this Cou...."'i should apportion any matter of right costs to
rer1ect the equitable extent to which the Plaintiff actually prevailed against Rich County at trial,
pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(B). $

IV.

PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO DISCRETIONARY COSTS UNDER IDAHO
RULE OF CIVll., PROCEDURE 54(D)(1)(D).
IDAHO RULE OF CrVIL PROCEDURE

54(d)(l )(D) provides that certain costs in excess of or

not provided for under Rule 54(d)(1)(C) may be awarded if the prevailing party shows that the
costs were necessary, reasonably incurred and should be assessed against the adverse party in the
interest of justice. Plaintiff does not, in either his Motion for Entry of Judgment or Memorandum
of Costs, indicate any basis for which he may be entitled to these costs.
In any litigation, the parties involved must incur a number of reasona.ble expenses attendant
to the logistical realities of legal work including copying, mailiIlg, travel and making phone calls.
The Plaintiff is not perm.itted to collect these expenses absent some specific reason so compelling
that justice itself must intervene and award these costs against the defeated. adversa.ry. Although
the Plaintiff insists that he made numerous attempts to settle this litigation for less than the jury
verdic.t, the only evidenc.e he points to is the January 21) 2004 Offer of Settlement made prior to
his case being dismissed twice on the merits in State Court and once 1.11 the U. S, District Co u.rt for

Defendant's alternative position that this Court should apportion only 30% ofmatt.er of right costs to Rich

County is intended solely for the purposes of argument and does not connote acceptance ofPlaintifts cost
calculations or waive Defendant's objections to Plaintiff's Memo!'andUn1 of Costs,
9
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the District of Idaho, Plaintiff s first filing. ~ Naturally. Rich County would have no reason to
initiate or otherwise engage in settlement discussions when the lawsuit was dismissed.. A fortiori,
this case involves a number of complex: issues with serious and far-reaching public policy
implications, which justified proceeding to trial.
In the absence of the requisite showings under Rule 54(d)(1)(D) or o'L\er good cause, the

Plaitltiff is not entitled to any award of disoretionary costs.

V.

UNDERI.c. § 6~1603, PLAINTIFF'S NONECONOMIC DAMAGES AWARD IS
CAPPED AT S250,OOO BECAUSE SHERIFF STACEY'S RECKLESS DISREGARD
AMOUNTS TO GROSS NEGLIGENCE ~'DER IDAHO LAW.
Under Idaho law, a plaintiff may not recover in excess of$250)000.00 for noneconomic

da:mages unless the action arises out of a feloni.ous act or willful or reckless misconduct 10 I.C. §
6-1603. Th,s provision is applicable to all actions seeking damages for personal injury, including
tori claim:; against governmental entities governed exclusively by the lTCA. Id.

lhe Plaintiff's claim against Rich County arises out of Idaho Code Title 49, which sets

forth t.~Cl lLtWS governing the o'WIlership and use of motor vehicles> including the standard of
conduct fur the operation of police vehicle. I.C. § 49-623. While this Title sets the sta.'1.dard by
whIch She! ill" s Stacey' sconduct was to be judged! it does not authorize or prescribe the manner

in which a ;;:,ause of action may be brought against Sheriff Stacey for his alleged misconduct

.4...9 noted in Footnote 5, supra, Plaintiffs Memorandum of Costs, p. 9, improperly discloses confidential
inforrnz.tion pertaining to two mediations conducted in this matter. Rich County will not comment in any manner on

the existen, e )r amount of any settlement offer(s) stemming from a. mediation of this case.
10

'lht :imit On a noneconomic damages aW2,rd is $250,000.00, subject to upward Or downward adjustment in
l.ge a,ccordance to any change in the average annual wage flS computed by the Idaho Irldustrial
Commission. I.e. § 6-1603(1).

direct

percen~
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under the Motor Vehicle Title. The Idaho Supreme Court has twice recognized the ITC.<\'s
applicability to the Pla:L.'1tiff's claim against Rich County. See Athay I; Athay 11.
Under the ITeA, grass negligence is defined as as '"'the doing or failing to do an act

which a reasonable person ... would ... recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and that
failing that duty shows deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to others." I.C, § 6904(C) (emphasis added). Reckless. willful a..TJ.d wanton conduct is "only present when a person
intentionally and knov.ingly fails to do an act creating U!lreasonable risk of harm to another, and
which involves a high degree of probability that such harm 'Will result." Id, (emphasis added),
The Plaintiff has never alleged

j

1101'

did the jury determine, that Sheriff Stacey both intentionally

and knowingly created the unreasonable risk of harm that lead to the PlaintitYs injuries. This
Courf s standard of conduct instruction did not require a jury to find that Sheriff Stacey

deliberately created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm and thus Stacey's c01lduct did not risk
to the level of "reckless, V\rillful and wanton conduct" under the ITCA.
In Athay I, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the ITCA did not provide the defmition of

"reckless disregard for t.~e safety of others» because I.e. § 6-904(C), by its own terms, only
applies to the ITCA and not to other portions of the Idaho Code. Athay 1, 128 P.3d 897, 902
(1da..h.o 2005). The Court did not, however, hold that reckless conduct as defined by I.e. § 6904(C) was inapplicable to matters covered by the. ITCA, such as the entry of judgment agamst a
governmental entity. The defmition.s contained in I.e. § 6-904(C) are specifically designed to
limit a governmental entity's liability in tort actions. Since I.C. § 6-1603 clearly applies to t..lUs

ac.tion brought under and in accordance with the ITCA) I.C. § 6-904(C) is the proper statute to
II bEFENDAN'I'RICH COUNTY'S MEMORANDUM IN :RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF '8 MOTlON FOR ENTRY 01' JUDGMENT
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look to in defining recklessness. Sheri.f'r s Stacey~ s conduct, as found by the jury, does not rise to
the requ.isite level of conduct that would exempt the application of the limit on noneconomic
damages a\'Va1'ds and. th.us this Court IIlUst reduce the Plaintiff s noneconomic damages to the
statlltory maximum,

VI.

PLAINTIFF'S AWARD MUST BE REDUCED BY THE AMOUST PLAINTIFF
HAS ALREADY RECOVERED FROM COLLATERAL SOURCES.
Idaho law provides that in personal injury actions, a Plaintiff may recover only those

d<.:L.rn&ges in ex:cess oftbe amount of compensation for bis injuries received from "collateral

sourCeS." ill an eifortto prevent double recoveries. I.C. § 6-1606. See also Dyet v. McKinley, 81
P.3, t 1236,

123~,

(Idaho 2003). Once ajl'lry bas rendered an award for the Plaintiff, t.he Court

mut reduc,.;: t.1e award by the amount Plaintiff independently received from these c.ollateral
smlfces.1a.

The idaho Supreme Court treats M:edicare write-offs as collateral sources that are
deducted fronl any damages award. Dyet, 81 P.3d at 1239-39; Slack v. Kelleher, 104 PJd 958)
967 (IdahQ 2004). Medicare 'V'Vhte-offs are the "reduction in charges required by Medicare

regulations and federal law." Slack. 104 P.3d at 961. In other words. write-offs account f01 the
dJference between the amount charged by a medical provider and the amount Medicare pays.
v,'here a plaintiff claims damages for medical expenses that include the provider's entire bill, as
tue- Plaintiff has in this matter, da.rnages are reduced by the difference between the bill 2U"'ld the
Me:licare payout,
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In order to calculate the appropriate reduction in Plaintiff's damages award based on the
amounts paid by Medicare and

Medicai~

the ~"tite-off amount must be calculated pursuant to

the Plaintiff's MedicareIMedicaid E>"'Planation of Benefits and other documents. The· Plaintiff
should have provided these documents in response to Defendant's numerous discovery requests
but failed to do so. On August 3, 2010. Counsel for Defendant Peter Stirba wrote to Plaintiff's
Counsel requesting the documents referenced in this section. Mr. Stirba renewed his request 'with
another letter, sent via fax to Plaintiff's Counsel, on August 12, 2010.luter receiving no
response from the Plaintiff or his Cou,,'1Se1, the Defendant issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum to the
Idaho APS to obtain these documents and is currently awaiting their response. PlaL.'1tiff would
ask that this Court stay the Entry of Judg.;."llent pending Defendfu'1.f s receipt and presentation of
these documents to the Cou..rt and requests that t.1Us Court compel the Plaintiff to produce these
items as soon as possible to avoid further delay.
DATED iliis

(~day of August, 2010.
STIRBA &

A,~,~~

By:
PE
ST
A
R. BLAKE HAMILTON
Attorneys for Defendant
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OF SERVICE

ft

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of August, 2010 I caused to be served a
O"ue copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE

TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT THEREOF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF COSTSby
the method indicated below, to the following:
Craig R Jorgensen, Esq.

c ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Attorney at Law

( ) Hand Delivered
C ) Overnight Mail

1246 Yellowstone Avenue, Suite A4
P.O. Box 4904
Pocatello, ID 83205 4904

W.cSimile

w

Alan. Johnston
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCL-\TES, P.A.
151 North Ridge AYe., Suite 210
P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
C ) O~ight Mail

(,.}facsimile

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Honorable Mitchell W. Brown
District Judge - Resident Chambers
P.O. Box 7T:::,
Soda Springs, idaho 83276

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Oyl"night Mail

("j..-p-acsimile

/
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CR4JG R. JORGENSEN (#1990)
Attorney At Law
920 East Clark
P.O. Box 4904
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4904
Telephon.e: (208) 237-4100
Facsimile: (208) 237·1706
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SD...'TH J1JDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE
KYLEATHA.Y~

)
)
)
)

vs.

ruCH COUNTY, UTAH,
A pol.ltical subdivision of the State o(Utah,

)
)
)
)

Case No. G'v-02 OOO72
u

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF RE
ENTRY OF JUDG:MENT AND
MEMORA'rWUM OF COSTS

)

CONl..BS NOW, the Plaintiff, and provides the following reply brief specifically replying

to the De:te:ndant's MeroOFandum dated A'U.~t 17,2010.
I, DEFENDANT~S LIABILITY IS NOT CAPPED AT $500,000

Defendant claims, inter alia, that $500,000 is the extent ofits liability. Rich County
makes thiE' claim that despite the language ofI.C. 6-926, which states
"Unless the goverru:n.ental entity has purchased applicable valid collectible
liability insurance coverage in excess of said linrit, in which event the controlling
limit shall be the remaining available proceeds of such insurance."

A. Available In.surance Is To Be Considered
~:;'Dst

of all, The Idaho Supreme Court in Athay II, has stated that purchased. i.'rlsurance is

to be ee: c:idered in the cap on liability question: The Supreme Court, in discussing the doctrine
of comi ty staled:

PLAThIT'IFF'S REPLY BRIEF RE ENTRY
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''Likewise, the Utah Act had a $250,000 damage limit for personal injury
to a single person in one occutrence, UC. §63-30-34, while the damage
under the Idaho Act was $500,000 per occurrence regardless of the
number injured. LC. §6-926 [:fu9]. 146 Idaho at 42.

The Court's reference to footnote 9 is of telling difference on this issue. Footnote
9 specifically states;
"The statute [I.e. §6-926]also provides that the damages limit could be
increased if "the governmental entity has pUl""'--hased app lieabIe, valid;
collectible liabllity insurance coverage in excess of said limit, in which
event the controiling shall be the remaining available proceeds ofsuch
4"'lSu.rance." I.e. §6-926.
Ifth.e Idaho Supreme COlL11 intended liability to be capped at $500,000

h'Tespective of any purchased insuntnce it would have stated so, and it further would not
have made specific reference in footnote 9 to "applicable, valid and collectible
insurance.•~
B. Defendant's Reliance on Footnote lOin Athav II is :Misplaced

Defendant relies on footnote 10 of Athay IIwmch states:
"[ £hi OJ This Court does not have authority to apply certain provisions of

the Ida..ho Tort Claims Act to another State or its political subdivisions.
They are the pro"isions regarding the compromise and settlement of
claims, I.C. §§ 6-912 and 6-913; pro'Visions regarding the purchase of
liability insurance, I.e. §§6-919, 6.920~ 6-921, 6-923, 6-924 & 6925; the
provision for payment of ajudgment or claim against the State when it has
not obtained insurance, I.C, § 6-922; and the provisions for levying taxes,

I.e. §§ 6 927 & 6-928."
p

NOWHERE in footnote 10. is I.e. 6-926 listed. Had the Idaho Supreme Court
intellded to include I.e. 6-926 in its list of statutory enac'im.ents which the Court did not
have au.thority to apply other States, it would have listed it. It did not
Turning further to the language of the Idaho Supreme Court in Athay II we find:

=

H • • • The policy of this State rega."Iiing tort actions against governmental
agencies entities is set out in the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Applying that
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Act when another State is a defendant in a tort action brou.ght in an Idaho
court would be treating that State in the same manner as our State would
be treated, and it would be consistent with the policy oHbis State." 146
Idaho at 421.
The purpose of the Idaho Tort Claims Act is to subject governmental entities to
: iability for tons committed when a private person would be liable for those torts as well.

Hagy v. State, 137 Idaho 618, 51 P.3d 432 (2002).
C. I.C. 6-919 Does Not Applv
Deienda!lL argues that I.e. 6-919 is a factor in its quest to exclude its available
)~uranCe, It

ckady is not.

I.e. 6-919 clearly refers to the State ofIdaho and its

"departrr;ents, otgencies, commissions, and other inst:rumentality oftbe State". It

discusse:., in cretail the "comprehensive plan to be provided by the administrator ofllie
d:lvision of iDsurance management." It has nothing to do with counties or political
subdivls,ons

uC

tortfeasors from other States.

I C. (;-9.W, 6-921, and 922 all make specific reference to the "coUlprehensive
plan' aud an refer to the State.

Howeyer, when we refer to Ie. 6-923 the focus shifts from the State to counties
a'uo

provides the authority for "pQlitical subdivisions" suoh counties to purchase

''':lec~ SSw.]

liability insurance for themselves and their employees".

Thu.s.~

Ada County,

'3o'UudiLry County, Caribou County, and any others' could purchase liability insurance

tte,::n whatever souroe they chose and in whatever sums they chose,
Rich County's claim that it could not participate in the "comprehensive pla..T)" is
~}2Ltially

true. No county cou.ld have, Counties were required to buy insurance for

'hemselves. Just because a county is ineUgible to participate in the "comprelhensive
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plan". it does not follow that a county's purchased liability policy is not '"applicable,
valid, colle..."tible liability insura.t'lCe in excess of said limits". Plaintiff understands Ri.ch
County had purchased a liability policy in excess of $500,000 limits.
Rich County has not been forthcoming in disclosing what policy ofinsuran::;e it
has in place and wha.t the available limits are. Plaintiff had specifically requested suoh

information in its earlier Memorandum dated August 3, 2010. PJch County should be
required to disclose and provide a detailed account of the policy limits available,
As indicated earlier, had the Idaho Supreme Court intended a $500.000 cap to

apply absolute irrespective of available insu.,.--ance, it would have said so; and it would not
have discussed the availability of insurance ill excess of$500,000 in footnote 9.

In conclusion, Rich County's liability is not limited to $500.000.
D. Rich County's Public Policy

Argument Is Without Merit
Rich County next argues that public policy somehow limits its exposure to
$500,000. It argues that since it is bordered by WyoDJing, Colorado, New Mexico,
Arizona, Nevada and Idaho that it would be "impracticable", if not impossible, for Rich

County to tailor its insurance policy to those States.

That arguru.ent is beside the point. The situation is that Rich County Utah has in
fact bought a policy of insurance which exceeds $500,000. This is not a question cf
prospective tailoring of insurance needs. Rich COl1nty purchased the policy of insurance.

It insures the County a.gainst liability. The question of what guidance the county and its

insurer company or COCll:CY would need at this point is not relevant to t..~e issue at hand.

The policy has been bought and paid for, the coverage attendant with such policy extends
PLAlliTIFF'S REPLY BRffiF RE E:N'TRY
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to the acts involved here, and its limits should be ayailable to a tort claimant such as Kyle
Athay.
Rich County, in footnote 2 on P. 4 of its Memorandum lists the va..'ri.ous statutes
which the Idaho State Courts will not apply to out of state governnlental entities. Once
again, LC. 6-926, is conspicuously absent. Utah's CUlTent liability cap and its source 0 f

L"1S'JIallCe is not relevant. The provisions of I.C.

6~926J

.and the pronouncements of the

Idaho Supreme Court tuAthay II are controlling. Simply stated, the cap is $500,000 or

the amount of insurance in ex.cess of $500,000.
Rich Coun..,ty raises what it terms "an entire array of constitutional problems", but
does not fully brief these, claiming that space funitations prevents it from doing so.
Counsel is uaaware of any space limitations for a. Memorandum oftbis sort,
Addressing these constitutional claims, Rich County cannot complain about due
process ami uufair notice. It is the party who first raised the question of the cap on.

liabili1 YbeD.' fe Judge Harding prior to the decision in Atkay 1. It has had fhiland
complete C pj )ortunity to address, brief: and argue these issues.
'" e can orJy guess what Rich County claims are "Commerce Clause
irnplication~" ,

Bm for the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Athay II extending "comity" to
Rich County, Utah, it would likely be exposed to the full amount of Kyle Athay's claims

in-espective of sny claimed cap on liability (See Nevada v. Hall 440 US 410, 99 S.Ct.

1182,59 L.Ed2d 416 (1979).

-

PLAlNTlFF'S REPLY BRJEF RE ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT M1I1 MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

Page 5

.----- ... -------.

:48 PM

Jorgensen

k

1\ 0,

237

?, 8

II. P~r.rIFF IS ENTITLED TO Thr.rEREST ON ITS OFFER OF
SETTLEMENT MADE FURSUMT'f TO I.e g12-301

Rich County" claims that the Plaintiff's Offer of Settlement of January 21, 20'04
somehow lost its efficacy because of a dismissal and that Plaintiff was duty bound to

!:"Jake a new one each time the case was dismissed.
Plaintiff was not required to renew his settlement offer. The case has never been
dis..1l1issed. Dismissal only comes after the Supreme Court adjudicates the dismissaL The
Offer of Settlement; as made on Janu.ary 21,2004 con1inued and is effective as against
Rich County. The Pla:intiffhad no duty to "renew his settlement offer". -To do so would

have requirexi the Plaintiff waive any interest that had accumulated already.
Rich County argues that with the dismissal, the Plaintiff had an opportunity to
reevaluate &"1d adjust its offer. Conversely, after each remand by the Supreme Court,
Rich County had the opportunity to reevaluate and atijust its decisiol1, about its exposure
to' the Plaintiff's claims. Rich County continued to defend the case, conclu.ding for itself
that PlaintiW $ claim was -valueless before a jury. It specifically chose to ignore the Offer

of Settlement and take its chances with the jury. It must now bear those c,onsequences of
its chances. An essential part of those consequences is the interest which has accrued on

the Offer of Settlement.
IlL PLAINTIFF IS THE PREVAILING PARTY
Rich County makes the novel and unsu.pported notion that cQmparative fault is

measurin.g standard to be used in the decision of whether Kyle Athay was the prevailing
party. It argues that since it is only partially liable (30%) that Plaintiff only pa.'iially
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prevailed. It argues the Court should apportion costs in accordance with this comparative

fault notion.
The deter.minatiOll of "'prevailing party~ is left to be sound discretion of the trial
court, The Court should consider the result of the action in relation to the relief sought
by the respective parties.

Tne only parties to this action were Kyle Athay as Plaintiff, and Rich Count-y

Utah as Defendant.
In Decker v. Homeguard Systems, 105 Idaho 158,666 P.2d 1169 (!d. App, 1983),

a jury awarded damages amounting to only 3% of the recovery sought. Despite that
small recovery in comparison to the amount soug.1:lt, the Court of Appeals f01.l."ld that the
trial. COlu-t did Dot abuse its discretion in detenniriing that the home O'WIlers were the

pr-:vailing party.
Here, the major issue was whether the comparative fault of Rich County was
gumg to

exce;~d the

comparative fault of Kyle Athay. The jury concluded that Kyle

AThay had G% comparative fault) despite Defendant's attempt to prove bis crossing the
center line constituted negligence and thus comparative fault. Plaintiff acknowledged
that Dary1 Ervin would have some comparative fault. The comparative fault on the part

of Rich C,Hmty was significant (30% to 0%). The analysis of the respective comparative
fault Duly is to determine wheth~ Kyle Athay prevmled. Clearly he did. The
percenta.ges fOU1,'l.d by the jury are not to be considered in apportionment of the costs. The

appDrtiorunent referred to ill LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) refers only to whether the Cou..rt should
apportlon costs among multiple parties, or where one party prevailed on some issues and
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aI!.Jt.J...ter party prevailed on other issues, Defendant cites no authority fur its 30%
limitation,
IV. Defendant Should Pay 30% of the Non-Economic Damages Awarded

Under any scenario, Rich County should pay 30% of $1,000,000. This is fully set

out in Plaintiff s earlier Mem.orandum.
CONCLUSION
The Court should enter Judgment for $1,307,205.10,

DATED this 18th day of August, 2010,
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P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810
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[ ] Hand-Delivery
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Alan Johnston
E. W, PIKE AND As SOCIATES, P.A.
P,O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403-2949
Fa:;;: (208) 528-6447
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DISTRICT COURT
SiXTH DfCLA,L COURT
/)BE,h,R LAf<E COUNTY IDAHO
~~lJ5t !q/~OIO /:3/fJrv1.
ATE
TiME I
CLERK
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH J1JDICIAL D1stmt\DF l'HE CASE NO.
STATE OF IDAHO, IN A.l\TD FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE

KYLE ATHf\ Y,

)

)
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)

VS.

RICH COlJNTY, UT.A.H,

Defendant.

CASE NO. CV-2002-0000n
MINUTE ENTRY

)

&

)
)

ORDER

--------------------------------~)
On August 19, 2010, counsel for the above-named Plaintiff, Craig R. Jorgensen, a.Tld
counsel for the Defendant, Peter Stirba llild Alan Johnston, appeared for further proceedings.
Dorothy Snarr acted as court reporter.
This matter was set for the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Judgment and other
issues arising out of the jury trial held in July, 2010. The Court reviewed the recent filings in this
matter. The Court also requested Defense counsel submit a copy of the dash cam video which was
admitted as an exhibit in the trial.

Mr. Jorgensen provided argument on his motion and Mr. Stirba responded.

FolloVving

argument from the parties on these issues, the Court took the matter UNDER i"',DVISEMENT. If
the information regarding the collateral source issue becomes available and is submitted by counsel
before the decision is entered, the Court 'will consider the information.

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

1

SO ORDERED.
DATED this 19th day of August, 2010.

Sixth District Judge

CERTIFICA TE OF MAILING/SERv1CE
I hereby certify that on the S;.tif- day of August, 2010, I mailed/served a true copy of
the foregoing document on the attorn~y(s) / person(s) listed below by mail with correct postage
thereon or causing the same to be hand delivered.
ATTOR.~'EY(S)

I PERSON(S)

Craig R. Jorgensen
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 4904
Pocatello, ID 83205-4904

Faxed 23

Peter Stirba
Blake Hamilton
STIRBA & ASSOCLA.TES
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810

Faxed (801)364-8355

Alan Johnston
E.\V. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949

Faxed 528-6447

KERRY HADDOCK,
Clerk of the Court

By

~1 !1iJw,~

D~Clerk
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DiSTRiCT COURT
S[XTH JUDiCiAL COURT
BEAR LAKE COUNTY IDAHO
~/o
-----TIME
CLERK
DEPUTY

CASE NO.

IN THE DISTRICT COIJRT OF THE SIXTH J13DICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN A.l~ FOR THE COIJNTY OF BEAR LAKE

KYLE ATH.A. Y,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

vs.

)

)

CASE NO. CV-2002-0000n

)
RlCH COuNTY, UTAH,

Defendant.

)

ORDER

)
)
)

This COlli"'1: received the following additional filings in this matter; Plaintiff's Reply Brief
Re: Entry of Judgment and Memorandum of Costs, Plaintiff's Further Brief in Support of Entry
of Judgment and Plaintiffs letter submitting additional authority for the Court's consideration.
The Court also received Defendant's letter submitting liability cap provisions from other
jurisdictions.
Based upon the submission of the additional documentation, the Court will take the
Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment under advisement as of today' s date.
SO ORDERED.

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

DATED this 31 st day of August, 2010.

Sixth District Judge
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Craig R. Jorgensen
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 4904
Pocatello, ID 83205-4904

Faxed 23 7-1706

Peter Stirba
Blake Hamilton
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810

Faxed (801)364-8355

Alan Johnston
E.W. PIKE & ASSOCLATES, P.A.
P,O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949

Faxed 528-6447

KERRY HADDOCK,
Clerk of the Court

By1)l~Wi~
Deputy Clerk
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P.o. Bel; 4-904
Ptlcatcl1o,Idabo 83205-4904Te1ephone: (208) 2374tOO
FaaDrile:: (208) '231-17<16
4:",!'1nJcr for P!a::irttiff

IN TB£ DIS'IRICT COURT OF'IlIE SIXTH .nJDJCIAL DISTRICT Of' THE

STAn: OFIDAH~ IN AND FOR THE OOtINTI[ OFBEAIlI...A..KE
KYLEAmAY~

)
)

}

case No. CV-02-000n

)

w.

)

RiOl COUNTY, utAH,
A polJticaI S'CIbdiv.ie:i<lIl of1I1e State cfUbih,

)
)

P'I...AlNIIFF'S FURT.HEIlBRJEF IN'
Su.rPOR'I' OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

}
)

au1borltiea md agu.m.em~ irl support ofPbi:n.tiffs Motioo fur Entry of Judgment.·

"

I. Is Plaillti1f'i Jmmary 21, 2004 Ofier of SdtJem.e:at V Elid.?
a)

=

Prior Dismissals apd 1!C"JlIan ds.

(a) revokes an.J' previOUS Offef". (LC. § 11- I 3<l(c D. PIamfiff did '~alc.ate" fu oifec, a.fu:r'

FLAINIlPF'S FURTHER lOOEF IN
SUPPORT OF ENTR.Y OF JUDGME.NT

Pagel

/~

;
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,

I

(b}

itsclai:m.

In Gilhen v. City afCddwefl. 112 ~ J86, 732 P .2d:1 55 (lJ:Wto App. 1987) 1be

=

Tne fdLbo Court of.Appeals noted:
~ we .are oon.fi:ontx::d. 00K.t with wltether - :in. c:aseli invoh.ing
nw1tlple debda.n1s - IR.CP 68 sbotdd be OO!Djtare (a) iDdepe.ndent
cffets w~ the pniicolac parties' uJ.tim.a1e liability, or (b) collective
affcts with. '(be lOtal ~very.

Charles WIigbt and Artbur Miller su~ that one (JIL'1I'05e of the
fiileral :nile js to protect the party mak.iJlg tile otJe.r.
See 12,

FEDERAL PRACllCE AND PROCEDURE ~ 3(1{}1 (1973). Rule
68, .as fi:Jmwlated, oompares "'the j~ and ''the offer_"
Onlinacity a defeftdant SJ.oldd 1!Dt be pem:ntted 10 point to the offers
Df of!:let:s for -protection fttml p!:{lspedlve oost reoovay. There:fure,
fLAINJ1FF'S FURTBERBRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
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-v.re believe Rule 68 oould be JCIId to td;t the offer and reccve;·ry :frcm
each. party independ.eutly. [&.1] <mly if its own offer ~ded its
:h:iiviiiual IiabiJlty ClIO the pmicolar defeodIDt be said. to Uv-e made a
..fair OM. We bcl~ iuterpn:tttioo win furwd die R1IIles policy of
enootm!l8lll8 :fair and reISOI3abJe settk:meot c..f:ir.::a by ca.c:b pmy.
:Here, me was ultimately held Eable fur rrJ.tm: 1bm ike $1500 it
omed. 1lrece~ 'With respect to 'IRe, ~ Gih:2t.s'" po:siUQll mer
1rial was :mare favo:table dum jf 1'RCs c:ffer bd been accepted.. 112
.Idaho 336, at 399.

The ldilw CCPurt ciredin fuofuote I, fhe case Oi.JOlu:$ff v. p~ DdUiflt~Co., 803

F.2d S67 (s4'- Cir.. 1986).

Tht"~ im:nt"" ofRtsle 68 is 10 pr<JUJOte early se:tdemeat of
litigation. We Itt: satis.fis::d that Congress did oot ~t the nile fi:I
pr-omate settlement gcnenUy and tlte::l limit its poremia1
Application 10 die small fracu(JD. of cml C2!Ie8 pODiim.g m federal
<:-om'!: in which • simgIe plaiDtitf sues a s:i.Dgle dd'eGd.an!..
Com;equcotty. we njoc.t the ar::gum.eat that the me does not apply
to ... joint crlfer:. We CODCIuW: that if J.bD;tml s judginCllf: bad beal
:reru.fered against both J'earod and Hug"hes, ble 68 wendel apply to
lUl1omatica11y Sbi:ft tile costs of the adioo tc the Plainti:f[" 003
Fed.2d 86' at 870.

Both.

Le.

~

11-301 atld IRCP 68 bEWe the pcr!pose of promoting sc£flem.mt. Rich

Cou.nty's claim 1iurt the o:!fi:r is imre..lid- flies in the

fare of t:h..e ~ puryose..
.'

In COIlclusiotl, IJezfrodaM asooro; that PWIaillflwl an Bppodmntyto °:reevalturte the case

Pbintiff s OIkr of Settkmeot. Defendant elected not to do (0 aDd wtead elected to try the case,
puttitlg itself at !isk fur pro-judgment interest as allowed by tlle sta1nte..

lU..WrIFF'S FURTHERBRIEFJN
SUPPORT OYEN'IltY OF JUDGMIDtl
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not ~amed.bow tDe Offuc ofSettlanent was c~ or un6ti:r to:it Deieadant

caaldhave

a.:;cefrted the O.ff~ and insLiWed itself aglim;t alarger verdict
II. 1l1enis N., ~'CAP" ~ UaWlity Whidl Wl)1[ld.huftttRki. ecl!dy

Ca)

The Syp:reme Comes d.ecis.ioD inJlm;L Q,id 001 find die "e.g" gmhed..

The I.dabo S~e Court in Atbay I foa, :in iE ofits <lpiJliQn bat 1he Ie. § 6-

!

I.

II

=

37L
~,

it was <If:n:rmi.ned in At1u!y II that SheriffStacey 'iI(3S not .an d:!!P1oyee.

Oni), Bear Uike Colinty could ma1re Sheriff Stacey mt. emplo,.ee. Bear LaJre O::nurty did

''Thet::e is no evidem.!:·e soppcBtingthe. ooD.tcnaon tb.ai Shed1f Stacey
was at] employee afBear Lake CoumyduringtleymsWt:..
'Ill.erebre, there is no nas-~ foe 1Io1dimg Bear lake Catmty li.ab1e
PL.AJN'fIFF'"S :FtJRlHER BJUE.F IN
SUPPORT OF BNT.RY OF ruDGMENT
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!

tor JUs ooruh.ct 1II.lda-tbe Jdabo Tart C~ Act."" 146 Idaho at

.{g.

I
f

empioyee ofBea:- I.mCoumy_ It necessarily foDowstha« the cap on b1hility doe~ not apply.

(b) The SgpI:eme Coart' I decision m4dA::r:v II didllOt find ... 0iI!p which ~ gIT m

In AtJuq II, fhe. Stlpreme Court, at § D. J. of its 0]I'ini0n was fac.e£ with !he questioa. of
~ K)1k

Mbay had to :lile a tort claims notice rmd.ec IUho lxw whlclJ. ceqWred. itbe done

'WithiD m mooths,. (lr~ Kyle .AJ&.ayoould file his tart daiminRic:b. CoUllty, Utah-M.1hin
one }'Cu. (_ reqtJire4 under Utah law).

IIb:mt romity_

ODe mmt carefiillyreed the hee.ding of1hl.s sooti.an to ml~ its limi1aficm. It stites;
"1. Did. &.e District Coort en'in hoJcb'nl that"dle c:brim ap.iDst
eo.l1~ was barred 'by the fail.-are, Co ~ timdy Dod.ee of
a artdBim UDder the ldal. Tort Cbims Act?1'
Ridl

:Because we b.1we never bdOre been aslmd to apply the doctr:ioe of
oomit)' in a tmt action agairu;t a.oother sbrte, we are amJmll'Icing a
new role oflaw. This O:mrt h3sthediscrclian to decidewl1~er a
new rule oflaw will be.applied10 all pending and .future ~ or
ooJy-to future cases, DTto.fufDre ~ aDd il!.e case in which 'the
rule was antJ.OTJI:JOed. '!12om~o" v. H.o.g-a11, 96 Jdaho 19, 25, 523
P.2cl 1365.1371 (1.974).

PI...A1NTlFF"S :F1JRTBER BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF ENTRY OF' JUI.JoGNFNr

<=>

.J

.l\1though we wiIl3AlfJ this new rule- to ail pe.nding ad fi:mJre
czscs,. we will apply the am.e limit tOr ::iviDg aJlDtWc of1Drt cbim
oaly to c.:ra.:us;s of actioa that arise d:cr·1he jaI!e oftbis OJIiI:rian.
Applyia,s that time ii:mit 1D tbc: pres_ <:as: wtdd n:sok in 1be
P.1ainti1r's ac:tiM beiDgdismissed 1m the f.a.i1urettl :fiIe:ootioe ofbls
tmt claim.against Ri:::iL Couaty",:ifbin ~lmDdred tigbty days,
CiviIlg thrt prevision. acly pmIIIIecti'l'e application woald. llVlrt
Cltjus.tice to !he Pl.aD:!tiff, r&:inoe the P.bimiffdid:not have DOuce that
tbercle-,\;;mtprovisioas: lfiilO] of1b.eJda'ho T~Claims.Actwtdd
be ~dcd to Riclr 0:mDty. R.:ich Co.mywiJI sot be prejudiced
because the Plaintiff gave bOtioe wit1Dn tJ.e time period that woold
have been pemrltred 1IDd~ Utah law, (l!nrpiu'c;i:; added)

KyJeAthay.

i

I

Of jotere:s«, 1be Tda1Jc Supreme Comt Jderl.:
The canstitutioo ctffhe UnifOO Stab!s does DOt protect one state
frt:nn being ned in th.eoourts ofanofuer $Ute. Newula~. HaJf.
(citaticn. c:mUtietlJ. 1A::ewise, the ''full :faith and <::rO:iit clause does
not rectu:ire a state to apply another:: Slate's law -.in vi<JJa:tioo of it!!
0'Mi. kgitimate public policy.~ Ad:ay II at 146 id.d:!o at 4-:20.

=

r 0 ~ttb.e Comt in. UDdCfStanding the jSs.:Ies before tile l<bho Supn:ne
, Collrt,. cxtl'adl;
"

In. Kyk Atbay's Appe1h:m.es Boef filed .in Atkay I" Kyle A1hay cta.ted- as fullffil..'li: "'Jodge

Hatdin1l erred whem he afforded the Utah D~"fundantl a $500.000 "'cap" OIl tiahility" See
Appcllmt' s ~ F, 18. a copy of w"h.iclI is at1ached. beret() as E:::::b.ibit "A" .
Fu:rtber~ K.fie

Athay argued that IDe Dis1rict Court had erred in e:rtendiDg rigllts,.

~eB. and protections

to Sheri1fSbcey. The AppeUJmt's Brief; p. 3(;-42. (Exhibit "Aj

PLJJNTIFF''S FURmERBlUEF IN
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Page 6
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.A.c~ within J 8(J

cb:ys, eva; '!bough the Utah 2Gt g:ave Kyie Atbaya fm1I year:in. which to gNe his

claim. 10 fiId Kyle A1h.ay had co.mplied wit1t Ut3h law m made his claim wim c.ne year.

Kyle .Atha.)' Was careful to -point oL41ilat the fudmg ofa eap 00 fU1lility in Athay I was <m
account<lfhls statn..s as an c:m]Ployee. Syeci1icdy, AppeUant"s Briefstxtes:

'1it Athay I, this oolJrt did not nJle that Idaho 1zw qrpiied. 011 all
issues.. It lQled ooly OllLe. 49-623 (rulea o.fme road] <md fur the
liability cap in LC. 5-926 (Stacey was an employ~ (e.mpJ!am
adikd). (See Exhlhit "'0" at p. 40.)
""£).

PLA1NTIFF~S

FURtHER BR:lBF IN

SUPPORT OFFNIRY OF JUDGMENT

Page?

f'

1
agree 001 r that tile defem:ri.c!lii.an. that §6-926 applies "stands ., (even 1bough. the basis
(eraploymem.)no Iaeger existed).

tiIrol!.gb 29 ~ aitached as :Exhibit uP".

In ccmcIm:ioo, the at».y finding by the lUbo Supn:me On&c\ that lit ~ap 00 lliIibffity vrolild

AtlI.ay U defuriti1'cly ~ed that Sbcri:ffSblcer 'Ml$ nat an employee of&ar-l..d:e
ColU!ty-;. and thecerore,. ~:is no basis far w.bieh 10 fiDd th.at I. cap on liabiky applies.. The-otily
'€!:ring thatAtMy II decided IS tbst tlLe:ootice requirements would nothar x:..yJe .Atb.a:y's claim.··

Nev4d.1J v. Hall is that a stare's e.aps en liability wi1l not ~ it when one of thci:r

Waho Tort ClalmsActappl:y ardon"t lIIPply. Th(Jge o:mclulidoDs ~reaJly beside the porm

=
l

~se Kyle ft.Jbay did give notice ofl::rig Tort aaim so ihat:it oomptied ~ the reqniremen1s

hWlDLaw.

k romi lD coosider that the Idaho law (witlt it; J80 day reqcireru.:nt) a.hauid apply. 'Wby
should ii1 Utah. had:received the notice it! k:gisiature~. Rich C:luIrty SOllgbt application

-

PI...AJNTIFFS FURrnER BlUEF IN
SUPPORT OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

PageS

'

CJ
CD

kgttimate pabue :policy."
~'sclearpoolic:po]icy is 00 ~ecti1s

ci'tize.ns mKylc A1tuIy. '.Ibere isll.()Jl~

served when we em:nd a cap OIl Hab:ility to Riclt CbuDty, t'ttah when tht:re is insmam:e in pJa.ce
dcsiglleci 4D cove:- the 10rts afRiclt O:rumy, Utah.

::fi:x is Ul fi:ru:I thet:e is nc GaJl in place.
DATEOthis :z~ d"ycfAngJ.l5t.20l(),

"=:1

>-

><
~

=

t'0

c:::J
\.'.~

CD

t'0
LU

--.J
-..J
c:::J
OJ

1#

PI..AlNTIFFS FURTHER BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF ENTRY OF JUIlGMENT

P~e9

CEKlll1CATI OF MAILING
I:hen:by «:rtifythat on be ~ day of Augut. 20 LO, I ~~ a 1mc: and ca:.m:ct: copy of
tII-e fa!'egomg plrading O!lbe foUawing ~s) by 1he mClllllJ so indicm"=
[ 1Fll.'st C1assM..id

FeM Stir"ha

I v?t3CSimile

P O.Box 810
sa!t[u.eCity. Utah. S411()-08](]

r J H.arui-Deliv<:ry

S11ltB...I;. &.A~SOru..TES

Fe%: (MJ) j6t~3,!5

AIm Jahnsfoll
E:W. PIKE AND Ass10cIA JES,.P .J.~
P.O. Box 2949
1dMo FaUs, Idcha 834Cl-29-49
F.r:r ('JlJ8.) j18-M41

--:r-j

::»-

><
::2':;

=

.

f'-.J

CJ
cx:::l
.~~~

t'---.J

LL)

-....::J
-1
CJ
Cf)
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i.

Bfatles,

.t speeds ill

~

t;f 95 miies per hour,. Dell

COIDpe1eBt

e\li4enee suggests the

DefeDd:antl w~ the.a.t3},3t to the 'Peed Gf1he pnrftit JIIDd die DefCllCants were ill dCI5(~

"~" f

yet
sia:1iag..lle
dectiued• to IIPPly it).
•
r

in liability.

=

Jadge H.md.ing a:t"ClIIOOIlSly gta.!De4 Sutmnary Judgmentto the BearLake County DefeadL~
<m me

22nd day of July> 2003 (R Vol. ~ p. 739). Judge H<m:lIDg's co:ndusicms incll.lChl1lte

foHowing;
,

I
I

(1)

1hattbe standard ofcare fur iliep()lice offi~~1U .~ cfum::gW'O"" amd that such

.., 0

..- . - - 'I

II

rnis .:;p;·LG:. sh>ill !klt opemte·ta reI.ieve & driver' of an _tborized
L>!' ~~ ';1~1''' drive. wrtt:T ChLe ~
fm the scuet:y of all perron.s asing the highway. (ern.pb.isis added).
e~:-, C1 pOl~ .c;mClC

f
.

~

(J.

.;_It
.~.

arpcoperty. Waho Code

§4~ti23(2){c).

The officexs.h.ave Il duty 10 drive with due regard foethe

saf~t;y 'sD perSGns (Idaho Code §49-ti23(-4». The ofiioe.rs; w.he.ll operating their 81I..cf:ible m: visible'

si.gma1 znay cg;ect <Jthcr motor.ists to yield 1berigbt of way to Uem. fI.owev.er,1b.ey.are siill regu:Ded
to ·'drive witb due regard for "be safety of all per.sans asing the

f.rlgbwaf'{Id.abo Code §4-9-62S(1).

.

'""r;!

:- >-

:

>-<

t

=

j~ ~

~:: ~
SheriffStaoev.

~"

c::::::J

~

CCJ

0

."

~..,

]
LD
;, ---J
i

..' --1
• : c::::::J

:! ~

(2)

. The benefits of the idaho T(lIt OailJ'"•.s.M - specifically protecti on of1he $500,000.00

cap 00 tiability.

The:s.e:fi."J:l&Dgs are iu erT{){. To begin. with, JudgeHaz-4ing giVes Stacey·more prateclion in
(d3M th<m be would beaff(}roe:l in his home stareaf£.fuh. L"tsh iaw makes Scacq uab1efur his acts

._--------_.

__.. _--_ ... - - - _ . _ - - - -

CJ)

I·

.'

,-...

..•.....~,

<

.".- .

I
i

of negligence in Utah, Judge Harding's decisic:m a1l(J~ S1acey to (:ome to Jdabo mel act

crt recldess disregard without e::rposcre 1(1 liability.

I

~
~

..

..

uP t.:J l ~>e[

'Why'?

citiz:ns md subj ects lAJd ~ors to 1be j~s4i:::tioo ofidabo Comts. The l1Jtlmg:s a1 S(j roD &:foul of

-'"

Idaho's policy of a.1lowiug L pe7son to recover fur his injmics. DeMe::JII!.T v. MCl:l:WelI, Ja; Idab::l 321,

647 P.2d 183 (1da.ho App. 19&'2).
Judge Budiog's ratioaaJe in affording privilege to Siteriif S~y1- "'the. ~or concern of

the.Bea:r.I.ake area" (R V(jL:IT, p. 5(4).
Why?

.

.

. Cc4e §67 -2329. Despite 1t:Us failure to pet:fect an agreement, !De Jtldge HarcfuJt still o..1i:Ilderl'

=
r- ..:J
C:::.
CD

1];'llat a.b:nrt: Kyle Atba,Y's inlerests? 1n his sta;te of pac:ap1egia, the CoIJI't shonld be .mare
o:mcerned abcratpro1ecting1hecitittns

oflda1x:J

than "cltillirJg" COOJl~l<:lJl between the agencieS

OfboRleciIIg stares (R V<lL lI" p. 504).
Judge Hardin8 stales he ~ tb: iIM!8ti:~n"" tn apply tbe. doctrine of comIty to Sheriff

"

. .

Fits! of all, UQ1h Co:Ie §63-30·1 {l provides- thatimmuoicy ~ sri! is waived foe J'l~igence

].f.

(A)

AlI.ciibli and "fSUaJ signals are used;

(q

The ofii.a::r- has beezl trai:ned ill ao:::ardao.ce "Mth tile vmnen poJicy; ZlDd

CD)

The

poru:;. . "is en OOJlfoCmaooe witii ~ estabEsbeO by 1be Deprut~ of ':

stuJdaJds .. _".
Stacey djd DOt: qualifY fur immunity inNs

CfMl ~ be.c:ause

his written policy (R VoL r, p,

2.14-216) was not:m "oanfocrtJallce VI'i't'h stan.dards . • •" became there~{Ul standmds.. UClih

of ~ WaIJentine Supp ~ p. 37. and Ord.et Striking Affidavit,. (Augroented. Itecanl <R Vul. IT, p.

"'A!isLmling ar~ th Utdl POST "Etmdard.'" has beea <'promulgated"'propt'rly - Ky.!e
Atb.!y ~ the Comt to oorapare the '<model"" an.d R.idl CoU:OIY for oocrfurm.ity (they are found at
Supp R. cW-43 and R Vol I,.p. 274-276). Kyle A1hayfurCher iD:yjtes the· Cotut to determine wbeihe:r
Stat%y~~ QWD policy.

.. - - .-- - - -• . - ..

P/f}il:S t'3rief )n ~rt TW

.-

- ---_. _ -- -

- - - - - - --

-

.....J

.

.

. TIrus, St:.acey-was not eMitled to .immtmity ml pEote::tiao in Utah.. yet Judge Hacdinggives
it 10 SUiGey mJ~.

In NewuJa 11. Hall , 440 US 4 ] 0, 59 LEd 2d +16, 99 SO llt2. a Univexsi.ty afNe~

N~ ntempted to qu1!!l se.."\~an '!be Stale afNe'iI1Ida. Ho~ 1beCaEfomia Supreme Q." lllrt

iLeId as II. ~r of Calif(l!'7!ia kw~ that the S<.A1e of Nevada was .emenable in suit in the Cilifan:ria

courts. Lztu, Nevada:filed (rfu. SJlmfI Stacey:) aPJe..TriBJMo1ioJi. to .Ji:mit the amount of damage!
IIIld ugood tbm Nevada'5 ~ cap on Ji2Ihifity afS25pOO applied in the California CGI.IIU. The
Califooria oeurt denied tbatmoti.<m, the.matter '\\'ea! tn tria.t. the jury found the N~ <kiva W!S

negligent.. and &wa...-dd: damages

in.:be SlmJ on J) 50,000. The IMI:er"Ulti tboo appealed to 1be U.S.

Suprcne Court.. It ll.ekl tlJat the· ful.1·fBjtb !lind. c-raiE.t cl!DI.Se of·theConsti1ution did DOt req~

ailifOmla t() apply Nevada's law (<:ap em ljabjIiry) in ·!.'loJation afits oWn 1e.gi1imate public policy
of allowing 1bOse n.egJigent1y nytrred to geCUre fall CO~ tem. for their quries

In this case, CalaGpUa has- "'declared its will""; it:bas adopted as jts
policy full. compe:lsatia1l in its courts :for .injuries 00 ill hiBhways
resulting :from fue neg£igenre. of others
those ~ be
re.sidcms or J)()mesiacres. ae:c:Ots of the State.,. Or yriv2Ire ' ~s.
Nc:rtbiJI.g in ~F~ Cansci1u!icm crutb~ or obllga1es this Court
10 fuLsfr2.te 1bat poJicy om of eo1i:m:.ed respxt fOr de sovereiglL.+y Gf

wh.e!ia-

N~

In tf:Dg Nation eacb.. !<lvereign go"'e:!1JS ooly wrfu !be ConseDt of the
govc:rnod.. The pocl{Me of Nevada have e<msellted fD fI Sjlste.m in
whlclt their Sw-e is ! ur.:;ect anly kJ funitzil liabilit;y in tort. .But the
pt>Ople of Cslifumia" who bltve bad:no voice in Nevw"s decision,
have .adopted Ii difk:rent system.. Eaeh of1tr.se. dc:cisicms is equelty

amtkd toowlesped.

N~dQ

Y. HaJJ, 59 L Ed 20, 4,2.!.429.

APFa.u.NT"s BuEF - PAGE 39
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=

w

1"he poopk (Jfldabo had lID voice ill U tlih's decision. b cap the liability ofits empLoyees who

I
I

Th.e clear 1eacbi!I.~ and holding <Jf Newx!ay_ HaIJ a that. (De e. cap" an tiahilliy does DOt apply
and K.yle AlDay is :free t() purs~ damages, Judge: fUIrtiing~s d ecl:iicm to "'cap" the Uab. Defendants'

,.

:;

said:he doclmed.

gro?fing out of a ooJlirion between. a. .Deptlty Sberif! ftom Maryllrld and a Dela~ resicientm

De.1Eware, Mary£m:iclainoed pItl1eCtion byvirtoe of jts 1Brtclaims ad, It ,userted the DeU.wace

Ccfurt should apply full fz:itfl and cmiit to the M&.r}'lmd act and fur1be.r, shoald apply (Xl!nit:y, aud

The ooc.t1ictiog irrteresfs of the SbepbcTIk in seekmg full
campensatiOa and the State ofMaryJ.d'.s roque;(:fur complete or
limitr:d re1jcf are diametrical1yopposed.. Since these eontlicting
requ.esCs canDOf be~. fbell1tima~ questicm.this Co-mt must
decide is v.fuetbe:r the 8ade GfMatylmd'.f reqEleSf fur absolute or
li.mit:ed .sovereign immunity for1be fm1B ofits agents ",rithin &. State
Of Delaware:. as a mafk.r Gecomity. eidlc:r offtms or c~'''<ith
the pifbIic policy of De]aw-a:re.. Accordingly, W'e must camille the
pu.blic policy of Dc:.JPIa..-re, mpadicuf.ar. as that pu1ilic p()licy is
reficam :in ihe lq;islative c::oact:f:nf:Db arm etedOO.:represe:c:rtatives.

7 i3 A.M at 299-300. .
. . .. The Delaware Lcmg.:Al::m. SC3tt..t1e and the De.Jawue Tott Cairns
. Act both :rdkct a cohetent and: compreh.erlsive public pelky whidJ
prohlbits a De.ia.wm: Court :fi:<lm ~gn.i.ring, as s matter of comity.
eitb.et the ab!>tW1e or 'Cbe ~ ~ei.gn iJn.numi.t;y arguments tbar
bave been assened by LJapp a.od tbeStale CJf~ Uad'ore,
'W'C have oJDcJuded that the public policy tmdertying & J:>....llroA.-are
. ~Arm Statute and the D::1a'W.aI'e Tart Claims Act Uvtlr.i
pe.ttnitf.ng S~ andClineto ~verthe full amouot ofmop~

..

- - - --- -

_..

__ _
..

~7{)

- _._- -- -

._-- .._----_.-._--

=

I
r
I

damageS 8'nW:dtrl1o eaCh

of them.

r= SDpeclOr Court should Mve

c::oterodjud~in i2v« ofShqiberd aruiClilleiD ~ witt

tb e damage .ilwm!s l:ecotltll)Ol.dcd by 1he a/aitta1DI.

.,

113 A.2d.:rt j01.

::~-

[,

--,:,
t

P'nDaples of comity de oot requi~ Icbho to apply UtBlt laY.' wlal to do so woold damage

. ~.

! ;.: .:".

r~

i!;J~

.

(eil App 1995).

by comity. SUJ'l!e'rl'. 0 'Cc;mtdl As!:.oc.. Inc... 84 f 3d 132 (4th Cit. J996); PennoJ1f!1" w. Neff. 95 U.S.

714, 72<l-22" LEd 565 (I 877].

Kyle ~'! due ~ rights ~ -yioJa1ed whe::! Jodge Hanfing exte'3ds protectiGnto

c.>
\

-I

c.,

Idaho oWS'..s .flCi

.c~mity

to

S~

Staoey. \i.'Jty should I(} Stacey did no1 cruatify fOJ

in.:favor of Stacey? WRy should lda.ho allow Stacey a

co

~

"~4:-ldess

di:sregard'" s1aOOttd when Ae does

not e..~.ha'l'ejtin. Utili?
If1De tibJes

~ re~ed

.

and an Uiaho Sheriff oommitted a tort an. i Utah. resident; Dmh

.

-

.

who did nat ma:t k:p£ requrrC!nents:for protection in his own home stm; 10 ba\'e such pcore::ticm

co
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'._/

1.

rallis ~WDDecisioo afJuIy12,2i>03

GR Vol. Il, p. 739-141 1Ju~~ struck

tilePu."lidav.its D-fPJs.inttlf's ex~ Othert.h.a!lciting iRa 56(e),. theCcmrt ciresooOt!.~wthari~.
The 4.~on :mal:es references to alleged deficie:acies:in k

A1p:::rt

.

AffiJav.i1 ~ gives few particulm.

q:uafifies as 1m ap::rt and his .Af:ii&vit was offacl :for tb.ose pwpases. IRE 702. His

~ offol.l!lCba:ion be ~UIe:red:in giving his CtwDaCL l:!iDes v. Hines,

129 Idaho 841.934 P..2d

2D (1997); Kessle.r 1'• .&raw~, 129 Idaho 647, 931 P.2d 641 (1997).

=
.

.

.

Kyle Aths:y invires the C()u:rt to co.r::si&er Alpert' $ Affidavits. There meno cJe:fedsJustifYiag
.

.

striking them.. Jodge Ikrdjog is e::::rDlOeotlsly ~ aboutAlpert giving ~piuions about wnat is
negligent <md recldess. Alpert-wnuld assist the jury (R V Q1 n,.p. g32).
Jooge Harding is st:rib.ng the Affida:vits ( .1I.DId. grami.ng Surnmsry hdgrne.rtt). is wntrary 1Q
..

"

cR Vol n, p. 752).

- - . - - _ . _ . _ .. - - - - - - - . - - - .

I
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era: R.
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Jorgensen

FAX No, 208 237 1706

p, 001

)
~

'"

tb.ilt policy, and that th: pursuit be conducted in accordance with that policy. Utah Code § 41-6-

14(4). Each of these requirements was met in this case. R.. Vol. ~ p. 252. The final requi.."'ement
for immunity under Utah law is that the: operator of the

~mergency vehicle has

a "duty to act as a

reaBooably prudent emergency vehicle operator 41 like circumstances!' Utah. Code § 41-6-14(5).

ItiB evident, given the argument presented herein. that Sheriff Stacey acted as a reasonably
p1;ndent emergency vehicle operator inlik.e 'oircumstances would. In fact, each of 'the officers
involved iIi tbi~ purgouit acted in the same prudent manner.
·Plaintiff.Aths:y relies upon Dqy jJ, Utah Department ofPublic Sqfety, 980 P.2d

H71 (rJteh 1999). for his assertion that '"Sheriff Staoey did n.ot qualliy for immunity and

in his home state, why sh.ould Idaho grant it?'· See Appellant's Brief at 38. However,
iovl~melltal immunity seotion

applied in Day, Utah Code § 63-30-7, was repealed six,

:after-the accideIltmDay, and was replaced byUtalJ. Code §63-30.10(lS), Sf!!.eDay, 980
1182. Thus the test for immunity under Utah 1aw would be entirely different under Utah
j

'63-30-10(15) than it was under pay. which. specifioally held that the Utah Code

~tlC'SLb1e at ~ time

w;: unco~titutiooa1. ld. at i 187. However, at least two Utah COlli"tS have

~~Wled t!J.at Utah Code § 63-30-10(15) is

constitutional imd that in circumstances Uke here,

of the requirements is met, immunity is warranted. See Kaurf.s, 2003! 70 P 3d 72;

:;,

"

-

--.-.-----~--- ..." ..

..---,---,- - - - - -
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the mjLLry occ:.rrred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred.,.(c) the domicile,

residence, nationality. place of incorporation and placo ofbusin.::ss of the parties, .and (d) the
plane where the relationship, if any, between !h,e parties is oe:ntcred.. .. Seubert Excavators, Inc. v.

AnderscmLoggmg CO' 126 Idaho 648, 651, 889 P.2d 82, 8S (1995) (citing John.son v. Pipchke,
j

108 Idaho 397,400, 700 P.2d 19, 22 (1985)):

Here, the Rich COl.ln..-ry' Defendants do not spe~ifically dispute that the District
Court was in.~c.tin app1y.i.ngldaho law. R. VoL II, p. 497·500. However, oontra.....yto what
..-- '-

,-'

-'-

;

plaintiff Atb.B.y asserts., the Rich County Defen.dants do assert that oruy either Utah. law or Idaho
jaw is applicabl,;; to this case, Furthermore, as will be discussed below, if this Court does decide .
W&.RPly ~Jtah law,

the Rich CD~ryd~f~~ wo!ud be immun.e from suit pur.mrmt to the U~
,<~• •~
~'
. """"
_.:~ " .""a......--?'~ .. -

• .",
I

I

GQ~~ernm.eD cal I:nmunity Act, and fuus would b~ entitled to sum.mary judgment because of the I
fa:cts ofthi. car,j, Iftlili Court dooides U? apply Idaho htw, the Rich CD:u;ntyDefendants are
egjitled tr.l SUIJ.:rrnary judgment regardless of whetb.er this Court determines the staD.dard of care to
~~~t.:iSS &sr:;gard or due care.
A.•

ALTHOUGH SUMMARY-.JtIDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE IN .

THIS C_4..SE, IF THIS·CASE 'HAD GO:N"E TO TRLti, EITHER TffE
IDAHO TORT CLAIMS ACT WOULD BE APPLICABLE,
INCLUDING ITS $500;000.00 DAMAGE CAP, OR THE UTAH
TORT CLAIM:S ACT INCLUDING ITS $250~OOO.OO DAMAGE CAl'.

Plaintiff Athaywould have this Court take a step ne'ver before seen in ;\mencan

and. apply the law of California to a Utah Defen.dant in case where the :injury

.-. -::g~1jmiil Idaho. Here, tbB .only link Ca1ifo:m.ia has to this case is plaintiff Athay' s m.isguided
1::J:.~~eo(.ir¢.a ~.l,!qp. 440

_

,'

-...-~I--Ij~~~ '8 BiliEF - PAGE 11

--~.-.-

-

U..s. 4 to {1979) :stands for tOO proposition that Califomia'5 no

_ _ '. _ _ _ """ _ _ ~".'

' . '"

o.

"

, _ .~

-_._- . ,- - ---"._--_. -,-- _•._--

...... . _

... , .... ,,- . . . . .. -. -~.- • ••

.-~

7 v." "- - " - - - ---
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damage cap is controlling. Hall only stands for the proposition that one state's courts must give
full :faith and credit to

me decisions rendered Lll another state.

The Hal! court states:

California has provided by statute for juritldiction in its courts over residents and
n.onreBidonts alike to allow those injured on its.highways through the negligy!lce
of oth.ers to secure full compensation for their ~juries in the California oourts.

In firrther implelrl.511tation of that policy, California has unequivocally waived its
OYm i'-:no:nUlity from·liability for the torts oommitted by its OViI!l agent!; and
autb.orized full rer;overy ev:en against the sovereign. As the Calliomia cotl1't.S have
fowd., to ;req'llire Califamia either to S"J!'I'e!lder jurisdictioll or to limif respondents'
recovery to the 525,000 maximum of the Nevada .statute would be obnoxious to .
its statutorily based policies of ju...~dictiOD o~er llotlreSid.ent motorists and full
reoovery. The Pull Faith and Credit Clause does not require tl:ris resuit.

ld. at 424. Tn.e issue in Ball was whether the law of the defendant's state of Nevada applied, or

the'law of-California applied which was where the injury o~cUIred and the plaintiff ltv-ea. There
,.
'
.
Clf law, Nevada. or Ca.1i:forni:r. .1.f)he Hal! CO'1l.r."i had used the doctrine of comity;

~1~?·· ": ~..
". - ~(D choices

. 1~~"'o\J. l.I.lU h.ave applie:d Nevada law in Califor:n.la. Bere, there are also :wo choices of law, Utah
~~O'.:."1..·;o..........,......·law. However,

plaintiff Athaywould have this Court construe Hall to hold that

:Utah law not Idaho law is applicable. but rather that the California rule of no cap on
· lf~~l3!~·ClEmlag(~

applies to e~eryone in. the United States because the SL.'Preme Court applied it

Tin a California case where ironicaL'y California law was applicable. See Appellant's

Plaintiff Ath.ay should rethink his argum,ent that the District Court "claims to

. the Utah Defendants.'; Appe.llimt's Brief at 41. Plain.tlff A:th.ay misunderstands
r:mmt;P.

.'; '.

. .:

~,

'

.m this
me District"Court
did decline to in"'wke comity in favor 9,f
-._-_case.
..... '.. .
"._. .
-, . - -_.

~

.,'

If the District Court were to have'applied comity, the District Court

- - _._ ._...

_ __ __
.... " ..

.....

..,,,.-_._-_..
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'Would have applied utah law. S~plyput.

the District Court did not apply Utah law, but rather

!:hose to appiy only Idaho law. Thus, the Utah defendants never enjoyed a privile.ge from their

cwn jurisdictio~ and comity wall n.over given. Therefore, if this Cou..-t does not uphQld the
Elistriot Court's grant of sum.ma1"Y judgment, which as evidenced below is eritirely proper: it must

apply either the Idaho damages cap ofS5DO.DOO.OO or the Utah damages cap of$250,OOO.OO.·

B.

ilPPLICATION OF THE IDAHO TORT CLAIMS ACT TO TE:E

UTAH DEFENDANTS IS NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL G;R.~rr
OF STATUTORY PROTECTION NOR A VIOLATIO~ OF ID.mO
STATUTORY POLICY.

,J.,.

'~1hen

ali issue presonted on appeal is not su.pported:by propositions of law,

authority, or argument, it will not be considered. on appeal." Leferink 133 Idaho 780, 992 P.2-d at
J'~":I

180..Here, plaintiff Athay presents no argument or proposition of law or authority that even

~~,
. i!i.~es that application of the Idsho Tort Claims Aot to the Rich County Defendants is either 1)
~ r~~

.

t~'!it~,

.~C011stituti.onal, or 2) a violation ofIdaho sta1utory polioy-o Rather. plaintiff Athay makes
~>, .

ii~erous statements followed byth.e.q'.lestion. why? 'This Court shouJdnot allow plaintiff
~1.t?ay to rely an the

smattering of inapplicable authority he presents to indicate why the

!~~"'

•

.~~lli:latiQn

of the Idaho Tort Claims Act to.the Rich County Defondants is in error.

;: ::~!,

•

First, plaintiffAthay states that "[s)uch rulings run afoul·ofld.aho'l!i long arm

(Idaho Code § 5-514), which protects Idaho citizens and subje....'""ts tort feasors to the
JU5:kSdll::;t1oln ofIdaho, Courts." Appellant's Brief at 37. .As :plaintiff Atbay admits, Idaho Code §

4 is jurisdictional. It does no~ deterroine which choice of laws is applicable. Therefore, .
~1t;I\J/m

--.--____

§ 5·514 is inapplicable to any discussion on this matter. Plaintiff A.thay's citation of

IP-I'lNDl~'8 BRIEF • PAGE
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J,daho Code § 5~514 does DOt amount to making aD argumont; citation

P. 006

to au.thority, or statu.tory

snpport for his allegations of unconstitutionality or 'Violation of pDlicy.

Second, plaintiff Atbay cites to DeMeyer v. Ma.:x:well, 103 Idaho 327, 647 P.2d
.7,B3{Idaho App. 1982). See Appellant's Brief at 37.

The DeMeyer case provides no support for

plainti:ff Athay' s allegations. The DeMeyer court undertook a choice of laws analysis, as the
DiStrict C01L.4: did here, and then applied IdBho law) as the District Court did here. The only
l~~ uage in DeMeyer that evon rem()t~ly advances plaintiff Atbay's position 5ho">\'8 that the
~~, '

' .\;

q-~.ct'iotCourt in fa.ct enforced Idaho policy by applyi:o.g Idaho law. Specifically, the DeMeyer
.,..•.
• :.1<\

'.. .b.\1ieid that "the trial court's refusal to apply Oregon's guest sta~te prorecred..ldaho ' s interest
~abn'1mll! its policy." [d,

at 786. The ~;C.7c f;ounty Defendants cannot imagine how the District ;
. -,- .•., ..,

===...,·~n· .ofId.apo

.:.......~

~--

...-

"-' . -

i

law in this oase ~d...Yio~ Idah.?.:~ p_o_liCY to arn1v its own laws.

;.;;.~·!a. toy:;;T 1J> not supporthre ofpla:intifi' A:thays

position that the District Court's application

EESiBiallo Tr'Tt Claims Act to the Rich County Defendants is unconstitutional or a violation of
. ~~, beC<lllSe pl.8i.otiff Athay presents !l.O authority, argument or proposition of

:C0ntention.,
this Court should not address.
it. Furthermore,
it is logical that applying
,
'

an accident that occwred in Idaho is .both constitutional and in acoord 'With a policy
ow.n.lawB, thus plaintiff Athay's argument falls as a matter of law.

-c.

;rF UTAH LAW WEF..E APPLICABLE, THE RICH COtIl\TY
. DEFE1'I'DA..~S

WOULD BE Th1MUNE FROM SUIT:BY
PLAINTIFF ATHAY.

"='~IUW -e:Oum ~ok 'to
~~ply..

the mlPst.significant relationship tes,t in deter.r:rrb:llng which

:m.i!bis ease, the 'pm,gllit sm.'?'/:ed in U~ and was cQntinued by a Utah
. ...._.,-._...'.
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Sheriff Stacey and the Rich County Defendants admit, as does plaintiff Atbay. that once
I

:tbe ,pnrsu~t

v..rj,~.

p, 007

I

entered Idaho, toe Bear Lake County Defendants assumed oontrol of the pursuit. R.

IT, p. 820-21. However, if this Court does detenni:o.e that Ut:ah.law applies to the Rich

Cotmty Defendants, they are imm:une from suit. Ironioally, plaintiff Athay asks tb.i.s Court to

a;plY Utah law. p1aintiif Atb.ay tries to llse an affidavit strbken by the trial court to say that Utah.
Gsde§

41-6~14

cannot b:l applied "because there were no [pOST] standards." See Appellant's

~f.at 3 8. However~ at l~t two Utah oou..~ have seen thiogs differently, and have applied

t1iab
Code § 41-6-14 as this
. .
. Court should. SeeKouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 2003,

70 P.3d

~

~~~:2~03 L"'T 19; Lyon li. Burton., 2000, 5 P.3d 616, 20nO UT 19~ 2000 UT 55. ,
"~":~' :" ;':"

- - - _ . ,..
The applicable Utah law in op~ati6n a:t the time oftbis tr:~G ool.lision allowed'. "

'

-""""-

"

I

,1,

~,~ch County Defendants would be i:rom.une from suit/ ~peci:fi~aTIy, Utah Code § 63~30- i
.!

. ..._.--.,..l

governmental iomUDity for "the operation of an emergency vehicle, while
~iR'idr:tV~:m 1n accordance

with the requiremen.ts of Sectio1l41-6-14," Utah Code § 63-30-

;~~!f.e~;o.diftodatU.C~~ § 63-30d~301 (2004)). Utah Code Section 41-6-14 allows that
~era't()r

of an authorized emergen..,,), vehicle may ... exceed the maximum speed Iin:ri"'i.S ... :

,~4 1 -6-14(2)(c).

Section 41-6-14 goes on to say

mat the "[p]rivileges g.-anted under

.

is Dot involved in a.. vehicle

'

. to the operator of an authorized emergenoy vehicle, who

only when: (:a) the operator of the vehicle ~oUDds an audible signal .. , ; or (b)

.~,,'D~~,.u........ , which l:S visible from in front of the vehicle."
~~a.r;,lnerlts

It is uncontroverted that

I ..

were met in. this,case. FurthellJlore, Section 41-6-14 goes on to

~~suiIlg· .aw..ncy have ap:Jl.I:Slili po1ky~ that the pursuing officer be !rained under'Y,

r-----------." .....
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In 1988 when the legislature revi,si:t.ed these statutes" reco:iifi...:ug them und:r different
sections ano .:trulldng slight amendments thereto, it had an opport:utrlty tD stcik:e the due care. language
from Idaho Code §49-623 and add. recldess disregard language to Idaho Cod.e §49-625 and Idaho
Code §49~705. For the Respondents to clabl "the legislatures intent .. , is evident" (Bear Lake

COutJ..."Y R.esponden:ts· Brief, Pa."ere 16) probably giv~s more credit of diligence to our legislature than
it d.eserves.
II.
CHOICE OF LAW, CO:MITY, AND IMMUNITY

The Rich Coun..+y Dtfencia:n.tsc1aiin tb.a1 the District C01L.'i may have 'been incorrect in
applyin.g, IdIitio law (Rich CoU1:lty Respondents' Brief;. Page 11). They:fu.r+'Jle:r contend that ifUfuh
law had siJplied" they would have been entitled to, immlJIlity (Rich COUllty Responcients' Brief, Page

11; 15, z:ud 16).
-

,

judge PJirding rlopted Idaho law as a proper choice of law. He also chose to apply Idaho' s

$500,000.00 cap0:!1liabilityto fuepjch County; Utah Defendant-s. The effect~ to apply thlsldahO
s".atutory caD in m;vot of an unauthorized
non-Idaho municipality.
,
~

A.

Idaho l&w and PQliCY;Rroteds Id;m 0 citizens from the torts of out of state

a"'long arm,j statUte (Id.ahO Code §5~514).

MaLo has

This sta:tUte allbtvs Idaho to

exte'lid its arms arJ, subject out of state tort feasers to the jn.."isdiction of court for the purpose of
fur"J:H~ing ldahc

::i

policy of protectllig itsci1lz.ens aga.i.nst tort feasors,

.]le effect of Judge Harcijngl s ru:1i:ng in extei:uiing a protective cap ill :favor of a nOn..
Idaho muni.cipaJity and against the interest ofi:ojured citizens, such 2$ Kyle Afuay, is cont:rroy to the
'

-"------

',
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Ju~e Hardi.ng~ 5 decision is r...u:""ther

xrntra.ry to Nevada

v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
B.
Y!ah law is not applicable and e'i~en ·if it were, Ricb Conntv Defendants
'i'i'ould not be immnne.

The Rich Ctmnty Defendants claim that they would be immune from. suit :in Qtah

(Respondents; BriElf, Page 15). The UtihDefendants cite Kourts v. Utah Hig}n.jlay Patrol, 730 P.3d
72 .(Utah 2003); and Lyon v. Burton, 5 P .3d 616 rutah 2000).
These Utah Defendants misState and misconstrue then- qwn law. They assert that

Lyon an.~ Kouris s"..and for the proposition that officers in pursuit are immune from Lawsuits.. The
following language for KtJuris is illustrative:

Utah Governmental Immunity Act «'Act'') gr.ants general imm:uoity
t.o govermnententities 'from suitfoI anyinjurywbich results from the
exercise ofa·governmental function! Utah Code A.Im.§63-30-3(l)·
(1997). On
other 'hand, the Act alSo provides a -waiver of
illununity ,£:or itrlury proximately caused by a :negligent .act or
omissioIl. of an employee committed 'Nitirin the srope of
employ.r:nent.' Id §63-30-10. Howeyer, the Act lists numerous
exc~tions to this waiver of immunity. one ofwbicb is._ 'me operation
of an .emergency vehicle, while being d.f:iven in accordance with the
requirements of§41-6-14.' Id. §63-30-10(lS).

me

Kouris, 70 P.3d;.lt 75.
Thus. §63-30-3(1) provides inlmunity. But

§63-30~10

waives immunity for employment

related n.egUgen ;e,
There, a',e "exceptions" to the waiver (see Led/ors v. Emery CourlIY & Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d
1162 (Utah 19~3 )). One such·exceptioll lswnell an emergencyvebide was being operated pursuant
......

tCi

§41'~14(4).
"

..:: ..: ... ,.,~.' ",

.L!;"'(,.:;'.':.L~'H"

.

~;:"

'

fhm: seCtion t'eq~~l'ti1f:a. ftrat the operator have audible and visual signa1s~

•

...J,

:"

.'

. '

•

'

have a written policy. be trained., and the writt.en policy l?e in confolIUan.c:e with POST standards.
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The standard of care in Utah .at thetir.ne of this purSulc read:
(a) Tne privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an
author...zed eJ:llel"gency vehicle from the duty to operate the verJ.icle
. wifn. rega:rtffor the safef:J1 of all perso:os~ or protect the operator from
the comequenoes of an arbitta:ry exe.rcise. ofthe privileges. Id. § 416-14 (19&8) (emphasis addedV

Rich County> s bold statem.en1 that they would be immune from suit is :fuJse and llJisleading.
I

C.

•

..

Cases cited bv the Utah Re§pondents do not stand for the ;gTopO'sition as

Kouris 'V. Utah Highway Patrol, does not stan.d for the proposition. RiDh County claims. In
Kow-is, a State Trooper was speeding in route to a report of.a child sitting :in the t.runk of another
automobile., V\1hile hold.i!J.g down the trunk lid and in doing so, struck Ii bicyclist.
The Trooper claimed hrrru:um:ty. Toe District Court granted SUlJJ.lll.a.'"Y Judgment The Tiial
Courtco:t'J.cluded that the Trooper was operati.tlg his vehicle, puxsuantto Utah Code §41-6-14, in that

he.had a visible signal a:o.d was therefore immUile. The Utah Supreme Court reve::-sed reciting there
was a question of fact as to whether, the

Trooper~ s

eme:rge:n.cy vehicle' s

~llal

signals were

"adequately visible".
The ili..T"USt ofthe.decision by the Utah Supreme Court was that immunity is :O:6t automatic

simply because law enforcement asserts the immunity claim. There are still questions offact which
mUst be reviewed by the Ti,lJ court, and tJiey aie,jUd.ged'iu atcordanceVvithUtah Code §41.:6-14(5), .
a reasonable care.

-

"Q!!y;i9~lyihlss~c:tioni£J ~Qsely alPn to kiaho Code §49-623 (4). For a detailed history of
how the Utah legislature has repeatedly changed th.is section, see Footnote 4 con:tain.ed in Day v.
Utah,98S·P .2d lI7t U 76~ "It.clearlyestahlished·a d'Qiy ofreasonable cm:e ... ". In. 2004, the Utah.
legislature removed "arbitrary exercise" language. 'The statute nDwreads: (5) The pl.ivileges granted
under ihi.s .section do not relieve th.e operator of.an anthorized emergency .ye)rlcle of fue dUly to act
as a re.aso1U1.ble pruaent emergency vehicle operator in. fu drcumstances. (Emp:b.?sis added) ..

.. ~----:--~----------------"'-- .....
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In Lyon v. Burton, aFire Chlefwas in route to a fire:in his ernetgencyvehicle. He entered

an in:terse:ct:.on against a red light and collided with the PWntiffs, rendering thero severely injured.
Th~ Fire Chief claimed immunity.

dollars:

d..1.."1:er

Trial was co:o.ducted, resul:ting in fi verdict Df 1. 7 million

tht Trial., the Trial Court dismissed the Fire Chief.

The Utah Supreme Co'Urt reversed and concluded that the Fire Chief was n.ot entitled to

ir.o.munity. On :he question of the standard of care, the Utah Supreme Court stated "C.biefBurto:n...
therefo.i e, had tb: priyilege of!'LU:!lllng the red light only if he slowed doiVn as necessary for safe

operatitJ1l..: 'hi" plainly presented afactual qUestWl1 for the jury". 5 P .3dat 623 (Emphasis added).
Kyle Athay has ar:gu.ed in his previous brief, and now continues to assert; that Sheriff
smoots aCU0llE, had they OCCUl1'ed in the State of utah, would have been judged under a st..andard

of rt-aso;nabL, care., pursuant to Utah Code §41 ~6-14. The 'Utah I!efellda:uts would not have be~n

entitled

to

lIDlD.ll!lity as boldly claimed by RespOndent (Ri(::.h Coun.ty Respondents' Brief, Page 15),

The .eliect of Judge Harding' s rol:ing in applyh1g a ''r''~k1ess disregard" st.an.dfu:d in this case
.is to grani gr~ater protection to the Utah Defendan:ts :in Idaho than:they would have enjoyed in their

~(.D~t; stai.t:. Hls niling, applying the Idaho cap on liability to 1he Utah Defendants :fur+.hB!
CCll.:";iavelles idaho' s long stated public poliCY'af protecting. its citizenS from the torts of out of state
tort fuasors. Had th~ situation
been ieversedand Bear
C011!1ty Defendru:rts had pursued an
...
.. Lake
.
"'"

~.

.,

'

'.

~

0ffend.tr rub the State of Utah, Utah courts would have applied 1Jtah law and would ha've judged
,

'

the law en..."brcem.ent officers' acts against the stmdard.of negligence/due care, and wo'Uld not have
grantee an wJallthorized, out of state municipality extra. protection·contrary-to the rights ofits injured

Uiib. citizens.

~ w.pmd,not illlow 1dah.fllaw enforcern.en,t into

Utah and allow their conduct to

municipality with a cap on liability - cCJIl.'l:ra.ry to tb.~ :interests of its injured citizen..
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Because this issue is essential., after remand., Kyle Athey asks the Court to address it now as
a permissive Appeal (IA.R 12. Idaho Depart ofLabor v. Su·nset Marts, Inc, 140 Idaho 207, 91 P .3d
111 (2004) so that an .4tJul)! III Willllot be necessary.

., TORT CL,AJM ISSUES
C.

,The District Court erred in concluding that Idaho's one hundred eilZ"hty (ISO).

day tort claim notice ride applied to the Utah Defendants.

The District Court concluded that the notice given to Rich Caunry, Utah - which was timely

under Utah statutes (a one year notice rule) .- was deficient since Idaho law required a one hundred
eight}' , (180) .day notice (R.Ve!.

n. p. 805-806).

This conchisioll is laden wf'-Jl several mors.

1.

' Judge Harding fOt;lnd that Idaho law - specifically the Idab.Q Turt Claims Act

(ITeA,. which provided for a one hundred eighty (180) day tort claims notice applies to the Ureh
•

I

•

,

Defendants. To get to this assumption., Judge Harding 'WaS misled into tb.ink.iug that since this Court

bad applied Idaho lay.r, sp~cal1y Le. 49~623 (from the MotDr Vehicle Code - Rules·ofthe Road)
for ;;tandard conduct that ldah~ la~ regarding notice to non-Idaho counties also applied. (R. 'VoL
,

,

IT, p. 802-804): fuAthay I, this Court did not rule that Idaho law applied on all issues. It ruled ocly
0:11 C.

§49~623

and for :the 'liability cap in I.e. §6-926 (Stac.ey was an employee);

2.·

Judge Harding found that rTCA applies to "all claims agaL."'1St a political

subdivision. includes any county." (R. Vol. n~ p. 8(5) (emphasis ill original). and that "the Utah

ExhPbet
:J5l I

--~-----'------------'----
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Defendants are covered by the definition of 'political subdivisions' contained in ITCA," (R. VoL il,
p. 804), and "The stat'.rte (Idaho Code §6.901, et. seq.) is not state speci5c". (R.Vol. II, p. 805).
It is impossible to ~ead the definitionsinldaho Code §6-902 without concluding it is speoific
to the State ofIdaho, its counties and cities, and its depmttnents and a.gencies; and

3. ..

Tne conclusion that Sheriff Stacey was a "servant" of Bear Lake County is,

and was, still a question of fact which should have been heard by the jth"}! to determine e. nUJ.'"TIber of
issues as they reLate to tort claims notice, and joint and several liability. This Court noted t.~e

findings that Stacey :was an, employee of Blear Lake County (Atbay I, at 908). Bear Lake Co:mty

disagrees.
D.

Ihe District Court erred when it c6ncluded that Kyle Athay's Notice of

Tort Claim was deficient 8S it :relates to Deputv Gregg Athav.

Judge Harding concluded the tort claims no~ce given to Beal' Lake County was deficient as
Lt related to Cbief Deputy Gregg Athay.

Judge Harding concluded that since the notice ·filed. witl'l. the Bear Lake County Clerk and
dated November 22, 1999 (R. VoL 1, p. 144), does notspecifically name Chie.fDepu.1.y Athay, it is
de5cient (R.Vol.

p.

791~792).

The Act provides; .

'6-907. Contents of claims. - Filing by agent or attorney - Effect of
inaccuracies.. ; . A daim filed under t,lte Dro'Visions of this sect;
. on
~

shall not be held invalid or insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in
sta±in.g the time. place. nature orca:u.se of the claim, or oiher"vrise.

r

It-- - - - - - - - - - - ' - - _ . _ ''~-.-,..-.--...-,-.-----~-

t-,

,.

tt,
--.~---

...,,--.

-------------.~---

,.-_,,' _ _ •• _ - . - . _ , . , . - . _________ ._ _

~

••• '" .M. _ _ • ..._._ ,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. , _ _ _
~
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unless it is sho\7i'n. fum t.1,.e governme..t1ta1 entitv was in fact misled to
its injlli-V thereb~ . (Emphasis added).

Inspection ofthe notice shows that it complies c1ear!y'With all the requirements of the statute.
There is abso1utely nothing in the record to in.dicate that t.i:te Defendants -were "misled to its
injury" by any alleged deficiency in the notice.
The spirit and intent of the Tort Ciaims Act a:n¢ the notice have been U1et

The purposes ofIdaho Code §6-905 are to (1) save needless expense
<L"ld litigation by providing an. opportunity for a:a a..rnicable resolution
oftb.e differences between the parties. (2) allow authorities to conduct
..li. full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to deta."'1l1ine
the extent cf ilie state>s liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to
prepare defenses_

Farber v. Idaho, l021d:aho 398, 630 P.2d 685 at68g (1981).
In Smith v. City ofPreston, 99 Idaho 618, 586 P.2d 1062, the issue VV1!.S whether a letter sent
by Smith's insurer, asserting its .subroga.tion interest, whi.ch grew ou.t of a l..."ltersection collision,

cOpStituted proper notice under ITeA. The City claimed the notice given by Claimant's ir.surer was
, deficient as to the actual claim.. .

. Tne notice in Smith failed to n.ame a single individual employee or officer of the City of
Preston. The Sl+p.re,me Court upheld this notice, stating:

. . ..aclaim ... shall not be held· invalid or insufficien.t by reaSDn of au
inaCcuracy in stating the time, place, nature or cause of the dai.m or,
otherwise unless it sho"'Ml that the goverrunent en.tity was in fact
misled to its inju.ry thereby. 586 P.2d at 1065.
.

is

~

'MPELt:A"Nr;dB~F -'PA~2

\
I'

--- -...-

-------.-- ..------....------------.-------
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See also FrieZv. Boise eUy HousingAuthority. 126 Idaho 484, &87 P .2d29 (1994); and lft{17
v. Uhl,

103 Idaho 274,647 P.ld 730.
In dete~gwhethe::-the purpose ofthe notice requirements has been, achieved. substmtial

oompliance is all that is required..

T..J.e st;ktute should not be given cor..struction which would defeat

the ends of justice. Jorstad v. Ct."YojLewiston, 93 Idaho 122,456 P .2d 766 (1994).
Respondents have not and cannotpointto auy circumstances that the notice prevented them
from :J.clrieving any of ,the stated purposes of the notice requi:-ement They were given full and
complete opportl1n.t~ to prepare defenses and investigate the :oJ.al-"'te~. In fact, an ,exhaustive and
e:l\.1:elJ.Sive :investigation was conducted by the ldaho State Police. as well as the Bear Lake County

Sheriffs Office follov{mg the acc.ident, That information and policeieports were readily available;
The Bear Lake County Sheriff's Office conducted a de-briefing. whiCh. was attended by
seve:a1 of the participants in the pursuit (R.Vol']I. p. 658).

In Messina 'V,M~eo, 854 F.Snpp. ,116 (B.D.N.Y. 1994), Defendant police officers rn.ade
si:milar claims, t.e., that the Plaintiff failure to \nrune and individually serve employees -was fatal to
.the Plaintiff':s case. A Federal District Cou..ri: in New Yorkecnstrued New Yark' s Tcrt Claims Act,
which had a notice I equirementsinillar to Idaho l s:
. The p1t.'"Pose ofthe notice ofc1aim provlsionis to put the municipalit"y
on iiotice as to the narure of the ,c1ain1. against it and its employees
thereby giving the rn'll!lioipality the opportunity to investigate the .
merits of me c1aimbefure the initiation oflitigaticn. ' .. In this case,
the city was upon notice -vis-a-vis the nature of the claims against its
~rnployees(office..t"S or agentS ofits pOlice and correction departments)

---------------.'
- - _ .._------.------_..._---- - ...._.,-_.,--_._-.-- ..,-,--
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and hence the notice of claim
145.(Emphasis added).

w~s

r'
ri,.'

not invalid. 854 F.Supp at

Ir
,.

Judge Harding's conclusion that the Defendants were misled because Deputy Gr~gg Athay

t

. was not sp;:cificallynotified that there would be a claim ""presented against him, assumes
that counties
.
""

.

and sheriffs departments can commit torts by some means outside the actions of their employees.

Since there is a ilnding (or at least an issue offact) that Stacey ~as an employee ofBear Lake
I

County - the notice to him - given to his "employer" within one hundred eighty (180)

day~

M

I

as

i

required by Idaho law· is also su:ffi.cie.nt. Gregg Athay and Dale Stacey are presumed to have acted
for their employer.and within the course and scope of their employment (I.e , §6-903(e)). It foUows

that their employer is liable. Respond~nts have admitted as much.

The District Court's conclusions are incongruent. In a footnote, Judge Harding stated:
This Court can surmise several possibilities wherein the requirement
maybe sa:tis:fied witb.6utneoessarily~g each possible employee
defendant by name: At the very least, notice should inolude a
.statement indicating that a claimant seclcs to hold culpable employee
tort feasots to answeI;" for the 'Wrongs alleged, Such a statement was
lacldng in this case,

(R.Val. IT, p. 792-793) •.

."

'.

II

Kyl.e Athay's notice.states, in. pertinent part:
This claim arises as aresult of the negligent conduct ofthe Bear Lake
. County Sheriff s Office. The negligen~ acts c.nd omissions of the
Bear Lake County Sheriff's Office include the following: Negiigently
engaging in a high speed vehicle chase.
*:**

;:---~~-----.---- ...... .. . ' -'--' -' -' -.,---~--

• ._ _ J,.- _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _
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4. As a direct and proxim.ate result of the negligence of the Bear Lake
C::mnty Sheriff's Office enge.ging in the high speed chase ....
The notice fu....-fher describes the names of the persollS involved and includes "'Bear Lake

County Shenffs Office",
Ref.ponden.ts cited no authority for their theory that failure to nrulle specific employees means
the notice LSfatally deficient
TLe spirit and interest of the notice requirement is satisfied. The coU1tties and their

employe cS were not "misled to their injury';, This Court·shouldnot endorse ~ policy which renders
tlie notice S"..aru.te a trap for me unwary where no-one is. misled and the purpose of the notice
t.

t'

••• '

req~'ements .have in fact beeti satisfied.

Galbreath v. City ofIndianapolis, 255 NE2d 225 (1970);
"

",

'"'

"

.,

FraJ,."Ztn v. City of Omaha, ..;.32 'NVil.2d 808 (Neb. 1988).
Tp.eD1strictCop.rterl"(ld in concluding that the bond r.equiremell.ts ofI.C.. ~6-610

i E.

Respondents' claim the lawsuit should be dismissed for a failure to post the bond as required
by Idaho Code §6-61 o. Tills argument is tvithout merit for several reasons ..
Idaho Code §6-610 has been sl.,1perceded by the Idaho TortClairos Act as. set fox*J:l in Idah.o
iCode §6-918(A). In Kent v_Pence, 116 Idaho 22~ 733 P.2d 219 (Ct. App. '1989), Kent sued the

County Clerk and Prosecutor for election law violations and failure to enforce election laws. The
District Cpurt dismissed the actioJ;l., finding that the actiol;lhad not been brought in bad fuiili, but that
it was withouta legal basis. The District CQurt awarded'attomey~ s fees, pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-

---- .........

-.~--~---,

..

- "-"-.......

'

.... "'-..

---- ------- ._._--------._...

}?/nf-FJ- brief In ~Vforf~

_--_ _- __
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..
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121. County officials argn.e on appeal that the Tri2J Court was correct~ and alternatively, argued that
the award of fees was author.iZed by Idaho Code

~6-61 OJ

which allows an award of costs and

attorney's fees ID certain actions againBt public offi~ engaged in law enforcement, but without a
sho'Wing of bad fhlth.
The Cuurt of Appeals rejected these arguments, reasomng as follows:
[T)he judge's resort to I.e. § 12-121 r.an afoul of the secon.d clear
message derived from I.e. §6·91 SA. The message is that any right to
recover attorney fees in an action fo:ro.oney damages under the Idaho
Tort Claims Act is governed 'exclusively' by §6.:..918A It is not
subject to 'any other statute or rule of court, except as may be
hereafter expressly and specifically provided Of authorized by duly
enacted statute of the state ofIdaho'. Idaho Code §12-121 contains
no express and specific language providing an exception to the
exclusive scope ofLe. §6~918A. Therefore, I.e. §12·121 yields to,
I.e. §6·918A in tort claim cases.
BUt in

***

event, we tkiuk these stgJuteLt, like LC. §12-121, have
heendisplaced in tort claims actions by the. clear language 1. C. §6918A. Concededly; these statutes have a more specific subject matter
focus than Ie. §12-121; but both of them antedate 1. C. §6-91 gA and
n.either of them has ever contained e~ress and specific language
establh3hlng.anexception to the exclusive scope'ofLe. §6~918A. We
hold that the fee a'W"atds in this case cannot be u.pheld UP(.Jn these
1l1t)l

statutes.

Id" 116 Idaho at 23 (emphaSis added).
The sole purpose ofthe bond,requirement ofL C. §6-.61 0 is, "in. the event Judgment is entered
against the plt.intiff' Qr petitioner,

f'Of

the payment to the defendant or respondent ofall costs and

, expenses that rny be a:warded against the plaintiff ~r petitioner, including an -a,"'''8!d of reasonable.

l

rI:

r

~------

.....................-.. , ...-..... ,.., ..

--------..._---.,
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.marney's fees as dete:rm1ned by the court". I.C §6-610(2). The bond requirement is inherently

intert:vvined with this purpose.
Here, hovvever, Appellant has alleged a clahli agaiP..st the defendants tLl1der the Idaho Tort
C1aim.s Act. 1 C.

§6~91 SA therefore governs any award offees• .utd requires a sbowing that Plaintl:ff

is guilty of bad faith before he can be required io pay defe!ld.ants' attorney fees
such

til.

or costs. Because

findiI;l.g is bound to be rare, the. Idaho Legislature did not believe that a bond would be

nepessazy. iuld., as pointed out inKent, supra, I.e. §6-610 contains no express and specific language
establishing.an exception to the exclusive scope of I.C. §6-918A. No bond is required here.

Even IT a bond were somehow required, despite the expressly exclusive I:ang"L'!a.ge ofLC. §6918A, Appellant could not afford to pay, such a bond, He, is «indigent" for plli"'Poses of paying for
such a bOnd. By its terms, I.C. §6-610 requires "a written unde...~g ,villi at least tyro (2) sufficie;ut
sureties" to cover the defendants' attorney fees and costs .. Appellant simply Cat1.Uot afford to pay the

cost for such bonds. The effect of such a requirement is to deny access to the co14'is based upon
one's wealth or, more accurately, the lackofit Similar Qbstacles to citize.nis access to

me courts

have been stricken by federal cow:ts as discrimination.agamst the poor. SeeBoddie v_ Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct 780' (1971) (holding that a state may n.ot deny access to the courts for a

.

"

divorce solely because Dfthe parties' inability to pay cou..-tfees and costs); Griffin v. Illinois, 351

u.s, 12, 76 S.Ct. 585 (1956) (holding that state must provide free copy of transcript to indigent
defendants for appeals as a mat:t:er of right); Jones v. State afMichigan 525 F.Supp. 636~ 641 (E.D ..
l

-----.--.-~.
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:Micb.. 1981) (rt:cognizi;.;.g that Gr~jin "is still sound constitutiDn.a11avl' and that if"the. state does
choose \.0 provide [appellateJreviewto a given class oflitigants, the state C81J.110t enact measu..~s that
arbitrLiI I1y deny effe...'"tive appellate review to any particular subclass of the class of litigants'}

Acees: to judicial process is a fundamental right Jones, 525 F.Supp. at 641 (citations
omitt, ':d). To deny AppelJ.ant the right to bring those who caused his paraplegia to justice, because
ofris fina.rlcial status, woUld be a travesty and would be a violation ofhls funda::nenta1 right to the

jude. all rocess and to equal·protection.

l'imilly, the bond requirement oil.C.

§6~61 o has been addressed by the United District Cou..'"t

in Idaho. A lvfemorandum and Order issued by the Honorable William B. Shubb in Blackhawk v.
City OJ Chubbuck is found atR. Vol. 1, p.165-177 (see particularly pages 7 and 8). Judge Shubb
.

.

found trV.il the 00) ld requirement is not necessary in cases brought under the Idaho Tart Claims Act
rhe oases cited by DefendSllts, Pigg v.' Brockmim. a 1957 cMe~ a.1'J.dJohnson v. Burley School

Diet.,

f::J1

election bond case~ are inapplicable;

F.

The Respondents w:\ived their claim ofdefed:s pertaining to tort claim notie.e~

. Tb: I. :omplaint iU this matter was filed on April 19, 2002. Bear Lake County Respondents
~ed

their A IlSwer on May 22) 2002. None of the nineteen ~A...:ffL"'U1ative Defenses set forth in the

Respondents' Answer raised the defective notice claim now made... Thus, four years after filing its
. AIl;;;wer, and after one appeal to this Court, the Respon~ents now assert that, "Thus, Plaintiff sclaim

-

'---'~--'---'----- ~'--"-.-----.-~.-.-~".-- ..

.~---.----

.-~

----~-,.-------
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agai!lSt Defendant Athay must be dismissed for failure to serve him ... as required by 6-906"

(R.VoL II. p. 140) and failing to post a bond.
Parenmetioally, §6~906 has no requirement that Deputy Gregg Athay be individually served.

§6-906 requh-es service upon the Clerk or Secretary of the poEtical entity involved. In this case, it
is the Bear Lake County Clerk. Without doubt, such service was achieved. Here, Kyle Athay flled
a detailed notice with the Beat Lake County Clerk. as required. His notice was substantially
compliant wim the statute. Unlike the claimant in Udell v. Idaho, 119 Idaho 101.8,812 P.2d 325
(Idaho App. 1991), where~ no tort claims notice was f1led,waiver applies.
In Miotke v. Cit)i ofSpokane, 101 Washlngton2nd307, 678 P.2d 803 (1984), similarc1aiIIls
of waiver were made.

In the

c~e

before us, this statute was not raised as a defense by the

state un:til FebrLtary 15, 1979, three years after t.h.e litigation began.·'
Atthat time; the first phase of litigation had been completed. Several
days ofhearings had been conducted, and the trial court had entered
its first set of findings and cOliclusions, In view of the substantial
litigalion Which had occurred before the defense was raised, we agree
-with the trial court that defense had waived any objection to
Plaintiff's failure to file under RCW 4.92.10.
~ONCLUSION

The District Court Orders granting Summary Judgment to Respondents should be vacated.
Tnis Court shocld order the District Cou.."1: to .instruct the jury on questions of agency/servafit, acting

in concert, and joint 8J.id severalliabiLTty.

L - . ' . : ._
. __
~
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Here, as win be described in section "\T" below. Appellant has failed to make a showing of any

issues of material fact su..f:ficient to establish 'lhe officers acted in reckless disregard. Therefore all
that rem.ained is a legal conclusion, noi a jury question, and the District Court's ruling was

ATTO~~YFEESONAPPEAL

L

APPELLA..~T

IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON

APPEAL, rather, TIlE RICH COUNTY RESPONDENTS .ARE

El\~ITLED

TO

COSTS ON APPEAL.
In order to be awarded

CDSts

or attorney's fees Appellant must be the prevailing party on

appeal. Idaho Appellate Rule 40. ill accordan.ce with the argument containe:d herein, the Rich
CQunt) R...."'Spondents request this Court deny Appellant's request for attorney's fees end costs in
tile event that he is not the prevailing ~'i.y •

The Rich County Respondents have incurred costs associated 'With thi.s appeal. Thus. to
the extent that they are the prevailing party, the Rich County ReSpondents respectfully request
.
.
leave from this Comt to fIle a Memorandum of Costs associated with this appeal, and to likewise

be awarded costs and attorfi.ey's fees as 'l-ppropria1e, Idaho Appellate Rille 40,
ARGUMENT
1.

--

NonCE OF CLAIM TO RIca COUNTY RESPONDENTS IS CLEARLY
UNTIMELY BECAlJSE IDAHO LAW APPLIES TO UTAH RESPONDENt'S.

----.----~--~-----~------~------

Interpretation 'Qfa statute is .Ii question of law over: which the Supreme Court ex.ercises free
review Wi,:d.e~mAth.::ry Ji.::Stacey;' 142.ldabO 360, 128 P.3-d 897 (200S) (Athay I); See also

2

M.:£;,tm.:T.r.ajka.Jl,"Baker;.:i! 39 ld!ilia 948.' 950, 'BE·P.3d 7.67, 769 (Idaho 2004),

Exhibit
---~~-'--"---
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The Idaho Tort Claims Act (£TeA), I.e. § 6·901, and lda.'lo law in general applies to the

Rich County Defendants according to the law oftbe case. A/hay v. Stacey, 128 P.3d 897.903 n.2
(Idaho ZOOS).

Idaho law requires that, for any act within the course and scope of his

employment, a plaintiff with a claim against an employee of a pOlitic.al subdivision must file a

notice of claim upon ~e political subdivision within one hundred eighty (180) days.

I.e. § ,6-906.

This is .a mandatory condition prece.dent for bringing suit. See McQuillen v. City ojAmmon., 113
Icaho 719, 747 P.2d 741 (1987) (failure to file notice of claim is fa.tcl to a claim), The notice of
claim nrust identify the known individuals involved. See

I.e.

§ 6-907. Appellant's Notice of

C.\aitn upon Rich County was untimely and deficient because his claims accrued on June 10,
1';99) but he did not serve a notice of clai:m UP(}TI Rich County until
!Xl

Jnths late, and he did not identify

She~.d:f Stacey.

also Notice of Claim, R. Vol. I, p. 78.

J1.1."le

8, 2000, nearly six (6) ,

See Aff. P3J.-nela. Shaul, R. VoL I. p. 74; See

Idaho law also requires that, before a claim may be

brought against .an officer,the plaintiff must post a bond. I.e. § 6-610(2). Appellant failed to

pos.t a bond and has therefore failed to comply 'With Idaho law.

Despite the fact that the doctrine of the law of the c·ase requires that Idaho law applies as
. was held in Athay It a review of the cOllflict of laws issue should r~mind the Court that this is a •
lawsuit in Idaho concerning a collision that occurred in Idaho.' R. Vol. II, p. 802. Idaho applies

the "roost significant relation test" as set forth in 1b.e Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §
j

15 in detennining which state's law is applicable?

:, ,Th¢,rd.ev.ant PGrtirin of Athayl diSctissesfhe cdiitliet: of law issue stating: ~'We are not at liberty
'.:@::disregtnd -the previsions of Idaho Code § 49-6.23 and apply Utah statutes to Sheriff Stacey

.~---,---".,

'- ..

Rzspondent's Brief - Page 23
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applies because Idaho law applies and this is a case against governmental

entities, Sette. § 6·902(3). Claimants against governmental entities m.ust comply with the rules
given th.at the !TCA is a waiver ofsove:reign immunity. See, e.g.• Great .'Northern Life. Ins. Co.

11.

Re.ad) 322 U.s. 47, 64 S.O. 813 (1944). Because the Supreme Court il'~Atl~ I determlned Idaho
law applies to this case, all of ldaho law applies. The Supreme Court in Athay I found it
improper to disregard provisio:ns of Idaho code with respect to the rules governing

t()

be

Ltauthor~d

em.ergenc:y or police vehicles," and the same analysis should apply to the ITCA Athay 1,.1d at
903. The State has only cOnsented to be sued under strict guidelines. therefore the entire act must
be applied.

Presru:nably, .AppellMt would have the Court apply the notice provisions of th,e
GOVeIl:'.1l1e:ntal

Iromu.'lity Act of Utah vers:us the ,ITeA. However Appellant did not c.h.allenge that

d.ecision in the appeal taken to the Supreme Court inAthay 1 and he fails to provide argument or
authority now. Since he did not raise such a challenge, and ~ does not argue now, the prior
d~cisjo!l of the

.
Supreme COurt and the subsequent decision of the District Court should stand.

Second, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District Court applyL."1g the
l-'rovi.sions of Idaho Code '§ 6-926 of the !TeA. Athay 1, ld. at 906. Further, Plaintiff Athay did
not challenge on appeal ibis Court's determin.ation that Sheriff Stacey was an employee as

de....'1ned by the ITCA, so thai deter:m.ination stands, Id Because the Court has affirmed that
when an Idaho stature provides the standard of care by which bis c.onduct is to he judged/' And,.'·
(tJhe district court con4u.oted a choice-of-Iaw analysis using the most-signi6.cant~relatio!l test set
forth in.tG.('PVJ;l\i,~. ,.J$pm"J37 Idabo,7.70" .5~ ~c3,c;l X21 :C2002}, and determined 4'mt Idaho law
should. ~y. The Afuays have not a1l~d on -appeal that the district court erred in its analysis
unda- 1hat .test"
,

Respondent's Brief - Page 24
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portions of tire ITCA were applica.ble, the remaining portions of the ITeA must be effective. Id.

Consequently the notice requirement of Idaho Code §

6~906

requires that all claims

against a. political subdivision or its employees shall be presented to said subdivision \\~thin 180

days of the date the claim arose. Idaho Code Section 6-906 states:
AIl claims against a political subdivison [subdivision] arising.under the provi$ions
of this act and all claims against an employee of a political subdivision far any act
or omission of the employee within the course oX' scope of his employment shall be
presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of the political subdivision within
one'hundred eighty (180) days from the &te the claim arose or reasooablyshould
have been discov~ed, 'Whichever is later.
Idaho Code § 6 906. Not flling a notice of claini. withln this Statutorily created time frame is an
p

absolute bar to the Plaintiffs cl€!ir:n.. See Newlan

11.

State, 96 Idaho

711~

716, 535 P.2d 1348;

1353 (Idaho 1975) (holding notice provision is constitutional and trn. absolute bar to Plaintiff's
claims).

Idaho Code § 6 908 states that 'Tn]o claim or action shall be allowed against a
y

goverrunental en:tity or its employee unless ,the claim has been presented and filed ,,,,'itb,in the time

limits prescribed by this act."
In 1975 the Idaho Supreme Court held that:
The statutory language is, clear and unambiguous.. It can occamo11 but one
interpretation and that is compliance is a condition precedent to bringing sun
3.gai."1St 'the state, "Where a statute is not ambiguous it is the duty of the court w
follow the law as enacted and if the statute is un\\'i.se,. power to correct is

legislative not judicial [citation omitted] If is clezu that compliance with a notice
of claim. requirement is mandatory and withollt such complianoe a suit may not be
maintained.

Newlan v, State, 96 Idaho 711, 716, 535 P.2d 1348,1353 (Idaho 1975).
The Idaho 'Supreme Court has never wavered

m in;,:stance

that untimely notice is an
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absolute bar to a Plaintiffs state law claims. See Cobbley v. City ojChallis, 138 Idaho 154, 157,
S9 P.3d 959, 962 (Idaho 2002) (holding that "failure to :file within the ITeA time. limitation acts
as a bar

to ~my

furLher action. "').4 Therefore, filing a timely notice pursuant to that provision is .a

condition precedeoi: to bringing s. suit against a political subdivision. .or other governmental entity.
See, e.g. Smith v. City ofPrest()n~ 99 Idaho 618 (1978). Failure to meet that notice reql1rrement is

fataJ co .a tort claim against a governmental entity.
Idaho Code § 6-902(2) de:fines"political snbdivision," in part, as any

~om:rty.

It does not

limit :;llch definition to only IdBho counties. If the analysis that "all of. an. act must apply; or none
at all' . applies to the provisions of the authorized and emergency vehicles statute, it must similarly
apply to the ITCA. Ultimately, because the tort claim notice was late, this suit is barred by law·
becaUSt: it should have been filed by December 7. 1999, and '\h'BS not. Also,

App~l1ant

had the

option of filing suit in U~ and baing S'>lbject to Utall law but did not. Had he done so Appellant
would have takr:nadvantage of a different standard of liability as well as a longer period to flle

the tLlrt claim.
ll.

FAU.rURE TO MEET THE B01\'D REQUIREMENT OF IDAHO CODE § 6-610 IS
A COMPLETE BAR TO APPELLANT'S CASE,

" Sc:e ako Magnuson Properties PartnersrJp v. City ajCoeur Dr.Alene. 138 Idaho 166. 169-170,
59 P.3d 971. 974·75 (Idaho 2002) (holding that "[clompliauce \Mith the notice requirement is a
maudatory condition precedent to bringing suit aga.inst a [govemroent entityJ, the failure· of which
is JaW to a claim, no matter how legitimate." (marks omitted)); Banks v. University a/Idaho, 118
Idaho 607,508, 798 P.2d 452, 453 (Idaho 1990) (same); McQuillen \I. City ofAmmon, 113 Idaho
719., 722, 747 P.2d 741. 744. (Idaho "l987){same); Tovar ll. Billmeyer.., .9.8 ..Idaho 891,,895, 575
IP.:24A:S~..·4~5 (Idaho J 9.78) {b')l{ling :that.actbn.p,iUS/: J;Je ~sed where Plaintiff failed to meet
~>:)!lpp4i.;tip'p.I$~t.:of (1;o~iUm:cec.'~t4..,~~,~q~~ts QfLC. § 6-906 by prese:nting his
claipls~r the City Vlithin rtime limit] after his alleged cause of action arose.") .

.. .....

........

--~-------.-----

..... "
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It is established and it is the law of this case thai: a police officer, who recidessly disregards

the safety of if..h.ers, is liable under rrCA. (Idaho Code §49-623; Athay 1).

Idaho has gellerally done away with joint fu'1d several liability, (See Appellant's Brief, P. 32).
However, legislature has 'preserved joint and several liability when parties act "in concerrl or in an
agency relationship and the result is a recldess act. Idaho Code §6-S03(5). Respondents have
provided no aufuority that ITCA carves out an exception when one of the actors committing a

rcckl.ess act is a county or its employee.
Nothing in the Tort Claims Act limits the lia.bility of a lnunicipality to negligence alO)J,e. A
sure agency

CaD. be

liable for <'other wrongful acts". If those "otherwise wrongful

acts'~

include .

; 0Ckl.e$.s disregard they give rise to joint and severall..iability. Such is a nat'.lrar conSequence ofthe
,

"

,

stat:u:"t.Ory structure. Wiilijoint and several liability. the.reckless actor~ s pro-rata share
. is one hundred
percent (100%).

B.

The Claim§ of R~ch COllntv.

The Rich County Responden:ts assert that the Notice provisions ofITCA apply and that Rich

Count.y and its Sllerm were entitled to a Notice of Claims within one hundIed eighty (180) days
pursuant to ITCA" 'and not the one (1) yea! requirement oHhe specifLC Utah statute.

To reach this conclusion, RJch Cpunty theorizes: (1) Because Idaho Courts have already
decided it does (Rich COlIDty'S Brief, P. 24); and (2) Conflicts oflaw analysis Sl.IPports application
vfldaho law.

Exhibit
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, Question "- Has this Court already decided thai Idaho rules of law apply percaining to the

giving ofTOlt Claims Notice to a Utah governmental entity?
Rich County states "Because the Supreme Court inAthay J dete:rn1ined Idaho law applies to,

i
I

this case, all ofIdaho lawappliest>. (Rich County's Brief, P,. 24),

lbis Court did not determine in Athay I that tht Notice provisions ofITeA applied to a uOriIdaho governmental entity.

What this Court did decideinAthay I was whether Id.W.o Code §49..623

applied to Sheriff Stacey. This statute relates to the standard of care, L e., a regulation of conduct

statute, is nQt a statu~ wl1ich allocates or determines liability (such as sovereign immUI:'ity). }J.so,
this Court in Athay 1, determint:d fuat'Idaho's $500 1000.00 "cap" on liability applied to Sheriff
Stacey, Nothing in Athay 1 can be read as findin.g that Idaho law applied on all legal issues.

I
l
I

Rilles onaw-which regulate conduct; such as negligence or reckless disre~ard, and rules of

lawregardlng the allocation of llability such as ic:lmunity, enjoy a different analysis,

See'

Restatement of the Law, 2<1, Cooflict of Laws, §6, ,Comment (f); §169. P.:.s discuSsed herein (at P.

22 and 27), the interests o£ Idaho and Utah are both properly served when the time requirement of
.

",

.

'.

Utah law apply.
Kyle Atb.ay has not waived.his
right to. challenge the application of Idaho law to the time
" .

,

limits fur gi~g notice. That was not an issue before the District Court in A.thay 1, nor was it au
issue nu a.ppeal now. It was only aft:eI:- rema:i1d to the District Court. that the. Utah Defend.t.mts
,attempted t@ raise this issue

and in fact, persuaded the District Court that Idaho law applied in

-----'~--,
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bla/:l}:et fashion. If any waiver at ali erists, it is a waiver on the pmt of the Utah Defendants in failing
to raise ~ in earlier proceedings.

l
I

Even if this Court were to determine that Idaho law appLies and that Kyle Athay had.a duty

to present a Notice ofTort Claim within one htmdred eighty (180) days, he has done so. Kyle Athay
gave notice to the principal of Sheriff Stacey. Bear Lake County, Idaho, within one hundred eighty
(ISO) days. This Notice was fully compliant with Idaho law. The evidence is overnrhelming th..q.t
Sheriff Stacey was acting as a '"st;:rvant" of BeaI' Lake COt.l:!l.ty once the"pursuit crossed over into
Idaho. Bear Lake County would be liable as principal for Sta.cey's actions, I'his 'Court has already
so ruled: "Sirice SheriffSt8.cey was the agent or servant ofDeputy
Athay and Bear Lake County,
aoy
.
.

I
I
t

l
l.

liability of Sheriff Stacey is imputed to them". Athay l, 128 P3d at 906.
Further Conflicts of Law Analvsis.

.Rich CoUllty asserts that tl;1ere is a conflict of law between the application 'Of IdahD law and
.Utah law. and
since the shorter notice requirements ofIdaho
la\vprovide them ~'ith an escape, they
.
,
assert the applicationofId.aho law.
A cOmparison of me statutes of the twostaies and the par"Jicular policies behind t.'1e statutes
is appropriate.

The Idaho Statute.

The Idaho
liability for certain Torts and allows a Clai..r:riant to bring
. Tort Claims Act creates
.
an action against a governmerrta1 entity such as a Sheriff s Depart:n.eut or a Sheriff s Deputy, The

t
~

r
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Idaho Statute specifically requires thata Claimant giVI: notice 0 fhis claim ,'lVitbin oAe hundred eigh.ty
(180)divs.

Here, Kyle Athay unequivocally provided notice to Bear Lake County. This Court has

f

I

construed the purposes of this notice requirement on a number of occasions, Those purposes are:
(1) ttl save needless expense and litigation by providing an opportunity for an amicable resolution

of the differences of the'parties; (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the, cause
of the iDjury in. or4er to determine the ert.ent of the State's liability, if any; and (3) ,allow the State
to prepare ~fenses. Farber v. Idaho, 102 Idaho 398, 63.0 P~2d 685 at 68'S (1981).

Tbe Utab Statute.

The Utah. equivalent of the Tort Claims Act also grants liability for certai.n torts and also
all.ows a Claimant the opportunity to' bring a cause of action. against a govel.ntr;lental eo.tity. A

prerequisite for any such cause of action is that the Claimant give notice ofhis claim within one year
of the event

In thls case. Kyie Athay provided the Rich County ·witb. a com.pliant TOri Claims Notice
\vitbin one (I)

year.

Fo!. ease of reference, a copy of that Notice. is hcluded ill the ll.ppendix

as

Exhibit. "B".
The notice provisions' of Utah's version of the Tort ClaL."tls Act (the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act), Utah Code Annotated §63-30-1, et. seq., serves two important purposes. Firs~ it

affords the responsible public authorities an opportunity to investigate, sett1e. or deny a claim.

---,---..---..
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:without expending public revenue for costly and unnecessarY iitigation. Secondly, it provides an.

oppon:uoity to remedy dan.ge.rons conditions so that fur"Jler damage or injury can. be avoided, Busch
'V.

Salt Lake lrzternatiol'lat A.irpOrt, 921 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1996).
Thus, the purposes for giving the pre-litiga.tion notice in both stateS is the same (i.e., to
.

plovide

fOJ

.

investigation and resolution, and avoid th~ expense of litigation).

TIle essential

iiff:::rence between the two S'tatutes is that the Utah legislature feit it impor-..ant to give Cl.aim.ants .a
full year !:o. which to provide the pre-litigation notice. .In the case before the Court, if Idaho law
(lTCA)'
applies
and requires an Idaho Claimant - to give notice to a' non-Idaho govenu:ri.ental entity
. . ,
(J :..iGh COUlJJ:Y, Utah), then Kyle Athay cannot recover from the injuries which rendered him a
pil !·aplegic. Utah's governmental and policy interest is fully met and protected. Utah got all its

legislature require:d. Utah cannot be allowed to use the time difference in..the two states as a sword
to hack dov.'Ii Kyle Athay's claim when me legislative pUIposes ,of its law have been fulfilled.
Review 'jf Idaho Authorities o;n Confliet of Laws Analvsis.
Idaho.applies the <emost ~gnificant relations test". Grover v. Isom, 53 P.3d 821, t37 Idaho

770 (2002); Restatement'(2nd) of Conflicts of Law, §6; Athay 1 at 903.

Ana:ysis tmderthat test first focuses on four factors.:
A.

Place of injmy;

B

Place. of conduct creating injury;

{.

Domicile/pLace of business of parties; and

_ " _ " _ _ b _ . " _ _ ' _ _ " _ _ . _ _ _ . ___

.

.~."

.. _ _ _ _ _
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_ _ _ _ __

20l0/SEP/Ol/WED 0320 PM

D,

era'

R.

Jorgensen

FAX No, 208 237

6

p, 035

Center of the parties' relationship. Grover, 53 P.3d at 824.

HOWeV8I:, the inquiry does not end there. M this Court noted in. Grover, on.ce the above
factors (focusing on iocation) are considered. they are ill be evaluated in light of the following Qolicv
concerns:
1.

The needs of the interstate and international systems;

2.

The rele:van.t policies of the forum;

3.

The relevant polleies of interested states and the relative interest of those states and

the determl:nation of the particular issue;
4.

The justified expectations;

5.

The basic policies underlying the pardcular field of laW; .

6.

Certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result;

. 7.

2.-71d

The ease and th~ d~term.in.ation of the application of the law to be applied..

Grover,53 P.3d·at 824. See also DeMeyer v. MGXl1!eZI, 103 Idaho 327,647 P.2d 783 (Idaho App.
i982); Restatement 2nd, Conflict ofLaws §6.

A review of some of these factors is appropriate.
(a)

.NeMs of the interstate systems. '"Choice of law rules, among other tl:u.l."1gs, should

seekto fwiher harmonious reLations between states and to facilitate commercial interoourse between
them. In formulating rules of choice oflaw, ~ stateshouJd have regard f01' the needs and policies of

[
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other States and of the community of states)). (Se~ Restatement of Law 2nd, CctJilict of Laws §6 .

Coromen:t (d) .
.(b)

~leya.ntpoIieiesofthefo!'um. Utah's policy, i.e., its'statutoryrequirementtbatTort

Clairrls he presented' wi"Jilil one year as a pre--condilloo oI the wajver of imrntlIlity aHo'wE the

.governmental entity to,investigate aud to remedy &mgerous conditions and settle chums 'Without tile

. expenses Df litigation.. In this particular instance, the Utah legislature deemed that such let~lative

purpose could be accomplished after: giving a claimant a B.ill year to bring his claim. The Utah
.legislature said, in effect. that claims prese1ltedwitbin one year still provides sufficieIJttime in which
to allo:C\I a governmental entity to achieve itS purposes of investigation and resolution. Utah bas a

dominarit interest in application of the rules, wh.ereby it waives immunity and ~ts liability and .
.regtlbres the method whereby such liability is allocated. The fact that an Idaho cl.~ant is inv,oived
.

.

.

sh::rllirl .make no difference in flus particular policy consideration. Ifits policy is satisfied with a one-'
year Lonce - how can it ask a more stringeut requirement Q~ a Claimant and thus escape liability?
(c)

Relevant policies of other interested states. "The foruin should seek to reach 'a

reE ..ilt that ~ 'achieve

the best possible accommodation of these policies".

(Restatement 2nd,

Codlict of Laws §6, Comment (f)).

In a perfectexample ofthe issue involved here, the COrru:o.ent (f) analyzes a situation wherein

a j-,Usban.d injures b.is:wife in a state other than their domicile. The Gomznent notes that the state of
. cc);.;.duct and injury has a doridnantmterest in deter.mining whether the husband's condu.ctwas

20

E

Craig R. Jorgensen
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tortious d whether the wife was guilty of contr1butory negligeT.1ce. On th.e other hand, the state
\If fi:J.~ ~p()uses'

domicile is the state of dominant interest when it comes

to the questioll. (If

whether the husband should be held immune frem tort lta.bility to his wife. Here, Idaho has a

do minant interest to derer:mine the standard of care to which a po lice officer is to answer for act£
committed on its road, Utah has fl. dominant int~t in seeing that me speeific statutory scheme

alim,:ving 211[;. regulating tort claims against is governrn.ental entities is carried out
In conclusion. the Utah Responden.ts .are using the more limited Ida:b.o :rules to its adv.mtage,
when in fact, ITS 8t 2itLltory mterests are clearly fully prdtectecL To do so violates an.-important interest
ofIdaho • to all6.w recovery to its ci.tizen by out of state tort feasors.

IV.

RICH COlJN1'j~~S WAIVER ARGUMENI

that Sh.eriff Stat,ey was an employee as .de:fin..,....a. bj the ITC.4., so that detec:ninatioD stands", \N.ch

'"'4) ,
.........1 S B'
ne,;.;;: , 1)
• .....
C0 nnhr"

Rich County oontinues "Because the Cou.::.i has affirr..ned that portions of meITeA were
.'

applicabk,·thc remaining portions oith.e !TeA must be effective". (Rich County's Brief, P. 25),

S:ated anotb.er Vl15Y; Since Kyle A:thay has not challenged the finding mat Sheriff StaceY·did
not come 'i¥itbin the definition of "'employee'; he admits ·that the tort claiJ:ns notice provisioru; of

ITCA also applyro anon-Idaho governinental entity.-(Note thatfue disc.u.ssi;?n ofvvhetb£r Stacey was

20
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an employee comes in a section of theAtrd~}J I opinion relatL:ng to whether Sheriff Stacey is protected'
by the $500,00D.00 cap on liability in Idaho Code §6-926),
Rich County> s logic does not follow. Just because the age·nc.y ofShe.rtff Stacey is established
for questions of the regulation of conduct and vicarious responsibility, does not lead to the

conolusion that the l;;t.w pert:aining to Utah's statutory gta::lting of liability/waiver of immunity

necessarily follows.
Rich Count,. s claim tha~ "political subdivision'> definitions apply to "any coun:ty'; including
.a nOJ,l-Idaho COUIJ.ty,' ignores the clear statements and definitions s~t for+.b in·the ldah{) Code. (Rich
County's Brief: P. 26).

Idaho C)de §6-902(1) def:iues "'state" - means the State of Idaho.

T{) say ·'political

stihdivisioL' .in idaho Code§6~902(2) includes a llOll-IdahO ~e is a stretch beyond any recognized
test of stacutor., interpretaiiDn.

.

v.

.

THE AGENTIPRINCll'AL - SERVAJ'\:'T VICARiOUS LL\BILIIX - JOll\'T A..'I\1D
SEVERAL

LIAB~ITY

ISSUES

. Tills section of the Brief will :fi,41:her address issues pertaining to agency, vica..'"ious IiabilitJ,
and joint and severaIllability. Some of these issues have ,already been discussed in the context of
other dainlS, and the analysis here bears on the other.

K fie Athay claims the Utah Sheriff and .me Idaho Deputies were ac.l'ing in co.::rcert in their
a1t.e!:npts [0 apprehend Daryl Ervin and, should the jury find their conduct !os~to the level of reckless
.

.
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE
FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LA...
7 EAST CENTER
PARIS, IDAHO 83261

KYLE D ATHAY

)
)

VS.

)

DALE M STACEY, ETAL.

)
)

Case No: CV -2002-0000072
/,tbl
'''7>NOTICE OF HEARIN~
f

~C4

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:

Status
Judge:
Courtroom:

Thursday, September 16,2010 at 09:00 AM
Mitchell W Brown
Bear Lake County Courtroom-Paris

I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on Monday, September 13,2010.

PlaintifPs Counsel:

Craig R. Jorgensen
P.O. Box 4904
Pocatello ID 83205-4904
Mailed
Hand Delivered

Defendant's Connsel: Alan Johnston
PO Box 2949
Idaho Falls ID 83403-2949
Hand Delivered
Mailed

Defendant's Counsel: Peter Stirba
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City UT 84110
Mailed
Hand Delivered

Dated: Monday, September 13,2010
KERRY HADDOCK

C~lerk
Of The 7;~ict CO/u~
By:

~

Deputy Clerk
CY Notice Of Hearing - Multiple
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DISTRICT COURT
SrXTH JUDiCIAL COURT
sJ¥R LAKE COUNTY IDAHO
~
_
--=t"''-''--L-''II.o~1
_
=Q. 0 10
Cd :; 'i ~
DATE
TIME

CLERK
IN THE DISTRICT C01JRT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL

DIS"55151YOF THE CASi: f'-:G.

STATE OF IDAHO, IN A..ND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE

KYLEATHAY,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
VS.

RlCHCOUNTY, UTAH,

Defenda11t.

CASE NO. CV-2002-000072
MINUTE ENTR Y
&

ORDER

On September 16, 2010, counsel for the above-named Plaintiff, Craig R. Jorgensen, and
counsel for the Defendant, Blake Hamilton, appeared by telephone for further proceedings.
Dorothy Snarr acted as court reporter.
This matter was set for a Status conference. The Court scheduled this hearing to address an
issue that arose post-trial.

Since the conclusion of the jury trial held in this matter, the Court

received information regarding ex-parte cOJ.TI...TTIunication between a member of the Court staff,
Deputy Clerk Brandy Peck and the Plaintiff, Kyle Athay. Following a discussion with the clerk,
she reported that she had also talked Virith Defendant, Rich County's representative, Sheriff Dale
Stacey and his wife during the trial. The clerk was advised the contact was inappropriate and any
further contact should be terminated. The Court advised the parties that its investigation revealed
that no confidential information had been communicated between the clerk and Mr. Athay or Mr.
and Mrs Stacey.
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER
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Mr. Hamilton related that defense counsel had been aware of one incident of
commllilication between the clerk and the Plaintiff during the trial, but when the communication
did not continue, it was not brought to the Court's attention. The Court is confident that no
information regarding the trial or proceedings was discussed between the parties, but felt it
advisable to apprise the parties of this matter.

In other matters, the Court previously took the Plaintiff s Motion for Entry of Judgment and
other issues arising out of the jury trial held in July, 2010 under advisement and the decision will be
forthcoming.
DATED this 16th day of September, 2010.

~
MITCHELL W. BROWN
Sixth District Judge
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-r:t-., day of September, 2010, I mailed/served a true copy
of the foregoing document on the attorney(s) I person(s) listed below by mail Vlrith correct postage
thereon or causing the same to be hand delivered.
ATTOR~"EY(S)

I PERSON(S)

Craig R. Jorgensen
Attorney at Law

Faxed 237-1706

Peter Stirba
Blake Hamilton
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES

Faxed (801)364-8355

Alan Johnston
E.\V. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A.

Faxed 528-6447

By

7'/---~~
Deputy Clerk
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151 North. Ridge Ave,> Suite 210
P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, 1D 83403~2949
Telephone: (208) 528~6444
Telefax: (208) 528-6447
PETER SllRBA (Utah Bar No. 3118)
R. BLAKE HAMILTON (Utah Bar No. 11395)
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES
215 South State Street, Suite 750
P,O. Box 810
Salt Lake City. UT 84110·0810
Telephone: (801) 364-8300
Telefax: (801) 364-8355

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN M1]) FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE

KYLEATHAY,

Case No. CV-2002-00000n

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S

v.

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

RICH COlJNTY, UTAH,
Defendant.
Defendant, by and through undersigned counsel. hereby moves this Court to conduct a
new trial in this matter. This Motion is made pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 59, and controlling
case law> and a Memorandum in support of this Motion is filed concurrently herewith,
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DATED this lday ofOctobec) 2010.

STIRBA & ASSOClA TES

~~

By:

PETER STIRBA

:1k-iL

R. BLAKE HAMIL TON
Attorneys for Defendants
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \
day of October, 2010 I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL by the method indicated below, to the following:
( ) U,S. Mail. POs,1age Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered

Craig R. Jorgensen, Esq.
Attorney at Law

~rnight Mail

1246 Yellowstone Avenue, Suite A4

( )

P.O. Box 4904

C....rPa.csimile

Pocatello) ID 83205-4904

Alan Johnston

() U.s, Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) 9J.ernight Mail
V;'F acsimile

E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A.

151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210
P,O. Box 2949
Idaho Palls, ID 83403-2949

( ) U.S, Mail. Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) O~-ght Mail

Honorable Mitchell W. Brown
District Judge - Resident Chambers
P.O. Box 775
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276

~csimile
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151 North Ridge Ave., Suite, 210

P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949
Telephone: (208) 528·6444

Telefax: (208) 528-6447
PETER STIRBA (Utah Bar No. 3118)
R. BLAKE HAMILTON (Utah Bar No, 11395)
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES
215 South State Street, Suite 750
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City. UT 84110-0810
Telephone; (801) 364-8300

Telefax: (801) 364-8355

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE

KYLEATHAY,

Case No, CV -2002-0000072

Plaintiff,
MEMORA.1'Ul[JM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S

v.

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
RICH COUNTY; UTAH;

Defendant.

Defendant Rich COlmty. Utah. by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to Idaho R.
eiv. Proc. 59, hereby submits the following Memorandum in support of its Motion for a New
Trial Or, in the alternatiVe, for production of all ex pa."te cOmmunication.
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BACKGROUND
1.

In July 2010, a jury trial was held in this matter.

2.

On September 16, 2010, a status conference was held wherein the pa..-oes were

notified that during the course of proceedings, there was oral ex parte cOm!nunication between a
Deputy Court Clerk and the Plaintiff.

3.

Furthermore. it was e:h."Plained that there was 'Written ex parte communication

between the Deputy Court Clerk and the Plaintiff in the form of text messages over cell phones,
4,

Defendant has no idea of the contents of the ex parte communication, the amount

of communication or when it took place.
5.

To date, there has not been an entry of judgment, and the Court has yet to issue its

final rulings on several issues.
ARGUMENT
This Court should grant this Motion for a New Trial because Defendant has likely been

unfairly prejudiced by the ex parte communication.. As this Court is aware, throughout these
proceedings, Defendant had been concerned v.ith the very real possibility of local bias and
prejudice. After a l~l1g and difficult trial, Defendant was notified that there had been ex parte

commu..rlication between the Plaintiff and a member of the Court staff. This conduct is
inappropriate and against the Code of Judicial Conduct. The ex parte cOm!nunication raises the
specter of bias. Defendant already had real concerns of bias, and ex parte communication on

unknown subject matters with Court officers solidifies these concerns. The current jury ve·rdict
should be vacated and a new trial should be held to ensure a fair trial.
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THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND CASE LAW PROHIBIT EX

PARTE COMMUNICATION.

Idaho canons of professional and judicial ethics complement the constitutional
requirement t.1ut parties to an action be accorded an open and fair trial, and that they be acc.orded
fundamental due process. Both the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibit ex parte commurucatians with the court.
The Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3A(4) specifically provides "A judge should
accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding) or his lawyer; fun right to be
heard according to the law, and ... should not initiate ex parte communications concerning
pending to impending proceeding." Citaticm omitted The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted
this in saying that the judge need nat initiate the ex parte comJuurication for there to be a breach
of this ptohibitian. See, Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594 (1986).

Likewise, Idaho disciplinary rules prohibit ex parte corumun.ications with court oft1cials,
Disciplinary Rule 7~ 11 OB provides: "In an adversary proceeding, a lawyer shall not
communicate,

01'

cause another to communicate, as to the merits of the cause with the judge or an

official before whom the proceeding is pending, except". 2, In \.Witing if he promptly delivers a
copy of the writing to oppasing counselor to the adverse party if he is not represented by a

lav.ryer. l ' Citation omitted. "The purpose ofDR7-110B is to prevent the effect or appearanee of

gra.TJ.t.ing undue advantage to one party," Soria, 111 Idaho at 623. In Soria, the Court ultimately
ruled "the errors described above [ex parte communication with judge] can never be described as
harmless. The true gravity of the e:t:totS [ex parte carnmunic,ation] can only be ascertained after
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the opposing party is given the right to , .. determine what the bias may have been. II ld.
(Reversing and remanding for new trial when ex parte communication occurred with judge),
Based on this principle. courts have repeatedly stated there is nothing "more dangerous
and destructive ofthe impartiality oft..'1e judiciary than a one-sided communication between a
judge and a single Litigant.'~ Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688,691 (Fla.l993) (quoting Rose 'V,

State, 601 So.2d 1181. 1183 (Fla.l992).
In this case, there is no question that ex parte communication occurred. Tbis Court held a

status conference to discuss the issue. The question is to what the ex: parte oommunication
entailed. Defendant has no idea the subject or subjects oftlle conversations, no idea how many

text messages Were sent and no idea if it was on a si.ngle date, over a span of days or weeks.
Regardless. the communication creates an appearance of granting undue advantage to one party,
The jury verdict must be vacated and a new trial is warranted.

A.

The Plaintiff Has The Burden Of Showing What the Ex Parte
Communication Entailed.

Idaho courts have held that ex parte comm'tlnicatioll t..riggers a close judicial scrutiny of

what has occurred, and places on the ~rinning party the burden of showing that no prejudioe has
occurred. Reuth

'II. State~

100 Idaho 203, 208 (1978). The courts have set up a four-step

procedure for when ex parte communication takes place.

(1)
It is for the losing party. in the first instance, to show that
there was some communication off the record and not in open
court. (2) The burden shifts to the VYinning party to show what the
communication was, (3) Ifhe cannot show what it was; the verdict
must be set aside. (4) Only if it is made clearly to appear that the
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communication could not have had any effect, can the verdict be
allowed to stand.

Id. (Reversing and remanding for a new trial where ex parte cOInmWlication between judge and
jury could not be produced).

As explained above. there is no question t.'lere was ex parte communication; as t.1-te Court
held a status conference specifically for the purpose of discussing the communication. The
burden now shifts to the winning party to show what the communication entailed. The
commUnication was in the form of te1tt messages. These written communications must be
produced to Defendant. If they cannot be produced, the verdict cannot stand. Even if the
commonications ate produced, it must be made clear that the communication could not have had
any effect on tb.e proceedings. In the like,Iy event Plaintiff cannot meet this burden, the verdict

must he vacated and there must be a new trial,
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing Defendant respectfully requests that the Plaintiff produce the
j

content of aU ex parte communication. b the event Plaintiff cannot produce all such

corru:nunication and, show that it clearly did not affect the proceedings at trial. this Motion for
New Trial must be granted.
DATED this

l

day ofOc.tobe1', 2010.
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES
By:

~~ /~~
R. BLAKE HAMIL TON
PETER STIRBA
Attorneys for Defendant
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DISTRiCT COURT
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BEAR lAI',E CI'WNTY.iDAHGI

KERR Y HALU&GK. CLER-K
i)Ef'UTY _ _ _ _ _CASEN.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF BEAR LAKE

*****
KYLEATHAY,
Plaintiff,

)
) Case No.
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
RICH COlJNTY, UTAH, a political
subdivision of the State of Utah,

CV -2002-00072

MEMORA~1J)UM

DECISION AND
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

)
)

)

Defendant.

)
)
)

-------------------------)
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiffs, Kyle Athay
(Athay), Motion for Entry of Judgment. This matter was tried to a jury for ten (10) days
between July 13, 2010 and July 26, 2010. At the conclusion of this jury trial, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of Athay against the Defendant, Rich County, Utah (Rich
County). The jury, pursuant to a special verdict, found that Dale Stacey (Stacey), the
Rich County, Utah elected sheriff, was acting within the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the accident involving Athay. The jury also concluded that
Stacey's conduct leading up to and including the time of the accident amounted to

MEMORANDUM DECISION AN ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT - 1
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"reckless disregard." The jury, in apportioning fault, concluded that Stacey was 30%
responsible for the accident in which Athay was involved and injured. l The "reckless
disregard" of Stacey was imputed to Rich County, Stacey's employer, purSUfu'1t to the
doctrine of respondeat superior. The jury also found that Athay had sustained damages
which were caused by the accident in question. The jury found that Athay had sustained
$2,720,126.00 in economic damages and $1,000,000.00 in non-economic damages.
Therefore, the total amount of damages, found by the jury to be attributable to the
accident in question, was $3,720,126.00. This resulted in a total verdict of$1,116,037.80
when reducing the total amount of damages by 30% in accordance with Idaho Code §§ 6801 and 6-802.
A number of legal issues have arisen with respect to Athay's request for entry of
judgment.

These include the following: (1) whether to apply the limitation on

noneconomic damages set forth in Idaho Code § 8-1603; (2) whether to award Athay
interest on fu'1 Offer of Settlement made pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-301; (3) whether to
award Athay costs of litigation, both "costs as a matter of right" and "discretionary costs"
pursuant to Rule 54( d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure; (4) whether the
$500,000.00 cap established by Idaho Code § 6-926 is applicable under the facts and
circumstances of this case; and (5) whether there are collateral source issues which
require a reduction to the amount awarded by the jury for damages pursuant to Idaho
Code § 6-1606.
The Court has received and considered the following in support of and in
opposition to Athay's Motion for Entry of Judgment: (1) Athay's Motion for Entry of

I In the process of apportioning fauit, the jury also concluded that Athay was without fault and that Daryi
Ervin was 70% at fault for the accident.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AN ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
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Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof; (2) Athay's Memorandum of Costs; (3)
Defendant Rich County's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of
Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof and Objections to Plaintiff's
Memorandum of Costs; (4) Plaintiffs Reply Brief Re Entry of Judgment and
Memorandum of Costs; and (5) Plaintiff's Further Brief in Support of Entry of
Judgment. 2
This matter was argued to the Court on August 19, 2010. Following argument
additional submissions a..'1d authority were provided to the Court and as such the Court
took this matter under advisement on August 31, 2010. The Court now issues its decision
on Athay's Motion for Judgment as well as his Memorandum of Costs.
DISCUSSION

A. Limitation on Non-economic Loss.
In 1987 the Idaho Legislature enacted a statutory cap on noneconomic damages.
The statutory cap was codified at Idaho Code § 6-1603 and was titled "limitation on
noneconomic damages." The statutory cap was set at $400,000.00 in 1987. In 2003 the
Idaho Legislature amended

I.e. § 6-1603 by reducing the statutory cap for noneconomic

damages from $400,000.00 to $250,000.00. The current version of I.C. § 6-1603 is the
2003 amendment. I.C. § 6-1603(1) provides as follows:
In no action seeking damages for personal injury, including death, shall a
judgment for noneconomic damages be entered for a claimant exceeding
the maximum amount of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars
($250,000); provided, however, that beginning July 1, 2004, and each July
1 thereafter, the cap on noneconomic damages established in this section
shall increase or decrease in accordance with the percentage amount of
2 The Court also received a Jetter from Athay's counsel and a letter from Rich County's counsel. Both
letters referenced authority, either case law or statutes from other jurisdictions, which they felt were
persuasive with respect to issues pending before the Court incident to Athay's Motion for Entry of
Judgment.
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increase or decrease by which the Idaho industrial commission adjusts the
average annual wage as computed pursuant to section 72-409(2), Idaho
Code.
Subparagraph (4)(a) of I.C. § 6-1603 also provides that "causes of action arising out of
willful or reckless misconduct" will not be subj ect to the limitation of $250,000.00.
As reflected in subparagraph (1), the statute buiIt in a mechanism whereby the
limitation would be adjusted annually.

This adjustment provided for an "increase or

decrease in accordance with the percentage amount of increase or decrease by which the
Idfu1.o industrial commission adjusts the average annual wage." The Idaho industrial
commission, as a courtesy, provides a running calculation of the cap amount on its
website. The limitation for noneconomic damages as of July 1,2010 was $305,028.46.

See Calculation - Non-economic Damages Caps obtained from Idaho Industrial
Commission website which is attached and incorporated into this Memorandum Decision
and Order by reference as Exhibit "A".
Athay argues that the limitation established by I.C. § 6-1603 does not apply
because he filed his action in 2002. Athay asserts that since his claim was filed before
the legislature imposed a cap, his claim is not limited by said cap. Athay also asserts that
even if the noneconomic loss cap were applicable that his noneconomic damages are not
subject to the cap because the jury detennined that Stacey's conduct, which was
ultimately imputed to his employer, Rich County, amolL.'1ted to reckless disregard. I.C. §
6-1603(4) provides that a cause of action arising out of "willful or reckless misconduct"
is not subject to the limitation.
The simple fact is that the noneconomic damages awarded by the jury in this case
were $1,000,000.00. 'When the Court applies the appropriate 70% reduction to this award
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of noneconomic damages, as mandated by
Rich County becomes $300,000.00.

I.e. 6-802, the 30% amount attributable to

Clearly this is within the limitation amount

applicable in July of 2010. For this reason the cap does not apply to Athay's claim for
damages and the Comt need address whether or not Stacey's conduct falls within I.C. §
6-1603(4) and its definition of "reckless misconduct."
Therefore, it is the determination of this Court that the jury's award of
noneconomic damages in the amount of $300,000.00 against Rich County and in favor of
Athay does not bring I.C. § 6-1603 into play because

t.~e

jury's award of noneconomic

damages is less than the current cap amount of $305,028.46.
B. Athay's Offer of Settlement.
On January 21, 2004, Athay served Rich County and other named defendants vvith
a document titled Plaintiffs' Offer of Judgment. 3 This Offer of Settlement was served on
counsel for each of the defendants. It provided, in relevant part, as follows:
The above named Plaintiffs, pmsuant to Idaho Code § 12-301 and Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedme 68, hereby offers to settle and to allow judgment
be entered against Defendants in total sum of Three Hundred Seventy Five
Thousand Dollars ($375,000.00).
The total offer of Settlement/Judgment herein of $375,000.00 must be
totally accepted and is not divisible and includes all claims recoverable by
Plaintiffs, including any attorney's fees and costs.
This Offer of Settlement was not acted upon by Rich County or by any of the other
defendants in this proceeding.
This matter proceeded to jury trial and Athay received a jury verdict in an amount
greater than the Offer of Settlement. Athay seeks recovery of interest, at the rate of 6%,
At the time this Offer of Settlement was served there were multiple defendants in the case. By the time of
trial all defendants had been dismissed from the litigation except for Rich County. Additionally at the time
this Offer of Settlement was made Athay's ex-wife, Melissa was still a party to this litigation. She likewise
was dismissed from the lawsuit prior to trial.

3
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on the $375,000.00 from the date of the Offer of Settlement, January 21, 2004 through
August 5, 2010 in the a,.'nount of $147,073.04. 4
Idaho Code § 12-301(a) provides as follows:
After commencement of any civil action based upon a claim for relief
arising in tort, from property damage, personal injury or wrongful death,
any claimant may at any time, no later than ten (10) days before the trial,
serve upon an adverse party, a written offer of settlement, offering to settle
his claim in such action and to stipulate to a judgment for a sum certain,
including any attorney fees allowable by law and costs of litigation then
accrued.
Ida.1).o Code § 12-301 (c) provides, in relevant part, that:
If such offer of settlement is not accepted prior to trial pursuant to
subsection (b) above, and the action reaches a final judgment by the court
after trial, the court shall inquire as to whether any prevailing claimant
made an offer of settlement, pursuant to subsection (a) of this section,
which an adverse party failed to accept. If the court finds that such
claimant has recovered an amount equal to or greater than his offer of
settlement, the court shall add to the judgment, annual interest on the
amount contained in such offer, computed from the date that offer of
settlement was served and shall enter judgment accordingly.
llich County asserts that Athay is not entitled to interest on his Offer of
Settlement. llich County submits two arguments in support of this assertion. First, llich
County submits that the Offer of Settlement was made collectively to all of the
defendants in the action and was not divisible among the individual defendants. Second
llich County asserts Athay's Offer of Settlement was made prior in time to this Court's
first dismissal of the case on summary judgment. 5 llich County argues that Judge
Harding's "dismissal effectively terminated the lawsuit and thus discharged with [it]

4 Actually Athay seeks interest on this amount until final judgment is ultimately entered. August 5, 2010
was the date in close proximity to the date of the submission. Athay contends that he is entitled to $61.64
per diem up until final judgment is entered.
5 Judge Harding, who presided over this case until his retirement in September 2008, granted all defendants
summary judgment on two separate occasions. Athay's Offer of Settlement was made in advance of both
of these summary judgments and ultimate dismissals. As relates to Rich County, the Idaho Supreme Court
reversed Judge Harding's summary judgment and dismissal on both occasions.
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Plaintiff's offer of settlement." Defendant Rich County's Memorandum in Response to
Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof and
Objection to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs, p.6. The Court determines that Rich
County's first argument is dispositive of this issue and as such will address this argument
and will not address the second.
Idaho Code § 12-301 provides a mechanism for plaintiffs, in the context of claims
arising in tort, to make a preL."ial offer of settlement to the defendant. If that offer is not
accepted by the defendant and the plaintiff recovers, at trial, "an amount equal to or
greater" than the offer of settlement the plaintiff may recover prejudgment interest on the
amount of the offer of settlement. I.C. § 12-301. There is little Idaho case law discussing
the application of this rule and no case law that is on point with the issue raised by Rich
County with respect to Athay's offer being made in a collective manner 'with the
limitation that it is not divisible between the respective defendants. The purpose of this
code provision "is not punitive; it exists to encourage settlement of cases prior to trial by
providing incentive to accept reasonable settlement offers." Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136
Idaho 681, 689, 39 P.3d 621,629 (2001).
Idaho also has a rule of civil procedure that is similarly designed. Rule 68 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, much like I.e. § 12-301, provides a mechanism where a
defendant may make an offer of judgment to a plaintiff in advance of tria1. 6 Much like

I.e. §12-301, Rule 68 provides as an incentive for a plaintiff to accept reasonable
settlement offers. This incentive provides that if a plaintiff fails to accept a party's offer

6 Some jurisdictions have expanded the rule to allow both plaintiffs and defendants to make offers of
judgment. Idaho has excluded plaintiffs by the express language of the rule which provides that it is
limited to "a party defending against a claim." LR.C.P. 68(a).
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of judgment and that pfu"iy obtains an award "more than the offer, the [plaintiff] must pay
those costs, as allowed under Rule 54( d)(1), incurred by the [defendant] both before and
after the making of the offer." I.R.C.P. 68(b). This rule is also "designed to encourage
settlement and to avoid the expense and time of unnecess&), trials." Gilbert v. City of

Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 399, 732 P.2d 355, 368 (Ct.App.1987) (City o/Caldwell).
In the absence of any controlling case law in Idaho pursuant to I.C. § 12-301 and
the issue of a collective offer of settlement and because the pu..tposes of both I.C. §12-301
and LR.C.P. 68 is designed to promote settlement and encourage the exchange of
reasonable settlement offers, the Court believes that an analysis of case law interpreting
and applying offers of judgment, both in Idaho and other jurisdictions, may be persuasive
on this issue.
In City

0/ Caldwell,

supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals was confronted with the

issue of how to treat offers made by two defendants. Each defendant made an offer to
settle its portion of the litigation to the plaintiff. Both offers were rejected. Vv'ben this
issue concerning LR.C.P. 68 was presented to the Court of Appeals it stated as follows:
Thus we are confronted next with whether - in cases involving multiple
defendants - Idaho's Rule 68 should be read to compare (a) independent
offers with a particular party's ultimate liability, or (b) collective offers
with the total recovery.
. .. Therefore, we believe Rule 68 should be read to test the offer and
recovery from each party independently.

Id. at 399.
In the present case, Rich County argues that there was never a separate and
divisible offer made by Athay to Rich County. Rather, the Offer of Judgment in the
amount of $375,000.00 was made collectively to all defendants. Rich County's Offer of
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Settlement did not divide between the defendants what amount it would accept from each
individual defendant. Therefore, Rich County asserts that it was not able to ascertain
from the Offer of Settlement what amount Athay would accept for settlement solely from
Rich County. Rich County asserts that this is fatal to Athay's claim for prejudgment
interest on his $375,000.00 Offer of Settlement. This Court agrees with Rich County's
position on this issue.
The Court finds the rationale set forth in the case of Duke v. Cochise County, 938
P.2d 84 (1997) (Duke) to be both persuasive and well reasoned with respect to this issue.
In Duke the "appellants made a single, unapportioned, lump sum offer for $2 million to
compensate three claimants presenting one joint claim for wrongful death and two
individual claims for emotional distress mId false imprisonment.,,7 Id. at 89. At trial the
plaintiff's obtained a combined verdict of $3.55 million and sought to recover "taxable
costs" under Arizona's version of Rule 68. The Arizona appellate court, in reversing the
trial court on this issue, engaged in an insightful analysis of this issue. The Arizona
appellate court stated as follows:
[W]hile Arizona courts have not addressed the validity of multiple party,
multiple claim offers under Rule 68, other states with offer-of -judgment
provisions comparable to Arizona's have held unapportioned joint offers
to be invalid for purposes of sanctions.
In Ramadanis v. Stupak, 104 Nev. 57, 59, 752 P.2d 676, 678 (1988),
Nevada's supreme court found invalid an offer made by a single defendant
to mUltiple plaintiffs pursuant to that state's offer of judgment rule,
reasoning that "where an offer is made jointly to all plaintiffs and does not
apportion the offer among plaintiffs, it is 'impossible to say that any
plaintiff received a less favorable result than he would have under the
offer of compromise. '" (Quoting Randles v. Lowry, 4 Cal.App.3d 68, 74,

7 Obviously the case at bar is procedurally different because there is only one plaintiff, not three. But there
were multiple defendants at the time of the Offer of Settlement. So the logic and application of the rule is
the same.
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84 Cal. Rptr. 321, 325 (1970).) This rule was thereafter extended to
unapportioned joint offers made by mUltiple plaintiffs to one defendant in
Morgan v. Demille, 106 Nev. 671, 799 P.2d 561 (1990). In doing so, the
court relied on Hurlbut v. Sonora Community Hospital, 207 Cal.App.3d
388,410,254 Cal. Rptr. 840, 852-53 (1989), in which the California Court
of Appeals stated:
To consider plaintiffs' Jomt settlement offer as valid would
deprive defendant of the opportunity to evaluate the likelihood of
each party receiving a more favorable verdict at trial. Such an
offer makes it impossible to make such a determination after
verdict. See also Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 856 P.2d
540 (1993). For the same reason, courts in other jurisdictions as
well have refused to validate joint offers under rules similar to
Arizona's. See Brinkerhoff v. Swearingen Aviation Corp., 663
P.2d 937 (Alaska 1983); Taylor v. Clark, 883 P.2d 569
(ColoApp.1994), Gilbert v. City of Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 732
P.2d 355 (App.1987); True v. T & W Textile Machinery, Inc., 112
N.C.App. 358,435 S.E.2d 551 (1993), affd, 337 N.C. 798, 448
§S.E.2d 514 (1994); D'Huyvetter v. A.a. Smith Harvestore
Products, 164 Wis.2d 306, 475 N.W.2d 587 (App.l991).
We find these cases persuasive.
An offeree presented Vvith an
unapportioned joint offer cannot make a meaningful choice between
accepting the offer on any single claim or continuing the litigation to
judgment on all claims. Imposing sanctions for failing to accept what is in
effect an unspecified and unapportioned offer of judgment deprives the
offeree of the opportunity to assess his or her chances of doing better at
trial against one or more of the parties covered by the joint offer. On the
other hand, requiring joint offers to be specifically allocated between
multiple parties or claims places no greater burden on the party making the
offer.
938 P.2d at 89-90.
The Court agrees with this analysis. This Court holds that a prerequisite to Athay
claiming the benefits associated with an offer of settlement under I.C. § 12-301, is that
first he make an offer to Rich County that is specific to Rich County. In this case the
Offer of Settlement is not divisible or specific to Rich County but is collective to all
defendants. Therefore, Rich County could not, at the time the Offer of Settlement was
communicated, "make a meaningful choice between accepting the offer of any single
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claL.'TI or continuing the litigation."s Therefore, the Court rejects and DENYS Athay's
claim for prejudgment interest in the amount of $147,073.04 on the basis that Athay's
Offer of Settlement was flawed because it was a collective offer to all defendants and did
not adequately apprise the defendants individually of the specific amount of the
$375,000.00 which was attributable to them.
C. Rule 54(d) Costs.

Athay has submitted a Memorandum of Costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)(5) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Athay claims that he is entitled, as the prevailing party
in this litigation, to an award of costs, both "costs as a matter of right" pursuant to LR.C.P
54(d)(l)(C) and "discretionary costs" pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). Rich County
objects to these costs in a general fashion alleging Athay's non-compliance with LR.C.P
54(d)(5) and also asserts specific objections to certain items of Athay's costs.
In deciding the issue of whether a party is entitled to an award of costs, the
Court's initial inquiry involves a determination concerning whether the party seeking
costs is the prevailing party. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l). Rule 54(d)(1)(B) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure defines a prevailing party with respect to a claim of
costs. LR.C.P. 54(d)(I)(B) provides as follows:

It might be argued that Rich County could have paid the entire $375,000.00 made in the collective Offer
of Settlement and it still would have been less than the ultimate judgment arrived at by the jury. While this
is true, the Court declines to address this issue by resorting to hindsight. As the much used cliche provides
hindsight is 20/20. However, this Court is mindful of the fact that litigation is a most uncertain endeavor.
While it may be that Athay recovered a substantial verdict against Rich County, it is also worthy of note
that there were very complex and tough legal issues at play in this litigation. All of the defendants but Rich
County were ultimately dismissed form this litigation. Rich County was in fact dismissed from this
litigation twice, only to be brought back in after reversal by the Idaho Supreme Court, pursuant to summary
judgment motions. As such, this Court declines to evaluate this Offer of Settlement from a 20/20 hindsight
perspective. Rather, this Court believes the statement made by the Duke Court to be most persuasive in the
context of litigation. As stated by the Duke Court "requiring joint offers to be specifically allocated
between multiple parties or claims places no greater burden on the party making the offer" and allows the
individual party the ability to assess the strengths and weaknesses of its position in light of the individual
offer.
8
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In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled
to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the
respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine
that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and
upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in
a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.
The determination of who is the prevailing party is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. This discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
finding that the trial court abused that discretion. Rockefeller v.Grabow, 139 Idaho 538,
545 82 P.3d 450, 457 (2003). The Supreme Court in Rockefeller goes on to state that
when the trial court is exercising its discretion it must (1) correctly perceive that the issue
is one of discretion; (2) the trial court must act within the boundaries of its discretion and
consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and
(3) reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Id.
In the present case, the Court concludes that Athay is the prevailing party. Athay

obtained a jury verdict of$3,720,126.00. Of this verdict, 30% of the fault associated with
this incident and the damages that flowed from the incident were found by the jury to be
attributable to Rich County.9 Based upon this record, the Court, after considering the
"final result in relation to the relief sought" in this litigation, has little difficulty making
its determination, therefore, the Court after a review of Rule 54(d)(l)(B) and the case
law addressing the issue of prevailing party, concludes that Athay is the prevailing party.

The Court recognizes that Rich County is asserting that by applying certain cap provisions and the
collateral source rule that the ultimate recovery by Athay against Rich County should be less than 30% of
the $3,720,126 jury verdict.
9
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1. Rich County's General Objection to Costs.

Rich County argues that the Court should not grant Athay any costs pursuant to
LR.C.P. 54(d). Rich County contends that because Rich County was found to be only
30% at fault it should likewise only be responsible for 30% of the Plaintiff s costs
incurred in prosecuting this matter to a verdict. Rich County has submitted no authority
in support of this contention. The Court rejects this contention. Daryl Ervin Jr. was
never a party to this litigation and he was found by the jury to be 70% at fault for the
accident. No other party was found to have any responsibility for this accident. The only
way for Athay to have obtained the verdict finding Rich County at fault was through this
litigation. That necessitated bringing this lawsuit and incurring the expenses associated
with preparation and trying this case. It would be patently unfair and inequitable to
reduce Athay's claim for costs by 70% in the present case when Daryl Ervin was not a
defendant at the time of trial and never had been a defendant in this litigation.
Rich County also argues that Athay's Memorandum of Costs is deficient. Rich
County argues that Athay "failed to provide the requisite 'itemization' of these costs
including proof that these charges were actually incurred such as receipts or invoices."
Defendant Rich County's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of
Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof and Objection to Plaintiffs
Memorandum of Costs, p. 7. The Court agrees with Rich County's contention that in
some respects Athay has failed to adequately "itemize" his claimed expenses as required
by LR.C.P. 54(d)(5). However, the Court rejects Rich County's contention that LR.C.P.
54(d)(5) requires as part of the requirement for itemization that a party include "proof
that these charges were actually incurred [by providing] such receipts or invoices." There
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is no such requirement under LR.C.P. 54(d)(5). Rather the rule provides, in relevant part,
as follows:
At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, any party
who claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a memorandum of
costs, itemizing each claimed expense. ... Such memorandum must state
that to the best of the party's knowledge and belief the items are correct
and that the costs claimed are in compliance with this rule ....
As the plain language of the rule provides there is no requirement that a party attach
receipts, invoices or other documents in support of their claim for costs. Rather, what the
rule does require is that the party seeking costs "must state [within the memorandum of
costs] that to the best of the party's knowledge and belief the items are correct and that
the costs claimed are in compliance with this rule." However, upon review of Athay's
Memorandum of Costs it is readily apparent that Athay's Memorandum of Costs is
deficient in this respect.

Nowhere in Athay's Memorandum of Costs is there an

affirmative statement by Athay that "to the best of the party's knowledge and belief the
items are correct and that the costs claimed are in compliance with this rule."lO However,
it is also noteworthy that Rich County has not objected to Athay's failure to make this
affirmative statement in his Memorandum of Costs.
The Court must then address the legal ramifications of Athay' s failure to make an
affirmation in his Memorandum of Costs that the costs are correct and in compliance with
the rule as well as Rich County's failure to object. The Idaho Court of Appeals addressed
this issue in Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 693 P.2d 1080 (Ct.App.1984) (Camp). In
Camp a party attacked the process by which costs were awarded under LR.C.P. 54(d)(5)

10 There is a lengthy discussion in the Memorandum of Costs stating that the discretionary costs were
necessary and reasonably incurred and then a discussion regarding attempts Athay made to settle the case,
without success. See Memorandum of Costs, p. 9. However, there is no discussion about the party's belief
that the amounts claimed were correct and in compliance with the rule.
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as it then existed. II In addressing this failure of the party seeking costs, the Idaho Court
of Appeals held as follows:
The answer to this apparent dilemma lies in a comparative analysis of
particular language employed in the applicable rules. As we have noted,
Rule 54(d)(5) provides a time deadline for filing the cost memorandum
and requires it to be verified. The rule further provides that "[fJailure to
file such memorandum of costs within the period prescribed by this rule
shall be a waiver of the right to costs." This language plainly prescribes
waiver as the consequence of an untimely filing, but it does not explicitly
impose the bar of waiver for failing to verify a memorandum. Concededly,
the phrase "such memorandum" might be interpreted to mean a verified
memorandum. But we think it unwise to postulate a jurisdictional
consequence upon an isolated, ambiguous phrase. The rule as a whole
should be considered, in relation to its companion rules.
Rule 54(e)( 5) provides that "the claim for attorney fees as costs shall be
supported by an affidavit of the attorney .... " However, it imposes no bar
of waiver for failure to comply with this requirement. In contrast, Rule
54(d)(6) provides that failure to object to a memorandum of costs, within
the time prescribed, "shall constitute a waiver of all objections to the costs
claimed." Rule 54(e)(6) provides that any objection to allowance of
attorney fees "shall be made in the same manner as an objection to costs as
provided by Rule 54(d)(6)." Reading these rules together with Rule
56(d)(5), we hold that failure to verify a memorandum of costs, including
attorney fees, renders it subject to timely objection but does not render it
jurisdictionally defective.
107 Idaho at 883. In accordance with the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in Camp, this
Court concludes that Athay's failure to include in his Memorandum of Costs an
affirmative statement that the claimed costs are correct and in compliance with the rule
does not render the Memorandum of Costs jurisdictionally defective. However, it does
render Athay's Memorandum of Costs subject to a timely objection. No objection was

11 At the time Camp was decided in 1984, LR.C.P. 54(d)(5) required that a memorandum of costs be
verified. The rule required that "such memorandum must be verified by the oath of the party or his
attorney stating that to the. best of his knowledge and belief the items are correct and that the costs claimed
are in compliance with this rule." Obviously LR.C.P. 54(d)(5) has since been modified and the requirement
that the memorandum of costs be verified has been abolished. However, the requirement that a
memorandum of costs contain an affmnation "that to the best of the party's knowledge and belief the items
are correct and that the costs claimed are in compliance with this rule" has remained intact.
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asserted by Rich County, therefore, the Court will deem that objection to have been
waived and the Court will consider Athay's claims for costs, both "costs as a matter of
right" and "discretionary costs", in accordance with the applicable rule.
2. Costs as a Matter of Right.
Rule 54(d)(1)(A) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "except
when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the
prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court." However, costs are
categorized into two separate categories, "costs as a matter of right" (LRC.P. 54(d)(1)(C)
and "discretionary costs" (LRC.P. 54(d)(1)(D). Rule 54(d)(1)(C) provides that "when
costs are awarded to a party, such party shall be entitled to the folloVv1ng costs, actually
paid, as a matter of right." The rule then enumerates those costs that are recoverable as a
matter of right.
Athay seeks "costs as a matter of right" in the amount of$15,514.03 pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure S4(d)(1)(C). These costs are claimed pursuant to LR.C.P.
S4(d)(1)(C) subsections 1,2,3,4,6,8,9 and 10. The Court will address these respective
claims in order.
Pursuant to subsection 1 of I.R.C.P. S4(d)(1)(C) a party is entitled to "court
filing fees." Athay has asserted a total of $249.00 for "court filing fees." However, upon
review of the file in this matter the Court will only allow Athay to recover $77.00 for
"court filing fees." Athay has requested $86.00 for costs associated with filing his Notice
of Appeal on the two occasions he appealed Judge Harding's decisions granting summary
judgment.

Those costs are awarded, if appropriate, by the appellate courts at the

conclusion of the appeal and not by the trial court. In fact, Athay has already recovered
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costs associated

~ith

the second of these two appeals, which this Cou..rt presumes

included this very same filing fee. 12 Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 423,196 P.3d 325,
341 (2008) CAthay If). Therefore, the Court will GRANT Athay's request for court filing
fees in the amount of $77.00.
Pursuant to subsection 2 of I.R.c.P. S4(d)(1)(C) a party is entitled to "actual

fees for service of any pleading or document in the action whether served by a public
officer or other person." Athay claims entitlement to $1,071.62 for the costs of service in
this case. However, the itemization provided by Athay reveals that he only incurred
$129.00 in costs for service upon Rich County. The balance of the costs for service were
for service upon the other defendants who were ultimately dismissed from this case.
There is also a $70.00 charge for service upon Daryl Ervin. Daryl Ervin was never a
party to this litigation and therefore the Court can see no purpose under the rule to have
effectuated any service of pleadings upon Daryl Ervin. This Court is unwilling to require
Rich County to pay the cost of service associated \vith other defendants and non-parties
to this litigation. LR.C.P. 54(d)(1) provides that "the trial court in its sound discretion
may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and
upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and
equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and
the resultant judgments obtained." This Court has found that Athay was the prevailing
party with respect to his litigation with Rich County. However, he did not prevail against
the dismissed defendants. This Court can see no equitable basis upon which it would
require Rich County to pay the service costs for other defendants or a non-party in this

12 In Athay v. Stacey, 142360,371, 128 P.3d 897, 908 (2005) (Athay l) the Supreme Court awarded costs to
Bear Lake County and Deputy Sheriff Gregg Athay.
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proceeding. Therefore, the Court will

GR"\"'~T

Athay's request for the costs of service

under subsection 2 ofLR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C) in the amount of$129.00.

Pursuant to subsection 3 of I.R.C.P. S4(d)(1)(C) a party is entitled to witness
fees of $20.00 per day for each day a Vvi.tness testifies at deposition or trial. Athay claims
witness fees in the $749.50 pursuant to this subsection of Rule 54(d)(1)(C). As stated
above, this is one of the claims for costs where the Court agrees with Rich County that
the itemization by Athay is lacking. The rule only provides for $20.00 per day for each
day the ·witness testifies at trial or deposition.

Athay has failed to provide sufficient

itemization to justify an award greater than $20.00 for the one (1) day the following
witnesses testified: (1) Debra Eborn, (2) Daryl Ervin, (3) Justin Hartley, (4) Royce
Phelps, (5) W.D. Jones, (6) Gregg Athay, (7) Katrina Jacobs. The total for each of these
Vvi.tnesses is $140.00. Further, each ofthese witnesses testified for only one day and there
is nothing in the Memorandum of Costs to establish whether they gave a deposition. As
such the Court can only award $20.00 each pursuant to the rule. Finally, Eric Arnell and
Shawna Anderson did not testify at trial. There is insufficient itemization to ascertain
whether or not they gave a deposition. Therefore, the Court cannot award any witness
fees associated with these two individuals. As a result the Court Vvi.ll GRANT Athay's
request in the amount of $140.00 pursuant to subsection 3 ofI.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C).

Pursuant to subsection 4 of I.R.c.P. S4(d)(1)(C) a party is entitled to "travel
expenses of witnesses who travel by private transportation ... who testify in the trial of an
action, computed at the rate of $.30 per mile, one way, from the place of residence,
whether it be within or Vvi.thout the state of Idaho." As relates to travel expenses for
"witness who travel other than by private transportation .. , [these shall be] computed as
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the actual travel expenses of the 'witness not to exceed $.30 per mile, one way, from the
place of residence of the witness, whether it be within or without the state of Idaho."
Athay does not seek travel expenses associated with a.!Jy of his witnesses except for Daryl
Ervin. With respect to Daryl Ervin he seeks $473.53 for his airfare, airline taxes and
fees, and a shuttle fee. However, Athay does not establish, through itemization, where
Ervin's place of residence is so that the Court can adequately compare the amount
claimed with the one way expense for travel by private transportation at $.30 per mile
which is the maximum this Court can allow under subsection 4 of LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C).13
Therefore, since the Court has not been provided with adequate information to make this
comparison, the Court must DENY Athay's claim for these costs.
Pursuant to subsection 6 of LR.C.P. S4(d)(1)(C) a party is entitled to recover

"the reasonable costs of the preparation of models, maps, pictures, photographs, or other
exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits in a hearing or trial of an action, but not to
exceed the sum of $500.00 for all such exhibits of each party." Again it is the conclusion
of the Court that Athay's itemization of these claimed expenses, pursuant to subsection 6
ofLR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C), is deficient. Athay has claimed $509.17 in expenses designated
as exhibit preparation. First, this amount is $9.17 over the limit imposed by the rule.
However, the significant problem with this request is that the Court is unable to ascertain
from Athay's itemization whether the exhibits that these expenses were incurred on were
actually admitted into evidence. The Court, upon review of the exhibits actually admitted

13 The Court recalls from Mr. Ervin's trial testimony that he is currently living somewhere in California.
However, the Court does not recall where in California. The Court declines to search the record and make
this independent determination, it.being Athay's burden to adequately itemize and support its claim for
costs in sufficient detail to allow the Court to make a determination from its Memorandum of Costs
whether he is entitled to a cost and if so in what amount. Having failed to adequately support his request
for these costs the Court will not conduct its own inquiry into this matter.
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into evidence by Athay, concludes that Athay did not introduce any models, maps,
photographs or pictures that were admitted into evidence. Rather, Athay's exhibits at
trial were merely photocopies of various documents, mostly medical records. One would
certainly question how the photocopy expense of Athay's exhibits introduced into
evidence at trial would ever exceed $500.00.

Without better itemization, this Court

cannot reasonably conclude that preparation of these exhibits justify an award of $500.00.
Without better itemization this Court cannot determine that these expenses meet the
criteria of this subsection and therefore the Court DENIES Athay's request for exhibit
preparation pursuant to subsection 6 of LR. c.P. 54( d)(1)( C).

Pursuant to subsection 8 of I.R.C.P. S4(d)(1)(C) a party is entitled to recover
reasonable expert vvitness fees for an expert who testifies at a deposition or at a trial of
the action, but not to exceed the sum of $2,000.00 for each expert witness for all
appearances. Athay claims an entitlement to $8,000.00 in expert witness fees pursuant to
subsection 8 of LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C). At trial Athay called three (3) expert witnesses to
testify. However, Athay claims an entitlement to costs for four (4) expert witness fees.
Rich County objects to Athay's claim for expert witness fees for two of Athay's claimed
expert witnesses, Dr. Geoff Alpert and Dr. Rosenbluth.1 4 The Court agrees with Rich
County's objection to the expert witness fees for Dr. Geoff Alpert.

Subsection 8 of

LR.C.P 54(d)(1)(C) requires that the expert witness actually testify "at a deposition or
trial." Dr. Geoff Alpert did not testify at the trial in this matter. Further, there is no
indication in the itemization contained in the Memorandum of Costs that he gave a
deposition either.

As such, Athay is not entitled to recoup any expert witness fees

14 Rich County does not contest Athay's claim for expert witness fees on Athay's two other expert witness,
Helen Woodard and Jerome Sherman.
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associated with Dr. Geoff Alpert pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C). Rich County also
asserts that Athay cannot recover expert witness fees associated V\rith Dr. Rosenbluth's
trial testimony. Rich County claims he was not an expert witness, but was a merely a lay
witness. The Court cannot concur with Rich County on this issue. This Court previously
held that Dr. Rosenbluth was not an expert witness as contemplated by Rule 26(b)(4) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

See Memorandum Decision and Order on

Defendant's Motions in Limine, pp. 3-5. This Court held that Dr. Rosenbluth was an
expert. In fact, the Court held that he was an expert and that he could testify regarding
his opinions regarding causation, medical prognosis, and future medical expenses and
needs. Dr. Rosenbluth did testify at trial and did state his opinions on these issues at trial.
Therefore, Athay is entitled to be reimbursed in the sum of $2,000.00 for each of the
three (3) expert witnesses who testified at trial pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C),
subsection 8. As such, the Court will GRANT Athay's request for expert witness fees in
the sum of $6,000.00 pursuant to LR.C.P. 54( d)(l )(C), subsection 8.
Pursuant to subsections 9 and 10 of I.R.C.P. S4(d)(1)(C) a party is entitled to
"charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in preparation for trial of an
action, whether or not read into evidence in the trial of the action" and for "charges for
one (1) copy of any deposition taken by any of the parties to the action in preparation for
trial of the action."

In the present matter, Athay claims reimbursement pursuant to

subsections 9 and 10 of LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) in the amount of $4,459.21. Rich County
has not specifically objected to any of these claimed expenses as itemized in Athay's
Memorandum of Costs. Further, upon review of the same they appear to be legitimate
expenses incurred either pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C), subsections 9 or 10. Therefore
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the Court will GRANT Athay's request

ill

the amount of $4,459.21 pursuant to

subsections 9 and 10 ofLR.C.P 54(d)(1)(C).
As a result of the foregoing, the Court will GRA."NT Athay's costs as a matter of
right pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C) in the amount of$10,805.21.
3. Discretionanr Costs.

Ru1e 54(d)( 1)(D) of the Idaho Ru1es of Civil Procedure states that "additional items
of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that listed in subparagraph (C), may
be allowed upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably
incurred, and shou1d in the interest of justice be assessed."
An award of discretionary costs under LR.C.P. 54( d)(1 )(D) is committed to the

discretion of the trial court. Great Plains Equip v. Northwest Pipeline, 136 Idaho 466, 474,
36 P .3d 218 (2001). The Court "will be deemed to be acting within the bounds of its
discretion even though it may not evaluate the costs item by item if the court makes' express
findings as required by LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) with regard to the general character of the
requested costs. '" Id at 474.
Athay seeks recovery of discretionary costs for photocopies, copIes of
videos/cassettes and medical records, court transcripts, long distance/conference calls,
postage, additional expert witness fees in excess of that allowed pursuant to LR.C.P.
54(d)(1)(C), and attorney mileage reimbursement at the rate of $.30 per mile. "'While this
Court will concede that said items of cost may well be necessary and reasonably incurred,
the Court finds nothing exceptional about said costs.

Rather, they appear to be ordinfu}'

expenses and costs one wou1d expect to incur as part of the normal litigation process. In the
present case there has been no showing by Athay that these claimed discretionary costs were
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in any way exceptional. The burden to establish that these items of discretionary cost are
exceptional rests with the moving party, Athay. Beco Canst. Co. v. Harper Contracting,
130 Idaho 4, 11, 936 P.2d 202, 209 (1997). In this Coui1:'s view these claimed items of
discretionary expenses do not rise to the level of being exceptional expenses justifying an
award of discretionary costs. The Court has no reason to conclude that said discretionary
costs were not reasonably incurred, but cannot conclude that they were in any way
exceptional.

As such, the Court 'will

DE~ry

Athay's request for these discretionary costs

under Rule 54(d)(1)(D) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
D. Application of $500,000 Limit Imposed bv I.e. § 6-926.

Athay asserts that "Rich County has a policy of insurance which is applicable,
valid, collectible liability insurance coverage in excess of said limit" of $500,000.00 as
established by Idaho Code § 6-926. 15 Rich County argues that I.C. § 6-926 and the
language set forth therein should not be applicable to another state or a political
subdivision of another state. This argument is asserted by Rich County despite the fact
that the Supreme Court in Athay II, supra, intentionally failed to include I.C. 6-926 into
the list of provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act that could not be applied to another
state or political subdivisions of other states. The clear implication from this exclusion
being that I.C. 6-926 is applicable to other States and political subdivisions of other
states. See Athay II at p. 429, footnote 10.
I.C. § 6-926 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

15 Rich County has not come forth with the limits of its liability insurance coverage, However, they have
conceded that they have liability insurance in excess of $500,000,00 by the very fact that they have asserted
that the limit of $500,000.00 should be applicable to them without regard to the fact they may have liability
insurance in an amount greater than $500,000,00. If their limit of liability insurance coverage were
$500,000 or less this debate would not be ongoing.
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The combined, aggregate liability of a governmental entity and its
employees for damages, costs and attorney fees under this chapter, on
account of bodily or personal injury, death, or property damage, or other
loss as the result of anyone (1) occurrence or accident regardless of the
number of persons injured or the number of claimants, shall not exceed
and is limited to five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), unless the
governmental entity has purchased applicable, valid, collectible
liability insurance coverage in excess of said limit, in which event the
controlling limit shall be the remaining available proceeds of such
insurance. If any judgment or judgments, including costs and attorney
fees that may be awarded, are returned or entered, and in the aggregate
total more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), or the limits
provided by said valid, collectible liability insurance, if any, whether in
one or more cases, the court shall reduce the amount of the award or
awards, verdict or verdicts, or judgment or judgments in any case or cases
within its jurisdiction so as to reduce said aggregate loss to said applicable
statutory limit or to the limit or limits provided by said valid, collectible
insurance, if any, whichever was [is] greater. [Bold Added]
The express and lL.TJ.ambiguous language of this statutory provision sets a political entity's
liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act at $500,000 unless it has "applicable", "valid",
and "collectible" liability insurance in excess of this amount.

In such a case, "the

controlling limit shall be the remaining available proceeds of such insurance." The Court
in its review of this language can find no ambiguity or confusion associated with the clear
meaning of this statute. As recently acknowledged by the Idaho Supreme Court in the
case of Ogden v. Griffith, 149 Idaho 489, _ , 236 P.3d 1249, 1254 (2010) when the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts must give effect to the statute as
written, without engaging in statutory construction. "Words should be given their plain,
usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the Court must give effect to all the
words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant."
Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310,208 P.3d 289,292 (2009).

Rich County attempts to establish an ambiguity by referring to the title or heading
of

I.e.

§ 6-926.

This heading includes the phrase "judgment or claims in excess of
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comprehensive liability plan." Rich County asserts that this heading or title "indicates
that this statute pertains to judgments in excess of Comprehensive Liability Plan."
Defendant Rich County's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of
Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof and Objection to Plaintiff's
Memorandum of Costs, p. 3.

The Court disagrees with this assertion.

The Court

interprets this title and heading as well as the body of I.C. § 6-926 to apply to all
jUdgments obtained pursuant to a claim brought under the Idaho Tort Claims Act,
including but not limited to judgments in excess of comprehensive liability plans. Idaho
counties, just like Rich County, do not participate in a comprehensive liability plan
established by I.C. § 6-919. Yet they are still subject to the provision ofLC. § 6-926, in
the same manner as Rich County. See Idaho Code § 6-923. This Court concludes that
I.C. § 6-926 is clear and unambiguous. The intent is to cap the liability of defendants
subject to the liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act at $500,000 unless said defendant
has applicable, valid and collectible liability insurance in excess of $500,000.00. If it
does, then the cap is not applicable and the limit of liability is increased to "remaining
available proceeds of such insurance."
To the extent that any ambiguity is created by the title or heading of LC. § 6-926,
the Court again reverts to applicable rules of statutory construction. In Kelso & Irwin,

P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 135, 997 P.2d 591, 595 (2000), footnote 2, the
Idaho Supreme Court noted that "under the normal rules of statutory construction,
although the title is part of the Act, it cannot be used to create an ambiguity when the
body

of the

Act

is

clear.

See

2A

Sands,

SUTHERLAND

STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION § 47.03 (5th ed.l992)."
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This conclusion is made in accord with the discussion ofthe Idaho Supreme Court
Athay II. In Athay II the Idaho Supreme Court stated as follows:

Our decision on how to apply the doctrine of comity must also give
guidance to our trial courts when a tort action is brought in an Idaho court
against another state, its political subdivision, or their respective
employees when acting in the scope of their employment or authority.
Idaho adjoins six states and a Canadian province, all of which have
differing statutes. If we were to pick certain provisions of the Utah Act to
apply to this case, it would not give much guidance to trial courts when
other sovereigns are defendants in Idaho courts, or if Utah changes the
provisions of its Act. The policy of this State regarding tort actions against
governmental entities is set out in the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Applying
that Act when another State is a defendant in a tort action brought in an
Idaho court would be treating that State in the same manner as our State
would be treated, and it would be consistent with the policy of this State.
Based upon the most significant relation test utilized in Grover v. Isom,
137 Idaho 770, 772-73, 53 P.3d 821, 823-24 (2002), the district court
determined that Idaho law should apply to this action. In a case such as
this where Idaho law applies under the proper choice-of-law analysis, we
will apply, pursuant to the doctrine of comity, the relevant provisions of
the Idaho Tort Claims Act when a cause of action seeking money damages
for negligent or ~Tongful acts or omissions is asserted against another
State, its political subdivisions, or their employees.
Because we have never before been asked to apply the doctrine of comity
in a tort action against another state, we are announcing a new rule of law.
This Court has the discretion to decide whether a new rule of law will be
applied to all pending and future cases, or only to future cases, or to future
cases and the case in which the rule was announced. Thompson v. Hagan,
96 Idaho 19,25,523 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1974). Although we will apply this
new rule to all pending and future cases, we will apply the time limit for
giving a notice of tort claim only to causes of action that arise after the
date of this opinion.
146 Idaho at 421.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that the express provisions of I.C.
§ 6-926 are applicable to Rich County. The Court further concludes that Rich County has

applicable, valid, and collectible liability insurance in an amount greater than
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$500,000.00. Because Rich County has not provided this Cou..rt with any information
concerning what the "remaining available proceeds of such insurance" are in excess of
the $500,000.00, this Court must assume that the available insurance is sufficient to cover
the entire amount of Athay's recovery pursuant to the jury's verdict and applicable costs
set forth in this Memorandum Decision and Order. 16
E. Collateral Source.

The last issue before the Court with respect to Athay's Motion for Entry of
Judgment deals with Idaho's Collateral Source Rule. This rule is codified at Idaho Code
§ 6-1606. This rule provides as follows:

In any action for personal injury or property damage, a judgment may be
entered for the claimant only for damages which exceed amounts received
by the claimant from collateral sources as compensation for the personal
injury or property damage, whether from private, group or governmental
sources, and whether contributory or noncontributory. For the purposes of
this section, collateral sources shall not include benefits paid under federal
life insurance contracts, benefits paid by a service corporation organized
under chapter 34, title 41, Idaho Code, and benefits paid which are
recoverable under subrogation rights created under Idaho law or by
contract. Evidence of payment by collateral sources is admissible to the
court after the finder of fact has rendered an award. Such award shall be
reduced by the court to the extent the award includes compensation for
damages which have been compensated independently from collateral
sources.
Athay asserts that the "proof of Plaintiff's medical at trial were medical bills for
which Medicare or Medicaid had paid. Thus there would be no reduction of this amount
on account of any Medicare write off. These sums were either paid from the $100,000.00
settlement received from Daryl Ervin's insurer, or by Plaintiff's oWTl personal funds."
Objection to Continuance, p.2.

Stated another way, Athay contends that there is no

16 If Rich County comes forward with evidence that its applicable, valid and collectible liability insurance
is in an amount less than the amount of the Court's judgment, the Court will consider an appropriate
adjustment to the judgment pursuant to a motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 59(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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collateral source issue for

t.~e

Court to consider because none of Athay's medical proof,

specifically the medical expenses, was subject to write-offs. Everything presented was
either paid by Medicaid or Medicare, which is subject to subrogation, or was paid
personally by Athay.
Rich County in turn argues that "where a plaintiff claims damages for medical
expenses that include the provider's entire bill, as the Plaintiff has in this matter,
damages are reduced by the difference between the bill and the Medicare payout."
Defendant Rich County's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of
Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof and Objection to Plaintiff's
Memorandum of Costs, p. 12. [Bold Added]
Based upon the record before the Court, there is absolutely no evidence before the
Court, as required by I.C. § 6-1606, for the Court to make an informed judgment
concerning collateral source.

At trial Athay claimed medical bills in the amount of

$111,7 63.34. These claimed medical expenses were summarized in Plaintiff's Exhibit
124, which was introduced and admitted into evidence vli.thout objection. The supporting
medical records and bills were also introduced and admitted into evidence without
objection as Plaintiff's Exhibits 125, 126 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, and 135. The
Court has reviewed these exhibits and has found nothing contained therein that would
support a finding by the Court that any of the amounts claimed therein are collateral
sources.
The Court submits that it is the burden of the Defendant to present evidence,
pursuant to I.C. § 6-1606, of payment by a collateral source. The record before the Court
is lacking any evidence of payment by a collateral source. Rich County contends that

MEMORANDUM DECISION AN ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT - 28

'3 '1-1

"the Plaintiff should have provided these documents in response to Defendant's
numerous discovery requests but failed to do so." Rich County continues arguing that
"On August 3, 2010, Counsel for Defendant Peter Stirba wrote to Plaintiffs Counsel
requesting the documentation referenced in this section. Mr. Stirba renewed his request
with another letter, sent via fax to Plaintiffs Counsel, on August 12, 2010.

After

receiving no response from the Plaintiff or his Counsel, the Defendant issued a Subpoena
Duces Tecum to the Idaho l\PS to obtain these documents and is currently awaiting their
response." Defendant Rich County's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff s Motion for
Entry of Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof and Objection to Plaintiffs
Memorandum of Costs, p. 13.
Despite these contentions by Rich County, no motion to compel was ever filed
requesting Court intervention or assistance in obtaining these claimed documents that
would be necessary to enable Rich County to verify and put into evidence issues of
collateral source, if the same exist. Nothing has been filed with the Court in response to
the subpoena Rich County claims to have issued and served on Idaho APS.
Therefore, the Court has no recourse but to find that there has been no evidence
placed into the record, by either party, that would support a determination by the Court
that Athay recovered damages in the jury verdict that were previously compensated by a
collateral source. Therefore, the Court cannot reduce the jury's verdict in this matter
because there has been no showing of payment by a collateral source as contemplated by
I.C. § 6-1606. 17

17 Again, if Rich County has evidence that Athay's damages in this matter reflect an amount covered by a
collateral source, pursuant to I.C. § 6-1606, the Court will entertain such evidence by way of a motion
brought to reconsider pursuant to I.R.C.P 11(a)(2)(B) or a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 59(e).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will enter judgment in favor of AthHY in the
amount of$l,126.843,Ol. This Jlldgment reflects the following breakdoVvil:

$816,037.80 18

Economic Darn.ages
Non-economic Damages
I.R.C.P, 54(d)(lXC) Costs
TOTAL:

$300.000.00 t9
$,10,805.21

$1~lZ6,843.01

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court

will siiIl an appropriate form of judgment in acoordance with this Memorandwn Duds! on

and Order upon submission by the Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
~~
DATED this ~ day of October, 2010.
,

~~,-~~

tl'"MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge

1&

19

This amount is 30% of Jury verdict in the amount of $2,720,126,
This amount is 30% ofjury v~rdict in the amount ofSll,OOO,OOQ,
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the date below, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document on the attorney(s) or person(s) listed below in the manner indicated.
Attorney( s)lPersons( s):

Method of Service:

Craig R. Jorgensen
Attorney at Law
1246 Yellowstone Avenue, Suite A4
Post Office Box 4904
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4904
Telephone: (208) 237-4100
Facsimile: (208) 237-1706

[ ]
[ ]

Peter Stirba
R. Blake Hamilton
STIRBA & ASSOClATES
215 South State Street, Suite 750
Post Office Box 810
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-8300
Telephone: (801) 364-8300
Facsimile: (801) 364-8355

[ ] U.S. MaillPostage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivered

Alan Johnston
E.W. PIKE & ASSOClATES, P.A.
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210
PO Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949
Telephone: (208) 528-6444
Facsimile: (208) 528-6447

rP<J

DATED this

~

U.S. MaillPostage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered

M

U.S. MaillPostage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivered

~ay of October, 2010.
KERRY HADDOCK
Clerk of the District Court

BY.~~
Deputy Clerk
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Calculation -- Non-economic Dama
Unofficial, provided as a courtesy

-V)

,

';t~

~
~
'<;:)

'-.,.

~
bhibi-t- A

i].
\:::.

ri".l.

j~O,

LUO !.:JI 1')0

CRAIG R. JOR.GENSEN (#1990)
Attomey a.t Law
1246 YB~lowstone Avenue· Suite A4

P.O, Box 4904 '
. Pocat:$llo~ Idaho 8320S-4904
Telephone: (208) 237·4100
Faosimile: (208) 237-1706
.4ttame;y for Plaintiff

IN DIE nXSTlUCT COVRT Ol{'TUE SIXTH Jt1DIClAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF JDAJIO, IN AND FOil THE COUNTY OJ' BF,Ul, LAK"E

KYLBATHAY,
I,

VI.

RICH COUN'IY. UTAH,
A political. eu:bdivision oftbe State
ofUtab.;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASB NO. CV-02...00072

JODGME~'T

l

The Court havins entered its MEMORANDUM DECISION AND OlIDBR:ON
PLAlNTIFJrS MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT~ on October 7~ 2010 and aood oa~e

appearing, the Court hereby enters Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff Kyle Athay and ~st the
Ddendant'lUch County Utah in the·amount ofONB MlLUON ONE HUNDRED T\VE.Nr\" SIX

T.tIOUSAND ErGHTHUl\1J)RED.PORTY THR:BE DOLLARS AND ONE ($1.126f 843,Ol).
'~

DATED this

g ,day of October, 2010

~
DISTRICT JUDGE

l~nOJ 3~Vl
I

'J

G7G '(HI

'

IAI J ~ 7 : 7

MV3S:01

[, I II 7 '0

' I '\(\

rAJ.. l~O. ~Ull t~ I lIUb

NU,

~LI

r', 1/1

With respect to the usues determined by the above it is hereby ClrR:rm:S:D in !\ocordlmoe,

Vitith :Rute 54(b) L.R.C.P. that the oourt has ~ed. that thore is no jUJt reason for delay of the
~try of a fit:l.a.l ju.d.grnent and that th~ court hu

ana. does hereby d.irect tha.t the a.bove judgment

shaIL be a fin~ judgment DpQt;1 which ex:l;IOatioD. may isrsue and au appeal may be taken as
pro'\ricied by the Idaho Appellate Rules,

tJb-

"

DATED tba~ day of October, 2010
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

rHER.lmY CERTIFY that on the date below, I served a we and co~ copy of the
foregoing document on the attomey(s) or person(s) listed. below:in the manner mdl.catcd..
[clJ u.s. MaillPoatagc Prepaid

Craig R.. j orgcnsen
Attomey At Law

[ 1 Ovemisht Mail
it><J

920 Ba.st Clark '

Facsimile"

[ J Hand Delivered

PO Box 4904

Poca.tello, lciahc 83205-4904
Telephone: (208) 237..4100
Facshni1e: (208) 2~7-1706

Peter Stirbs.
,It. Blake Ha:oillton
STr.RBA & ASSOCIATES
215 South StIl.te StI~t, Sui1:o 7S0
POBox 810

[t.(J U.S. MaiVPQstage Prep~d

,[ J, Overnight Mail

[tiJ

FaoBbni1e

[ J Eland Delivered

Salt Lake City. Utah 84110-8300
Telep~one: (801) :36+-&300
Fa.osfmile: (801) 364-8355

Alan Jobnston
151 North Rid.ge Ave, Suite 210

POBox 2949
Idaho Fa.1ls • Idaho 83403..2949

[\1 U.S. MailtPostage Prepaid.
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile
,

r 1 Hmd Delivered

Telephone: (208) 528-46444
FaoBim:ile~ (208)5:48-6447

DATED this

1..~
ciay of'October, ZOlO
KERR.YBADDOCK
Clerk ofth.e District Court
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CRAIG R. JORGENSEN (#1990)
Attorney at Law
920 East Clark
P.O. Box 4904
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4904
Telephone: (208) 237-4100
Facsimile: (208) 237-1706
Attorney for Plaintiff

~H

KERRY HADrHllCIC CLERK
OEPUTY'_ _ _ _ _ CI.SENC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE
KYLEATHAY,

)

Plaintiff,

)

).
)

CASE NO. CV-02-00072

)

vs.

RlCH COUNTY, UfAR,
A political subdivision of the State
ofUtab;

)
)

)
)
)

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF TO
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL

1

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and provides the following points, authorities, and arguments
in opposition to the Defendant's Motion For A New Trial filed October 1,2010.
SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S POINTS.
1.

Defendant has inaccurately represented the law to the court.

2.

No contact occurred between the Plaintiff and the court, the jury,. or any

individual juror.
3.

No error has occurred in the proceedings.

4.

Assunung arguendo that there has been error, such error was harmless.

.

I

I.R.c.P. 61.
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5.

The Affidavit of Kyle Athay shows that the limited contact between
himself and the court Deputy Clerk was in no way related to the
proceedings and no information passed from the clerk to the court nor to
the jury nor any individual juror.

1.

Defendant Mischaracterizes The Law.
Defendant's counsel misrepresents the meaning of Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, 111

Idaho 594, 726 P.2d 706 (1986).
First, Defendant's memorandum cites Soria as holding that the trial court's decision was
reversed and remanded, strongly suggesting that it was on this issue of judicial bias based on ex
parte communications. This was not the holding in Soria. The case was only remanded in part
on the issue of excessive damages, and not for a new trial, and not because of judicial bias
resulting from ex parte communications. To cite language from p. 623 ofthe Soria decision and
not disclose it was from a dissenting opinion is a misrepresentation. Likewise, to state
"(Revising and remanding for a new trial when ex parte communication occurred with Judge)"
(See Defendant's Memorandum p.4) when that was not the case is a misrepresentation.
The majority opinion in Soria stated that the trial court's failure to disclose evidence to
the jury was harmless error. In Soria, the Plaintiff and two of the Defendants had entered into an
agreement. Apparently the basis ofthat agreement was disclosed to the court in a meeting with
the court and outside the presence of the non agreeing Defendant, Sierra Pacific Airlines.
Defendant's memorandum quotes from the dissenting opinion though the memorandum
does not indicate that the quotes were drawn from the dissenting opinion. The facts in Soria are
not analogous to this case.
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Defendant also cites the case of Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,596 P.2d 75 (1978). This
civil case was an inverse condemnation case brought by the Idaho Department ofFish and Game.
After the case had been submitted to the jury the jurors had a question. The court had assumed
that the Defendant's counsel was not available and had left the courthouse and city for someplace
else. The court communicated, without the presence of counsel, to the jury through a message
delivered by the bailiff.
On appeal, among other issues, the State of Idaho Fish and Game Department raised the
issue of ''the trial courts communications with the jury outside the courtroom and off the record,
Rueth, 100 Idaho at 205,596 P.2d at 77. Of particular importance is the fact that the Supreme
Court in Rueth stated "it is not without reason that procedural irregularities involving
communication between the trial court and jury are judged by a far stricter standard than those
between jurors and other court officials. Id. At 207-208, 79-80.
Defendant asserts that the four step procedure for communications between the judge and
jury should apply in this case. The communications here between the Plaintiff (and for that
matter the Defendant's agent Sheriff Stacey) pertained to matters not related to the case at all,
were not a communication with the court itself nor a communication between any of the parties
and the jury.
The communications here are not comparable. The contact with Brandy Peck, totally
unrelated to the case, had no effect on the trial and the jury verdict.

II.

No contact occurred between any party, the court, or the jury.
The court conducted a telephone conference on September 16,2010. In that conference,

the court disclosed that there had been contact between his Deputy Clerk Brandy Peck and the
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Plaintiff Kyle Athay. Further that Ms. Peck had had conversations with Sherif Dale Stacey and
his wife during the trial.
The court further advised that it had conducted an investigation and had determined that
"no confidential information had been communicated between the clerk and Mr. Athay or Mr.
and Mrs. Stacey".
As the court's Minute Entry and Order reflect Defense counsel acknowledged that they
were aware of communication between the clerk and the Plaintiff but did not bring it to the
courts attention.

III.

The communication between the Plaintiff and the court clerk is not error.
Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 3(B)(7) provides that:
A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or
that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A judge shall not
initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other
communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning
a pending or impending proceeding.
The comment to this section recites, "A judge must make reasonable efforts, including

the provision of appropriate supervision, to ensure that Rule 3(B)(7) is not violated through law
clerks or other personnel on the judge's staff'.
The intent ofthe language used in the rule and comment is that the ex parte
communications must make their way to the judge and/or jury and they must be related to the
case so that they could effect his consideration of the case. There was no communication which
made its way to the judge or jury.

IV.

The error, if any, is harmless (I.R.c.P. 61).
LR.C.P. 61 Provides that an error shall not be grounds for granting a new trial or for

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRlEF To DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL - PAGE 4

setting aside a verdict unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with
"substantial justice".
The rule further directs that the court is to disregard any error or defect in the proceeding
which does not affect the "substantial rights of the parties". See also L& L Furniture Mart Inc v.

Boise Water Corporation, 120 Idaho 107,813 P.2d 918 (Idaho App 1991).; Martin v.
Hackworth, 127 Idaho 68, 896 P.2nd 976 (1995).; Heer v. J.R. Simpiot Company, 123 Idaho
889,853 P.2d 634 (Idaho App 1983).
CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion is meritless. The court has already conducted its own investigation
and determined "no confidential information has been communicated between the clerk and Mr.
Athay or Mr. and Mrs. Stacey" (Minute Entry & Order September 16,2010). To suggest this has
any effect on the outcome is facetious. There is no error. The events have no effect. These
matters were harmless.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/5

day of October, 2010.

2G RvrGRGENSEN
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ERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of October, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing pleading on the following person by the means so indicated:
[/fFirst Class
[ ] Hand-Delivery
Facsimile

[rf

Peter Stirba
STIRBA AND lit.. THA WA Y
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810
Fax: 364-8335

[ v(First Class
[ . ] Hand-Delivery
[i-1Facsimile

Alan Johnston
PIKE HERNDON

151 North Ridge Ave Suite 210
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949
Fax: (208) 528-6447
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DISHleT COURT
SIXTH JUGICIAL DISTRICT
E"EAft lA'K£ COUNTY.IDAHQ
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, CRAIG R. JORGENSEN (#1990)
Attorney at Law

920 East Clark
p .0, Box. 4904

Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4904
Telephone: (208) 237-4100
Facsimile: (208) 237-1706
Attorney for Plaintiff

DEftUTY. _ _ _ _ _ ClSE NI.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE' OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE
"

KYLE ATIIAY,

)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)

VS.

RICH CO'()1\{TY, tITAli,
A political subdivision of the State
of Utah;
Defendants.

CASE NO. CV:"02-00072

)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVJT.oF KYLE ATBAY

KYLE ATHAY, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am the Plamtiff in the above entitled matter. I make this Affidavit for the

purpose of opposing the Defendant's, Motion for a New Trial.
2.

If called to testify I could testify competently ~ to the matters contained in this

,Affidavit.
3.

A few days after the trial of this matter commenced I met Brandy Perkins, the

Courtroom Deputy for Judge Brown during the trial During a break from the trial the judge and
the jury had left the court room. I was sitting at Counsel table.

Ms, Perkins came down from her seat at the clerk's desk and as I recall had been speaking
APrIDA\lIT OF KYLE ArHAY - 1

to someone on the Defense team, either Ms. Abke, Mr. Johnston, or the gentleman who was
assisting the Defendant with technical equipment or perhaps Sheriff Stacey or his wife. After
speaking with them for a few minutes she approached me as I sat at Counsel table. We exchanged
social pleasantries. As I recall she asked me how many children I had and what their ages were.
4.

Either later that day, or the next day, in a similar recess, Ms. Perkins spoke to me

again and at that time we exchanged telephone numbers.
5.

Thereafter, we would telephone each other or text each other when the trial was

not in session. Since I traveled from my home near Montpelier, Idaho to trial in Pocatello every
day I had long periods of time when I was on the road. We may have talked or texted during my
trips home, but mainly it was when I was at home.
6.

At no time, did we ever discuss the case and the trial. Ms. Perkins did not

communicate anything to me that she knew with regard to the judge's and jury's activities,
thinking, or court proceedings. At no time did I inquire of her about the case. I recall one
occasion when she asked me how I thought the case would go. I responded I had "no clue". The
calls were about our children and their activities. Ms. Perkins was upbeat in our conversations
and that was helpful to me. I thought Ms. Perkins' role was limited to "swearing people in". Our
relationship was entirely casual.
7.

I did not save the text messages that had been exchanged.

8.

I did not discuss my contacts with Ms. Perkins with my attorney. The contact was

so mundane, social in nature, and so unrelated to the case I did not feel it was important. At no
time did I intend to convey a message of impropriety. I observed Ms. Perkins having
conversations with many people connected with the trial. I did not sense our contact was any

AFFIDAVIT OF KYLE ATHA Y -
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different. I had no contact or communication with Judge Brown orany Juror except during'
proceedings in open comt.

YOUR ~A.FFIANT SAYETH FURTHER NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIBED AND S'o/0RNto before me this

/5 day of October 2010.
,~---

(SE

CRAIG R. JORGENSEN
) NOTARY PUBLIC
, STATE OF IDAHO

CERTIFICAtE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

(:s day of October, 2010. I serv~ a true and correct 'copy of

the: foregoing pleading on the iolloW'ing.person by the means so indicated:

[~Class
[ ] Hand-Delivery
[v11facsImile

Peter Stirba
STIRBA M"D BATRAWAY

P.O. BO:8: 810
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810

fctFirst Class
[ JHand-Delivery

Alan JaMston
PIKE HERNDON'

[-.-}Facsimile

151 North Ridge Ave Suite 210
Idaho Falls,ID 83403-2949
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D1SH<ICT COURT
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

SE.lft It,I\E COUNTY, IDAHO

ALAN JOHNSTON (Idaho Bar No. 7709)

PE.PUTY._ _ _ ___'CASE,NIf.

E. W. PIKE & ASSOCL4.TES, P.A.
151 North Ridge Ave" Su.ite 210

P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls. ID 83403-2949
Telephone: (208) 528-6444
Telefax: (208) 528-6447

PETER STIRBA (Utah Bar No, 3118)
R. BLAKE HAMILTON (Utah Bar No. 11395)
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES
215 South State Street, Suite 750

P.O. Bo'lt 810
Salt Lake City, DT 84110-0810
Telephone: (801) 364-8300
Telefax: (801) 364-8355

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

STATE OF IDAHO, COIJNTY OF BEAR LAKE

Case No, CV-2002-0000072

KYLEATHAY,
Plaintiff.

DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S
MOTION FOR LThlITED
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE

v.
R1CHCO~TTY~

UTAH,

Defendant

Defendant Rich County, Utah, by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to Idaho R.
Civ, Proc, 40(d)(2), respectfully moves this Court for Limited Disqualification of Judge Mitchell
W. Brown to hear and render a decision upon Defendant's October 1.2010 Motion for a New

1.

DEFENDANT RICH CoIJNTY'S MOTtON POR. LrMtTEb DtsQUAL1P1CA'tlON OF JUOOE

& ASSaCIA':')' .

F ...~X•

N'o , .PJOl1 ::Fl
.""_ ..

5

Trial. A supporting Memorandum and Affidavit ofR Blake H31nilkln are filed concurrently
he;:~'With.

DATl~D this

t Z. _ day of October, 2010.
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES

By:

~ _~~lt---::=;::;..... ____
PETER STIRBA
R. BLAKE HAMIL TON
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

,...,~¢'.........--

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this (/ ~y of October, 2010 I callSed to be served a
true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S MOTION FOR LIMITED
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE by the method indicated below. t.o the following:
Craig R. Jorgensen, Esq.
Attorney at Law

'Il)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
"

P.O. Bux.4904
Pocatello, LV K32U5-4~U4

Alan Johnston
PIKE HERNDON STOSIeH & JOHNSTON
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210

P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949
Honorable 1-lltchell W. Brown
District Judge - Resident Chan1bers
P.O. Box 775
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276

3.

).

A

"_,

....

1(

"1

( ) Pelcsimilt'>

M

'U.S, Mail. Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail

( ) Facsimile

.n. u.s, Mail, Postage Prepaid
f) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
() Facsimile

~/

DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S MOrION FOR LlMITED DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE
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SlxrDlsrr..I,ft COURT

S£A~ tl~PlcbAutTOIS Hiler

I' Y. iDAHO
2016 OCT 22 AM 9: 58

KERR Y HAGEH3CK, CLERK
DEPUTy _ _ _ __
~

ALA...N" JOHNSTON (Ida.~o Bar No. 7709)

CA.st,..,

E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P .A.
151 NorthRidge Ave.; Smte 210
P.O. Box 2949

Idaho Falls, ID 83403·2949
Telephone: (208) 528-6444

Telefax:: (208) 528·6447
PETER STIRBA (Utah Bar N (). 3118)
R BLAKE HAMILTON (Utah Bar No. 11395)
STIRBA & ASSOClATES
215 South State Stl'eet, Suite 750
P.O. Box 810

Salt Lake City. Dr 8411 0-0810
Telephone: (801) 364-8300
Telefax: (801) 364-8355
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE

Case No. CV-2002-0000072

KYLEATHAY,

Plaintiff:

v.

l\fEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY)S

RICH COUNTY. UTAH,

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE

MOTION FOR LIMITED
Defendant.

Defendant Rich County, Utah. by and through undersigned cowlsel, pursuant to ldaho R.
Civ. Pree. 40(d)(2), hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support its Motion for

1. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S MOTION FOR LIMITED DrSQUAI,IFICATlON OF
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Limited Disqualification of Judge lvfitchell W. Brown. In accorda."1ce \vith Rule 40(d)(2), the
Affidavit of R. Blake Hamilton in support of Defendant' s Motion is filed concurrently herewith.
FACTUALBACKGROl~~

1.

From July 13,2010 to July 26, 2010, a jury trial was held in this matter before

Judge Mitchell W. Brown in the Sixth Judicial District Court for Bannock County located in
Pocatello, Idaho.
2.

Brandy Peck C"Pecl(',) served as the Courf s sale Depu.ty Clerk for the entire trial

and was present in the cOlutroom throughout the proceedings.
3.

On August 3, 2010, the Plaintiff filed his Motion for Entry of Judgment which

was argncd on August 19. 2010 before Judge Brown. On October 7, 2010, the Court issued its
Memorandum Decision and Order on the Plaintiff's Motion and the Judgment was entered the
foilowing day, on October 8, 2010.
4.

On September 16, 2010, the Court held a telephonic status conference at its own

initiation to address an issue that arose post-triaL See Minute Entry & Order, September 16,
2010. The CO"urt informed the parties that the Court had become aware of certain inappropriate
ex parte communications between Peck and the Plaintiff. Ky Ie Athay, both during and after the

trial. The Court went on to explain that during the trial~ the Court became aware of some
communication between Peck and the Plaintiff upon which Peck was told that this contact was
inappropriate and shcmld be terminated. The Court believed that there were no further
" commUlllcations between Peck and the Plaintiff during the trial. At SOme point after the trial, the
Court learned that Peck and the Plaintiff continued to engage in ex-parte communication via
2. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFI:!NbAl..rI' RiCH COUNt?' S MO'I""lON flOR. LrMItED DISQUAUf'ICA.TION Of:
It.Jl)GB
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telephone and text message and, agalll, admonished Peck and !'eported her behavior to the
Judicial Administrative Office. The Court stated that it did not believe any confidential
information was disclosed betvveen Peck and Plaintiff based on Peck's representations to Judge
Brown.
5.

At no point during the trial did the Court inform the parties of the Court's

knowledge of the improper ex· parte c,ommumcation between Peck and the Plaintiff. See Minute

Entry and Order, July 26, 2010; Minute EntrY & Order, September 16, 2010.
6.

The Court did not disclose how it learned ofPec,k's conduct during Or after the

trial or the substance of its admonitions to Peck and thus Rich County has insufficient
information to believe that no confidential information was improperly disclosed betl:veen Peck
and the Plaintiff, that Peck's social relationship with the Plaintiff did cause her to improperly

influence the jury,

Or that the

ex-parte comtnunications were ever terminated. See Affidavit of R

Blake Hamilton, October 20~ 2010.

7.

On October 1, 2010~ Rich County mad its Motion for a New Trial ("Motion")

based upon Peck's c,onduct, particularly in light of her Deputy Clerk: duties during the trial and
close contact \vit.~ and access to the jury.
8.

On October 13,2010. the Plaintiff fIled his Reply Brief to Rich t~unty's Motion

for a New Trial and Affidavit of Kyle Athay ("Affidavit") in support thereof. In the Affidavit,
the Plaintiff admits that he met Peck during the trial and soon after exc,hanged phone numbers for
S(>Clal purposes. The Plaintiff states that during the trial; he spoke to Peck on the phone and

corresponded via text message while he was driving back to his home in Soda Springs, Idaho
3, 1v.tEMORANDtJM IN SUPPORT OF' DEFENDANT RlCH COUNTY'S MOTION FOR LIMI1ED DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGE
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from the Courthouse in Pocatello and when the Plaintiff was at his home. The Plaintiff also states
t.1at in one conversation during the trial, Peck asked the Plaintiffhow be thought the case was
going, to which Plaintiff responded he "had no clue." The Affidavit does not state whether Ms.
Peck shared her I houghts regarding the case with the Plaintiff.

9.

~l.he

Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct provides, in part:

«""Whe:rt: circllD.J.stances require; ex parte conununications for scheduling,

administrative .PUlJ2oses or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters

or issues on the merits are authorized; provided the judge reasonably believes that
no party will gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte
commurucatioll...
Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(7)(a).
10.

'J he Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct provides. in part:

"Ajud~c shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality lDl6ht reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to w..stances
where .. the ju tge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts that might
reasonaHy af1,:7ct the judge's impartiality in the proceedings[,]"

Idaho Code of ludic',ll Conduct, Canon 3(E)(l)(a).

ARGUMENT
The
judge from

II)AHO
pre~

R JLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE provide that any >arty may move to disqualify a

. din:..; in any action for cause, including situatiol1$ where the judge is "a party, or

is interested, in the u~ :jon or proceeding." Idaho R. elv. P. 40(J)(2)(A) (2010). A party may also
move to disq tl:Jity a I udge based upon the judge' s bias or prf'l udict: for or against a party in the
action. Id. Th !Idaho t"';ode of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge voluntarily disqualify him or
herself "in a p, oceed. ng lll. which the judge's impartiality might reasvnably be questioned,"
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including sir~,ations where the judge "has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts that
tJ Light

reason, Lbly affect the judge's impartiality in the proceeding .; Idaho Code of Judicial

Con.duct. CaliOn 3(E).
Undel both Rule 4tl(d)(2)(A) and the Idaho Code of JUoiJcial Condud, Judge Brown
should be disqualified fr01Jl hearing argument and rendering a decisioll on Rich County's Motion
for A New Trial ("Motion ") and Rich County's Motion fur Lmited Disqualification of Judge
Brown should be granted.

1.

Judge Brown ibts An Interest in the Dispositiun of Rich County's Motion for a ~ew

Trial and Cannot Render an Impartial Deci.:.ion on the Motion.
Rich County's Motion is based exclusively llpon Pe,ck's impruper ex parte
communication \vith the Plailltiffboth during and after the July 2010 jury trial. Peck's duties as

rleputy Clerk during the trial brought her into frequent, '.lirect contact 'I,-fith the jury and thus
I

r3ises serious concern that Peck's personal relations.hip with the Plal.lltitlwas cOlnrnurllcated to
The jury in some manner that may very well have improperly influen0ed the jurors' opinion of the

patties and '1>vitnesses in the case and the jury's eventnal verdict.
As Deputy Clerk, Peck was a member of the Court staff l:llder the control and supervision
of Judge Brown. See Idaho Code of Judicial CcmJuct. Cwon 3. As purt of his duties to dilige,ntly
and impartially perform his judicial duties, Judge Brown must 110t iJ titiate or pemiit ex parte
communications except those for scheduling or u.ciminisU'ativ.: pLUposeS or emergencies unrelated
to a case's substantive issues. See Id., at Canon 3(B)(7j(8j, Judge Brovm is requiTed to

discourage inappropriate ex parte conununications <'!.lid

tn. ike

reasonable efforts to ensure his
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staff, in_iuding clerks, does not act in violation of t.'1e ex prute communication rules. See Id. at
Cal:lQ', J, C./l1llDentary (emphasis added). Fmther, as mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct,
Jud.;;c bro'/n must require his staff to observe the same standards of diligence and impartiality
tb, .it.:.pply to him as the Judge and refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice in performing their
cffkial d,tti:::s. ld.. at Canon 3(C)(2) (emphasis).

D,rring the Saptember 16,2010 status conference. Judge 3ro,",,11 stated that he became
,

<tw<::t'.: of ex patte contact between Peck and Plaintiff at some point during the trial and that he
had ;, diE.cussim.l with Peck in an attempt to stop her inappropriate behavior. Judge Brmvu did not
provide any details as to when or how he came to leatn of Peck's conduct. when the discussion
,

with P<!ck took })lace. or the substance of the discussion. Judge Bro\l\,'ll did not disclose his

discovery or the discussion with Peck on the record during trial. In other words, there is

insufficient information at this time to deternJ.ine not only whether Peck's conduct improperly
influenced the j ury or affected the trial proceedings but also Whether Judge Brown acted in
accordance with his judicial duties to take reasonable steps to ensuri: Peck did not continue to
violate the rules against ex parte communications or any other standard of conduct.
Judge Brown acknowledged that Peck's ex parte contact with the Plaintiff, including
phone calls and text messages, was inappropriate and should have been ceased immediately. See
Minute Entry & Order. September 16. 2010. Since it is not disputed that Peck's conduct was

improper, the question becomes whether Judge Brown took adequate steps to investigate the
extent w'ld mlJuxe of Peck's contaots with the Plaintiff and to ensure Peck did not continue to or
further violate the rules of judicial conduct Judge Bro·wn.'s own actions are inextricably
6, .M:E:MoRANbUM IN SUI'PORT OF DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S MOTION FOR LIMITE!.) DiSQUALIPrc.HION 01'
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implicated in any decision on Rich County's Motion thereby diminishing Judge Brown's ability
to objectively and impartially decide the Motion. Judge Brown has already stated on the record
that he believes he took appropriate steps to reprimand Peck and address the problem; a fact with

which Rich County cannot, Vllithout at least a complete disclosure of the underlying facts, agree.
Due to Judge Brown's interest in the Motion's resolution and impartiality v.rith respect to the
propriety of his conduct, Judge Brown should be disqualified from deciding the Motion.

n.

Judge Brown Has Personal Knowledge of Disputed Material Facts.
Based

On

the information provided during the September 16, 2010 status conference,

Judge Brown is likely to be called as a witness to testify as to the material faots upon which Rich
County's Motion is premised. As previously noted. other than the status conference, there is no
record of when or how Judge Bro'wn became aware of or handled Peck's inappropriate conduct

or the ac,tual extent and nature ofPeckls ex parte contacts with the Plaintiff and these facts are
necessary to the Motion's determination.
Judge Brown informed the parties that he believed that there was only one instance of ex
parte contact between Peck and Plaintiff during the trial and that Peck terminated contact after
being admonished by Judge Brov-.rn so that Judge Brown did not find it necessary to make the
parties aware of the problem, on the ree.ord or otherwise during the triaL However, the facts as
j

recalled in the Plaintiff's Affidavit raise considerable doubt as to whether Peck's behavior was
adequately addressed so that the trial's impartiality and integrity were not affected. The Plaintiff
states that he and Peck initiated and carried on an improper social relationship throughout the
trial and often spoke on the phone or sent text messages while the Plaintiff commuted from trial
1, WJEMOl\.A.NTlUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT RlCI'i COUNTY'S MOTION FOR. LIMITED DISQUALIFICAnON OF
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or was at his honie. Despite the Plaintiff s assertion that he and Peck never discussed the trial,
the Plaintiff states that Peel< directly a.<>'ked him his opinion about the trial on at least one
occasion. Clearly there were several contacts between Peck and the Plaintiff and, on at least one
occasion.; the two discussed the case before it had been given to the jury. Resolution of the issues

in Rich County's Motion. is fact-intensive and requires additional disclosure fr:>rn Judge BrO\¥n
to properly evaluate his ~tions to maintain the trial's impartiality and faimess.
It should be noted that the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to voluntarily

disqualify himlherself "in It proceeding in which the judge ~ s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, n including instances where the judge "has personal knowledge of disputt,d
evidentiary facts that might reasonably affect the judge's impartiality in the proceedings." Idaho
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E). Proceedings from which ajudge should disqualify
bim/herself because his/her impartiality might reasonably be questioned include those situations
where there is merely the appearance of prejudice or bias as opposed to actual, proven bias.
Bradbury Y. Idaho Judicial Council. 233 P.3d 38, 45 (Idaho, 2009) (citing Liteky v. United
States, 510 US. 540, 54g (1994» (emphasis added); see also Microsoft Corp. v. United States.

530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000). Further, Idaho Canon 2 requires judges to "avoid impropriety and
the awearance of impropriety in activities that may reflect upon judicial conduct." Idaho Cod.e
of Judicial Conduct. Canon. 2.

Here, Judge Brown's own actions and decisions regarding Peck's conduct, including his
decision not to bring the matter to the parties' attention during the trial, are at issue in Rich
County's Motion. Judge Brown llas personal knowledge of all of the facts surrounding Peck's ex
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parte communications with the Plaintiff and at this time, many of these facts are mlkno'W!1 to
Rich County because they have not been fully disclosed on the record. Among Judge Brown's
judicial duties is his obligation to enSure the fairness and integrity of the judiciary by requiring
his staff to comport with the judiciary's ethical obligations, including abstaining from improper
ex parte com..-nunications 'With the parties to an action. Due to Judge Brown's close nexus and
personal

involv~anent

with the facts and concerns raised in the Motion. bis rendering a decision

on the Motion for a New Trial undeniably gives the appearance of impartiality and unfairness. In
order to avoid the appearance of improper bias, Judge Brown should either vohmtatily disqualify
himself as required by Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct or grant the instant motion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregOing reasons, Rich County respectfuUy requests that its Motion for Limited
Disqualification of Judge be granted.

DATED this

2'"2.. day of October, 2010.
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES

By:
PETER STIRBA

R. BLAKE HAMILTON
Attorneys for Defendant
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Craig R Jorgensen, Esq.
Attorney at Law
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'\i) U.S. Mail; Postage Prepaid
C ) Hand Delivered

( ) Overnight. Mail
( ) Facsimile

Pocatello, ID 83205-4904

Alan Johnston
PIKE HERNDON STOSICH & JOHNSTON

~.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered

151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210

( ) Overnight :Mail
( ) Facsimile

P.O. Box: 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949

y/) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown
District Judge - Resident Chambers
P.O. Box: 775

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
() Facsimile

Soda Springs, Idaho 8327(,
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DISUICT COURT
SIXTH J~DIC1Al DISTRICT
S£AR tf;, ~ £ COUNT Y, 10 A HO

zOIn OCT 22 AM 9: 5,
KERR Y HA,t}90CK. CLERK
ll£l'!JtY-_ _ _ _ CASE.NI;

ALAN JOHNSTON (Idello Bar No, 7709)
E. W. PIKE & ASSO( '.lATES, P.A.
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210

P.O. Box 2949
Idilio Falls, lD 83403·:'949
T,~lephone: (208) 528-(>444
1 defax: (208) 528-644!
PETER STIRRA (Utah Bat· No. 3118)

R: BLAKE HAMILTO:'~ (Utah Bar No. 11395)
S fIRBA & ASSOCIA l'ES

215 Sou.th State Street, Suite 750
PO. Box 810
Salt Lake City, UT 841W·0810
T~lephone: (801) 364-!r,OO
Telefax: (801) 364-835;

AttorneY$lOt Defendant
} N THE SIXTH J1JDIClAL DISTRICT COURT
& fATE OF IDAHO, C01JNTY OF BEAR LAKE

--- -- -

._-------,------

KYLE ATHt\.y,

CCllie No CV-2002-0000072

Pla:illt(fl~

AFFWAVIT OF R. BLAKE HAMILTON
v.

RICH COI.JNfY.

ufrill.

Defe! lCl ant.
---

--- ._----------'--- - . - ----_._---

STATE OF (T \.H

)
:SS.

COUNTY OF ;:;ALTLAKE )
R BL.t-\,tCE HAMIL TON, being first duly sworn. depo~cs and states as follows:
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r am an attorney employed by Stirba & Associates, and together with Peter Stirba

I am counsel of record for Defendant Rich County. Utah.
2.

On July 13; 2010, a jury trial commenced in this matter. The jury returned its

verdict on July 26. 2010.
3.

On September 16,2010, I participated by telephone in a status conference in this

4.

During the status conference, the Court informed the parties that the Court

matter.

received information that a member of the Court staff. Deputy Clerk Brandy Peck and the
Plaintiff, Kyle Athay had inappropriate ex-parte communication both during and following the
jury triaL Brandy Peck served as the Court's clerk during the July 2010 jury trial.
S.

The Court indicated that during the trial, the Court bec,arne aware that Ms. Peck

and the Plaintiff were having ex-parte communications. Judge Brov.~ admonished Ms. Peck for
her behavior and, observing no further inappropriate communications, believed the issue was
sufficiently resolved and thus did not bring the issue to the parties' attention during the trial.
6.

The Court further indicated that after the trial, the Court became aware that Ms.

Peck and the Plaintiff continued to communicate via text message. The Court again advised Ms.
Peck that these ex~parte communications were inappropriate and that further contact should be
terminated. Ms. Peck indicated that she did not impart any confidential informati(m about the
case, trial, or jury to the Plaintiff. The Court reported Ms. Peck's behavior to the Judicial
Administrative Office.
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The Court did not disclose how it learned t.hat Ms. Peck was engaging in ex parte

communications with the Plaintiff during the trial or how the Court was notirled that Ms. Peck
continued these communications after the trial despite being admonished to discontinue
inappropriate communication with the Plaintiff.
8.

Other than stating that Ms. Peck was told that ex parte cotnmunications wit.\ the

Plaintiff were inappropriate) the Court did not disclose "the substance of its reprimands to Ms.
Peck, but stated that it believed these warnings sufficiently resolved this issue.
9.

The Court indicared that upon disc.overy that Ms. Peck and t.he Plaintiff continued

to communicate post-trial, an "investigation," was conducted but did not disclose 'i~rho carried
out the investigation, what steps were taken to investigate. or any other substantive information
concerning the investigation.
10,

On October 13,2010, the Plaintiff filed his Affidavit in opposition to Defendant's

Motion for New Trial wherein the Plaintiff eonfiInlS that he and Ms. Peck l had extensive
communication during the trial and indicates that:
'a) The Plaintiff exchanged phone numbers with Ms. Peck dur:...rtg the trial for personal

purposes.
b) During the trial. the Plaintiff and Ms. Peck would talk ou the phone while the Plaintiff

drove home from Pocatello to Soda Springs, Idaho and when the Plaintiff was at his home.

1 Plaintiffs Affidavit refers to the Court's derk as "Brandy Perkins." but nonetheless appears to
concern Brandy Peck and the incorrect last !It.'Ut1e in the Affidavit appears to be a typographical

error.
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c) On at least one occasion, Ms. Peck asked the Plaintiff "how he thought the case would

go."
d) The Plaintiff did nof discuss his contacts Vlith Ms. Peck with his attorney because the
Plaintiff considered the contacts social in nature and casual.
11.

Based on the information provided during September 16, 2010 hearing in

con.junction with the Plaintiff's Affidavit, Ms. Peck a.l1d the Plaintiff developed an inappropriate
social relationship and conversed throughout and following the trial. Ms. Peck and the Plaintiff
discussed the case, on Ms. Peck's initiation> on at least one occasion, and Ms, Pe.c,k continued the

terminated.
12.

Ms. Peck's behavior creates the appearance of impropriety in the Court's conduct

during the trial because, in part. Ms. Peck had extensive ex parte communication with the
Plaintiff during the trial and continued these contacts post-trial during which several motions
were filed and a judgment had yet to be entered. There is no record of when or how the Court
learned of its clerk's inappropriate behavior or the substance of any admonishment the Court
gave to Ms. Peck.

12.

Rich COUIlty is without suffic·ient information to determine the full extent and

n.atUl'e of Ms. Peck's contacts with the Plaintiff and thus cannot determine with certainty whether
the contacts caused a material error such as unfair prejudice or improper influenCe in the trial.
13.

As deputy clerk during the trial, Ms. Peck was a member of the Court and thus the

Court itself has an interest in the disposition of Rich County's Motion for New Trial based upon
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Ms. Peck's conduct. Judge Brown may be required to testify at a hearing on this Motion because
he has personal knowledge of the facts surrounding the manner by whlch the ex-parte
communications came to light both d'i.'lring and after the trial and how the issue was addressed
with Ms. Peck.

DATED this

~

~fOctober. 2010.
R. BLAKE HAMIL TON

SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN TO before "'" this

~!ct0720 10.

NOTARY PUBLIC .........,
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I HEREBY :~BRTIrY tb;:, . . on this
day of October, 2010 I caused to be served a
true copy of the fur.:gc,mg i\.F1lDAVIT OF R. BLAKE HAMILTON by the method indicated
below, to the~(Jlo\.ving:

Craig R. JOf! oUtl1. Esg
Attorney at .a·'V
1246 Yellov,shllle Avenue, Suite A4

y;) U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail

P.O. Box 4I j,J.lPocatello, ·iO 832u5·4904

( ) Facsimile

Alan. Jz,nnsto

~U.S, Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail

T

;

PIKF HER".,;DON STOSICH & JOHNSTON
151 NOl'th Ridge A've., Suite 210
PO. BO)>.2949

( ) Facsimile

ldaho ::·alls. ID 83403-2949
Honorahle Mitchell W. Brown
Distrk: Judge - Resident Chambers
P,O. Box 775
Soda ';prings. Idaho 83276

~ U.s, Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail

( ) Facsimile
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DISTRICT COURT

SIXTH JUDICIAL DISHner
SEAR LAKE COUNTY. iDAHO

20lD OCT 2Z ftM2= 31,
KE:RRY H"D90CK. CLERK

ALAN JOHNSTON (Idaho Bar No. 7709)

OE,.UTY _ _ _ _- C
CASE"',;

E. W. PIKE & ASSOCL>\.TES! P.A.
151 NorthRidge Ave" Suite 210
P,O. Bex 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949

Telephone: (208) 528-6444
Telefax: (208) 528-6447
PETER STIRRA (Utah Bar No. 3118)
R ELAKE HAMILTON (Utah BarNo. 11395)
STIRBA & ASSOCI.>\.TES
215 South State Street, Suite 750
P.O. Box 810

Salt Lake City. Dr &4110-0810
Telephone: (801) 364-&300
Telefax: (801) 364-8355

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COrRT
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE
KYLE ATHA Y,

Case No. CV-2002-0000072

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S

v.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR
ALTERNA TIVELY FOR JUDGMENT

RICH COUNTY, UTAH,

NOTWITHSTA.;,~DING THE VERDICT

Defendant.

Defendant Rich County, Utah. by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to Idaho R.
Civ. Proc. 50 and 59, hereby files this Motion for New Trial. or Alternatively) for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict. A Memorandum in Support of this Motion will be filed in
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STIRBA & ASSOCIATES

By:
PETER STIRBA

R. BLAKE HAMIL TON
Attorneys for Defendant
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of October, 2010 I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
OR ALTERNATIVELY FOR JUDGMEN1' NOT\V1THSTANDING THE VERDICT by
the method indicated below, to the following:
Craig R Jorgensen, Esq.
Attorney at Law
1246 Yellowstone Avenue. Suite A4
P.O. Box 4904

Pocatello, In 8320Sw4904

Alan Johnston
PIKE HERNDON STOSrCH & JOHNSTON
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210

P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949
Honorahle Mitchell W. Brown
District Judge - Resident Chambers
P.O. Box 775
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276

~ U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

...g)J U.S,

Mai1~

Postage Prepaid

Il) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail

( ) Facsimile

bfJu.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
() Facsimile
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KERR,( HAfH)OOK. CLERK

ALAN JOHNSTON (Idaho Bar No, 7709)
PIKE HER..~DON STOSICH & JOHNSTON
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210
P. O. Box 2949

()EJ!'UTY'-_ _ _ _ CASENe.

Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949
Telephone: (208) 528-6444
Telefax: (208) 528-6447

PETER STIRBA (Utah Bar No. 3118)
R. BLAKE HAMIL TON (Utah Bar No. 11395)
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES

21'5 South State S rreet, Suite 750
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, TJT 8411 0-0810
Telephone: (SOi) 364··8300
Telefax: (801) 364-8355

Attmwe:ys for IJe/e.11;(Umt

IN THE S:t.Xr:1f JOI>ICIAL DISTRICT COURT

STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE

-- -

--------.,---------------

KYLE ATMY,
DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

v.
RICH COliL"LY, UTAH,

Case No. CV-2002-00000n

Dc;.tenJant.

Judge lVtitchell Brown

--- --.---

--------'----------~------

Defendant, Rich COl,mty. Utah. by and through undersigned counsel, hereby files this
Reply !viemorandum in Support of its Motion for a New Trial. The Affidavit ofR. Blake
HarrUllJn ill Support of this Reply is filed concurrently herewith.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUNn 1
1.

Fr' ,ill July 13., 2010 to July 26. 2010, a jury trial was held in this matt~r before

Judge :Mitchell \'1. Bro'Nl1 in the Six.th Judicial District Court for Bannock CC)Ufity located in
Pocatello, Idaho.

2.

Brandy Peck ("Peck") served as the Court's sole Deputy Clerk for the entire trial

and was present in the courtroom and had access to the jurors throughout the proceedings.
3.

On September 16, 2010, the Court held a telephonic status conference during

which the Court jr..fonned the parties that Peck and the Plaintiff engaged in inappropdate ex
parte communications v .. a phone and text message during and followi.ng the jury trial. The Court
further stated that Peck':. conduct was admonished during the trial and upon the Court's post-trial
discovery of Peck's and the Plaintiff s continued ex parte conununication but that based on
Peck's assurances, Peck: had not disclosed any confidential information concerning the case to
the Plaintiff and the isst,e was sufficiently resolved
4.

The COl...rt did not inform the parties of these ex parte communication.s at any time

prior to the September 16, 2010 status conference either on the record or otherwise. The Court

did nul provide the pw:ties wit.~ information about how and when it became aware of the ex parte
comnl unications during or after the trial) the nature and substance of t.~e ex parte

COi1l11l.unications bern een Peck and the Plaintiff or the manner and content of the Cou.rt's
admunishments of Peck's conduct that would allow Rich County to detennine whether Peck's

-------

--1 ~ 1.0 fal.>tual grounds upoL.vhkh Rich County's Motion for a Now Trial and the instant Memorandum is based are
1<lL.O LIlly aetforth in the ,Alfidavit ofR, Blake Hamilton in SupporlofRich County's Reply Memorandum in
Su; '[i, .. 1t of Motion for a Ne",' Trial.
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personal relationship caused her to influence or prejudice the jurors to render a verdict in the
Plaintiff s favor.
5.

On October 13. 2010, the Plaintiff filed his Reply Brief to Defendant's Motion for

a New Trial and Affidavit of Kyle Athay in support thereof. In the Plaintiff's Affidavit, he
provides additional information regarding the nature and extent
a

onus relationship with Peck:

The Plaintiff met Peck during the trial and exchanged phone numbers with her for

purposes of carrying on a personal and social relationship unrelated to the case.
b.

During the Plaintiffs two-hour commute to andlor from Poca.tello for trial, he a..1.d

Peck would regularly converse on the phone or exchange te);:t messages. The Plaintiff also spoke
to Peck on the phone while he was at his home. The Plaintiff did not save andlor does not have
access to the text messages to or from Peck.
c.

The Plaintiff did not inform his attorney of his relationship and communications

with Peck because he considers the relationship casual and social.
6.

Despite Peck's assurances to the Court and the Plaintiff's statements in his

Affidavit that he and Peck did not discuss the case during their ex parte contacts, Plaimiff asserts
that during one of their conversations, Peck asked t.~e Plaintiffhis thoughts about how the trial
would result.
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The ~ Test Applies to Determine "'nether A New Trial Shonld Be Granted
Under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1).

In Idaho, one of the grounds for which a trial court may grant a new trial is where there
was an. "irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party," resulting in an unfair
trial. LR.C.P. 59(a)(I). VVhere amotion for a new trial is premised upon irregularities such as a

party's or the court's misconduct, the issue is whether the misconduct denied the losing party a
fair trial, See Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 919 P.2d 107, 11211daho 1999). The Idaho Supreme

Court employs Rueth's four.prong analysis to determine if irregularities in the t..'ia! proceedings
prejudiced the jury's deliborative process and substantially affected a party's right to a fair trial
so as to warrant a new trial under LR.C.P.

59(a)(1)~

61; See Slaathaug, 979 P.2d at 112; Hinman

v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 771 P.2d 533,536 (Idaho 1989).
The Slaathaug Court ex-plained that "where a motion for new trial ... is based upon
misconduct, the moving l)arty has only the burden to establish that the misconduct occurred, to
and does not have the added burden of showing 'that the violation resulted in prejudice. 979 P.2d
at 112·113. The misconduc. at issue was the defendant-prevailing party's intentional violation of
the LR.E. 615 witness exclusion order of which the plaintiffs only became aware after the trial
1d. at 111. The Court held that once the plaintiffs established the violation, the burden shifted to

the defendant to "establish the conduct could not have a/focted the outcome of the trial," noting
that it made particular sense to require the defendant to establish lack of prejudice because the

.,

- ill its Motion for a New Trial, Rich County iUlIdverten.tly relied upon the dissenting o}Jinion in Soria v. Sierril
Pacific Airlines, 726 P.2d 706 (Idaho 1986). £oria's correct holding is premised upon the Court's analysis of th(l
alternate basis for granting a new trial under IKe.p. 59(aXl) and not upon an "irregularity in the proceedings," as
in the instant case. Rich County withdraws its mistaken reliance on Soris.
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defendant's conduct was in controversy. Id. at 112·113 (emphasis added).
Here, it is not disputed that the Plaintiff and Peck engaged in ex parte communication
and/or contact both during and after the trial. Su Affidavit nfKyle Athay. The Court considered

the communication "inappropriate,'J and was not for "scheduling, administrative or emergency
purposes," as authorized by the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct. See J;y!:inute Entry & Order,
September 16,2010; I.C.J.C. Canon 3(B)(7)(a). Had the COU1t considered the communication
proper and authorized, it is unlikely that the Court would have admonished Peck and instructed
her to terminate the contacts immediately as it did. See Minute Entrv & Order.
Rich County has met its burden under the ~ test. It is a ma.'ter of record that there
was unauthorized and inappropriate ex parte communication between the Plaintiff and Peck a.Tld
it is thus the Plaintiff s burden to show what the commurucati()n was and that the communioation

could not have had any effect on the jury's deliberations, Slaathaug, 979 P.2d at 112 (Citing
Rueth v. State, 596 P.2d 75,81 (Idaho 1979)); see also Hinman., 771 P.2d at 536. Otherwise, the
verdict cannot stand and this Court should grant a new trial.
A.

The Communications' Effect on the Jury Cannot Be Determined Bec&nse the
Plaintiff Cannot Demonsb'a.te the Substance or Charac.ter of the
Communications.

Once the moving party has demonstrated that the relevant misconduct occurred, the
burden shift<.> to t.h.e non-movant to "show what the oommunication was." Slaathaug, 979 P.2d at
112 (citing Rueth, 596 P.2d at 81). If the winning party "cannot show what [the communication]

was, the verdict must be set aside,}> Id.; see also Hinman. 771 P.2d at 536.
In Slaathaug, the Idaho Supreme CotUi held that since the plaintiffs established that
defendant had provided trial transcripts to witnesses in violation of Rule 615~ the burden sh.ifted

&uSSOCIATES
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to the defendant to show both the transcripts' content and that the violation could not have had
any effect on the verdict 979 P .2dJl.t 113. "In Idaho, it is definitely not the case that the losing
party has the double burden of sho,",ring both that a , .. violation has occurred and that' actual
prejudice' has resulted." Id. at 112 (Citing Rueth, 596 P.2d at 80). If the prevailing party cannot
meet its butden, prejudice is presumed.ld. at 113.
Here. the Plaintiff admits that the ex parte communications occurred but has not
disclosed, and asserts he is unable to disclose, precisely what the oonununications were. See
Affidavit of Kyle Athav. Nor was the conun'unication's substance revealed on the record dwing

the September 16,2010 status conference. See :Minute EntJ:y & Order. With,out full disclosure of
the improper conununication's content, particularly during the trial, Rich County cannot
conclude th.~t the jury's deliberations and verdict were not affected by Peck~s relationship with
the Plaintin Tile Plaintiff has not met his burden under the Rueth analysis and thus "prejudice is
presumed," 3.L,d a new Irial must be granted. Slaathaug, 979 P.2d at 113.

B.

The Communications Could Have Had it Considerable Pl'ejudicial Effect on
the Jw-y and it New Trial Should Be Granted.

Un. ,er che Rueth test~ even if the winning party can show what the communication was, a
new trial

LS ,1G aetheless

any effe.>t

",1<

appropriate unless it is clear that the cOnIDmnication could not have, had

the jury. ~ 596 P.2d at 81. If there is any indication that the communication

was "ot }../.cb a character that it may have affected the jury, the verdict must be set aside." rd.
tn Hillman. the misconduct at issue was the bailiff's response to two of the jury's

questi, ,nS

',lltri rlg

autho jz .tti(
only C:ll~le

I'

J.

its deliberatiolls without notifying the court of the questions and without prior

l'rom the Court to answer such questions. 771 P .2d at 535. The bailiff s conduct

light after the trial. The trial court held that the bailiff's actions, taken in the context

6
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0f a case with complex issues, was "sufficiently prejudicial" and ordered a new trial. rd. at 536.
The Idaho Supreme Comt agre.ed, holding that "since there exists reasonable doubt as to whether
the actions of the bailiff could have had an affect on the jury,'~ a new trial was properly ordered.

3

rd. (emphasis added).
Here, the Plaintiff cannot show that his and Peck's condu.ct had absolutely no effect on
the jury; s deliberations so that Rich County was not prejudiced, especially given the nature of
this case. Personal injury cases such as this one can be highly emotional because they often
require jurors to "right," a 'Wrong suffered by an innocent party. Ajury's deliberations and
eventual verdict is thus highly susceptible to those influences that may enhance the sympathy felt
toward the injured party. It is conceivable; if not probable~ that the jury or other Court staff Vli.th
access to the jury, was swayed or biased by Peck's growing relationship and personal affections

1'01 the Plaintiff. thus raising considerable reasonable doubt that the jury was entirely unaffected
by the misconduct at issue.
iI.

The Misconduct at Issue is Not "Harmless Error" and a New Trial is Appropriate.
Where an act or omission by the Court or a party "affect(s] the substantial rights of the

pu· des," such that a
'\A 1

refusal to grant a new trial or set aside a verdict "appears ... inconsistent

th substantial ju.stice," the act or omission is not "harmless error" and a new trial should be

gr Jlted. I.R.C.P. 61. As explained above, where it is concluded under Rueth's fOUI-prong
analysis that 'the alleged misconduct denied a party a fair trial, the court can and should grant the
pa j)/' s motion for a new trial. In other words, each party has a fundamental; "substantial right"
3 1.1 Hinman, the Idaho Supreme Court also affirmed the trial court's granting anew trial on the grounds that the
Ve· diet was against the weight of the evide,nce and thus "discussion may not be necessary of the alli;ged improper
co.,duct of the bailiff during jury deliberations." 111 P.2d at 535. However, since the trial court held that the bailiffs
CC;lduct pruvided an alternate basis fol' granting the motion for a new tria~ the Court analyzed this issue "for future
gUdanoe of [Idaho] trial courts." rd,
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the jury's misoonduct. If this right

W;lS

a~'fe,-,trd

SJ lO'

Jd be ordered in accordance with "substantial justice." See Slaathaug, 979 P .2d at 112-113;

.)Lt'

,.1,:80

as determined by the Rueth analysis; the verdict should not stand and a new trial

Hinman. 771 P.2d at 534·536.

Ire Slaathaug, the Idaho Supreme Court highlighted the trial court's observation that
w.,.o;;re misc.onduct comes to light after the jury returns its verdict~ it is "difficult, if not
i 1.:npossib1e," to ascertain the prejudice to the moving party caused by the. misconduct and thus a

J.lew trial lS an appropriate remedy that also "serves as a deterrent to discourage future
violations., .. ' 979 P .2d at 111. Similarly. Rich County does not know the extent to which the
jury t not 1u n:ccnllon the Com or its staff, was aware ofPE.",ck's relationship with the Plaintiff and

has no way

Ot

kDvwing what effect the improper contacts at issue may hav: had. Despite the

Court's belief that Peck's Contacts with the Plaintiff were limited and sufficiently resolved, the
J 'laintiff S S"N;) en statements suggest otherwise. In light of the significant risk that Rich Counti s
1 i~ht

to a l.!h' trial was compromised, the Court should grant a new trial,
A

.x

1,;;;W

tda! io, also appropriate to discourage future violations of the ethical rules against

patte ('.( rnn ctmication

and to encourage greater disclosure when the Court discovers rule

vi iaticQs, If r'lO Cou.rt had informed the parties of its discovery; it is far more lik{;lly that the
in: )prcpriatt 0onta0t would have ceased and the instant Motion could have been avoided,
Dyring the, lal, the Court decided not to inform the parties that it had become aWfU'e of Peck's

ir.apprupriae conduct. In his Affidavit, the Plaintiff notes that he did not tell his attorney ab()ut

hs comrm:, tic .ttion with Peck based on his opinion t.~at the relationship did not amount to
miscondu.c['
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Tile Ida..~o Rule~ of Professional Conduct state that as part of maintaining a court's
impartia:rty, a lawyer shall not engage in any illegal or unauthorized ex parte com..murucations.
LR.P.C,3 5(b). f{ad thd Plaintiff's attorney learned of his client's ex parte contacts with Peck, he
could ha',.! adhsed the Plaintiff that this behavior was, contrary to the Plaintiff's own opinion.

inappropri;.Jte w~d should ue ceased. That way, even if Peck chose to ignore the Court's
admomshnlenl ;, the PIa ,ntiff would have 1::nown that he should discontinue the relationship.
Also, th.~ }Jar: ,es could h.i.'lve considered alternative methods for resolving the issu.es raised by

Pr;(;k' fo .,;oLtaC't prior to me case being su.bmitted to the jury, such as replacing Peck with Judge
Br .JWl l ' S I ~gul<:.lt derl

Of

atlothel' available clerk. Full disclosure of iSSUeS that 1na),

meet a

part· s ,LbsL!ntial right,; $b.ould be encouraged to more effectively resolve issues that could

nev S .lllite a Dew trial.

CONG'LUSION
For t:le fOregoiI ). reasonS, Rich County's respectfully requests that its Motion for a New
Tid t

be graded.
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day of November, 2010.
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES

By:

PETER STIRBA
R. BLAKE HAMILTON
Attorneys for Defendant
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I hEREBY CERTIFY that on this
:'--~day of November, 2010 I caused to be served
a true co; ''Y of the foregoin.g DEFENDANT RICH COUNTY'S REPLY MEMOR..A.NDUM
LN SUPt!ORT OF MOTION FOR A I\1]:W TRIAL by the method indicated below, to the

rz.-.

foUo,ving:
Craig R. Jo[ ~ensen> Esq.
Attorney at Law
1246 Ye1t)wstone Aventle, SuiteA4

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail

P.O. Box -+904
Pocatello, ID 83205-4904

( ) Facsimile
( ) EleciI'onic Filing

Alan JOlll1S[OIl

('/1U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered

PIKE HERNDON sTOSIeH & JOHNSTON

Ave., Suite 210

P,O. B{!.{ 2949
Idaho b'a11s, ID 83403-2949

( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Electronic Filing

HonOlable Mitfl1ell W. Brown
District Judge Resident Chambers

(I ) Hand Delivered

151 NothRidge

P,O. Box 775
Soda Spring: Idaho 83276

( ~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Electronic Filing
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.SJXTH JUDICIAl DISHIer

BEAR LAKE COUNTY. IDAHO

ZUrU'NOY -2J1lM ~: 22
KERRY
ALAN JOHNSTON (Idaho Bar No. 7709)
PIKE HERNDON STOSIeH & JOHNSTON
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210
P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949
Telephone: (208) 528-6444
Telefax: (208) 528-6447

tU,e.I~e;K,OlE.K

iJEPUT,Y _ _ _ _ cAsrNe:

PETER STIRBA (Utah Bar No. 3118)
R. BLAKE HAMIL TON (Utah Bar No. 11395)
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES
215 South State Street; Suite 750
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, DT 84110-0810

Telephone: (801) 364-&300
Telefax: (801) 364-8355

Attorneys for Defentkmt
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF IDAHO; COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE

KYLEATHAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

_4.FFIDAVIT OF R. BLAKE HAMILTON
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT RICH
COUNTY'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A NEW

RlCH COUNTY) urAH,
Defendant.

TRIAL

Case No. CV-2002-0000072
Judge Mitchell Brown
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COu"NTY OF SALT LAKE)
R. BLAKE HAMIL TON, being first dilly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am an attorney employed by Stirba & Associates, and together with Peter Stirba

I a.rn counsel of record for Defendant Rich County, Ut.ah.
2.

On July 13, 2010, a jury trial commenced in this lnatter. The jury :returned. its

verdict on July 26, 2010.
status conference in this

3,

On September 16,2010; I participated by telephone in

4.

During the !>iatus conference, the Comt informed the parties that the Court

Ii

matter.

received information that a member of the Court staff, Deputy Clerk Brandy Peck and the

Plaintiff, Kyle Athay had inappropriate ex-parte communication both during and fonowing the
jury triaL Brandy Peck served as the Court's clerk during the July 2010 ju..ry trial.

5.

The Court indicated that during the trial, the Court became aware that Ms. Peck

and the Plaintiff were having ex-parte communications. Judge Brown did Ilot disclose its

discovery on the record at trial. The Court further indicated that after Judge Brown admonished
h1s. Peck for her conduct and observing no further improper behavior. Judge Brown believed the
matter was sufficiently resolved and did not warrant disc.losure on the record.
6.

The Court further indicated that after the trial, the Court became aware that Ms.

Peck and the Plaintiff continued to communicate via text message. The Court again advised 1v15.
Peck that these eXMparte communications were inappropriate and that further contaot should be
tenninated. Ms, Peck indioated that she did not impart any confidential information about the,

2
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case. trial, or jury to the Plaintiff. The Court reported Ms. Pe;:;k's behavior to the Judicial
Administrative Office.
7,

The Cou..'1 did not disclose how it learned that Ms. Peck was engaging in ex parte

communications vvith the PLaintiff during the trial or when or how the. Court was notified that
Ms. Peck continued these communications after the trial despite being admonished to
discontinue inappropriate communication vvith the Plaintiff

8.

Other than stating that IvIs. Peck was told that ex parte communicatioos with the

Plaintiff were inappropriate~ the Court did not disclose the substance of its repri.mands to Ms.

Peck. but stated that it believed lhese wamings sufficiently resolved this issue. There is no record
of when or how the Court learned of its clerk's inappropriate behavior or the substance of any
admonishment the Court gave to Ms. Peck.
9.

The Court indicated that upon discovery that Ms. Peck and the Plaintiff continued

to communicate post-tria~ an '<investigation;" was conducted but did not disclose who carried
out the investigation, what steps were taken to investigate. or any other substantive information
concerning the investigation.

10.

On October 13,2010. the Plaintiff filed his Affidavit in opposition to Defendant's

Motion for New Trial wherein the Plaintiff confinns that he and :Ms. Peck l had extensive
communication during the trial and indicates that:
a) The Plaintiff met and soon after exchanged phone numbers with Ms. Peck during the
trial for personal purposes.

1 Plaintiffs Affidavit refers to the Court's clerk as "Brandy Perkins." but nonetheless appears to
concern Brandy Peck and the incorrect last name in the Affidavit appears to be a typographical

errOr.
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b) During the trial, the Plaintiff and Ms, Peck would talk on the phone while the Plaintiff
drove bome from Pocatello to Soda Springs. Idaho and when the Plaintiff was at his home.
c) On at least one occasion, Ms. Peck initiated a discussion of the case before it was
submitted to the jury~ asking the Plaintiff "how he thought the case would go."
d) The Plaintiff did not discuss his contacts with Ms. Peck with his attorney because the
Plaintiff considered the contacts social in nature and casual.
11.

Based on the infort:nati.on provided during September 16,2010 hearing in

conjunction with the Plaintiff's Affidavit, Ms. Peck and the Plaintiff developed an inappropriate
social relationship and conversed throughout and following the trial. Ms. Peck and the Plaintiff
discussed the case, on Ms. Peck's illitiation, on at least one occasion and WiS. Peck continued the
improper contact after being warned that such behavior was inappropriate and should be
terminated.
12.

Ms. Peck had extensive eX parte communication with the Plaintiff during the trial

and continued these contacts post-trial during which several motions were filed and a judgment
had yet to be entered.
13.

Rich County is without sufficient infonnation to determine the full ek"tent rod

nature of Ms. Peck's contacts with the Plaintiff and thus catr..not determUle with cel'tainty whe--.her
the contacts caused a material error such as unfair prejudice or improper influence in the trial.
14.

_A..s deputy clerk during the trial~ Ms. Peck had repeated contact with the jury

outside the presenc,e of the Parties. Rich County is without sufficient information to conclude
that:Ms. Peck's personal relationship with the Plaintiff did not cause her to influence or persuade
the jury to render a verdict in the Plaintiff s favor and thus deprive Rich County of a fair trial.

4
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DATEDthiS~ of November, 2010.
R. BLAKE HAMIL TON
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

V~y of November, 2010,

NOTARY PUBLIC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

nJ-

I PillREBY CERTIFY that on this -z;
day ofNoveOlber, 2010 I caused to be served
a true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF R. BLAKE HAMILTON IN SUPPORT OF
DEFE1"illANT meR COUNTY'S REPL Y MEMORA.~'DUM IN SIJPPORT OF MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL by the method indicated below, to the following:

1P U.S. Mail. Postage Pre.paid

Craig R Jorgensen, Esq.
Attorney at Law

( ) Hand Delivered

1246 Yellowstone Avenue, Suite A4
P.O. Box 4904
Pocatello, ID 83205-4904

( ) Electronic Filing

.Alan Johnston

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

PIKE HERJ-.i'DON STOSICH & JOHNSTON
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210

(
(
(
(

( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949

) Hand Delivered
) Overnight Mail
) Facsimile
) Electronic Filing

~rrU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Electronic Filing

Honorable :tvfitchell W. Brown
Dis1Iict Judge - Resident Chambers
P,O. Box 775

Soda Springs, Idaho 83276
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